[maxglute]

Look up all the latest CSR reports / think tank analysts who track PRC missile developments. Or former Pac fleet deputy chief of intel Fanell who confirmed tandem PRC hypersonics struck moving ships at sea a few years ago - two high end missiles from different sites 1000km inland synced to hit moving hull in time+space. This fairly straight forward technology for country that has space program, especially mars/dark side of moon where communication is just one big killchain problem. Because carriers are so slow, highend missiles so fast, maneuverability/adjustments relatively easy problem, carriers can never get so far away from where fast missiles will not be, and fast missiles only need to make minute course corrections to compensate.

PRC commercial sats can track individual fighters. PLA has enough ISR (look at all the Yaogan launches within just last few years) now for persistent IndoPac coverage, they don't need to pinpoint/loiter/luck etc, they essentially know where a carrier is within meter level accuracy at all times, including SAR to look through clouds. They're not spitting out spacex # of paylods but they've put up 100s of imaging satellites in last few years, with more coming, and likely have enough just commercial imaging now to track US carriers globally without losing sight of it.

This is not meant to condescend, but essentially your talking points are based on popular misunderstanding from online opinons that poorly regurgigated a series of online articles explaining why carriers are "not doomed" from Naval Gazing ~5 years ago, but even in those essays the author specifically carved out PRC nascent carrier kill chain at the time as the exception. It's 10 years later, PRC now has 100s times better ISR coverage missile capabilities, the talking points are even more out of date. The caveate of the articles was always, carriers are not doomed, except for maybe against 2015 PRC whose has XYZ (ISR, # of launchers / salvo sizes, level of informatization) that puts the fight pretty even. It's almost 10 years later, PRC has increased XYZs by magnitude, it's not level playing field anymore. i.e. PRC deliverable single salvo size went from, 2015 maybe a US CSG can successfully defend if dump missile defense into VLS and airwing to 2024 PRC who can launch enough to satutate any CSG loadout at ranges where they can't effectively operate.

E: this is not mentioning PLA system destruction warfare that will also degrade fixed targets like replenishment fleets who has to reload in port, the tldr is they can simply disable the entire carrier group (really all of USN) by limitting them to single deployment assets by denying airwing/escorts fuel. There are many ways to break USN carrier conops that are not designed against peer adversaries who can reach deep into USN logistics chain.

[skhunted]

Or former Pac fleet deputy chief of intel Fanell who confirmed tandem PRC hypersonics struck moving ships at sea a few years ago - two high end missiles from different sites 1000km inland synced to hit moving hull in time+space.

Thank you for this, new to me, information. Did they hit ships on a fixed course or hit ships doing evasive maneuvers?

are based on popular misunderstanding from online opinons that poorly regurgigated a series of online articles explaining why carriers are "not doomed" from Naval Gazing ~5 years ago

I've never heard of Naval Gazing. You don't know the sources of my information as I've not mentioned what they are.

[maxglute]

We just know it's a moving target, likely towed, which is about as mobile as sinkex goes, including those by USN. Other things to note is PRC does tons of missile tests - 100s - more than rest of world combined. Good reason Fanel, deputy chief of intel for IndoPac asserts PRC can hit moving ships at sea. Because PLA does the same tests US does to validate AShMs, but they also do a shit ton of them.

Not trying to be presumptious about your sources, but basis of narrative that carriers are fast and hard to find traces back to those series of articles if you formed your opinion from readings within past 5 years - that's where it likely came from. It gots regurgitated and telephone gamed in various defense blogs and corrupted even more in online commentary. If knowledge is older than that, then it's obsolete.

[skhunted]

Take the satellites out. Are the carriers still vulnerable? Isn’t this all part of combined arms? Neutralize the enemies advantages.

[maxglute]

That's playing with kessler syndrome game theory, since PRC has anti sat capabilities too. Except US has lead in space assets, especially for defense, and would lose disproportionately more capabilities in full scale ASAT war - global capabilities they need for other commitments. Degrading space degrades carrier group capabilities.

Other thing to consider is US ASAT capability is limited - only like ~20 ASM135 which can reach high (~500km) LEO were produced (but we don't really know how many exists). SM3s which US has ~500, not all of which are ASAT capable and validated at ~250km. A lot of Yaogan constellation are at ~500km. Those SM3s may reach that, but they also double as ballistic interceptors for high end AShMs. TBF we don't know much about PRC ASAT inventory, we just know they have capbility with industrial base to build a lot of ordnances.

PRC also can launch satellites rapidly via road mobile TELs, and have long range, disposable, supersonic drones like WZ8 as backup/redundant kill chain. Of course US likely has ability to quickly put up space assets as well. There's also all sorts consideration like US launching an coordinated ASAT strike is basically shooting 100s of missiles without warning - if it doesn't accidentally trigger MAD it's going to trigger use-it or lose-it counter strike. Doing it gradually/piecemeal = PRC will have time to respond.

Really it comes down to attrition/numbers game, but when space assets in the multi 100s, there's a lot of build in redundancy against decapitation strikes, which inherently makes such strikes more difficult to pull off, i.e. is US going to disperse elements in theatre because just about anything in 1IC can still likely be hit with PRC missiles without GPS using INS/dsmac/tercom navigation. PRC going to know somethings up if Yokosuka gets emptied and adjust retaliation posture accordingly.

Things gets complicated vs adversaries with modern ISR in the ~100s. Caveate being that club is pretty much US+PRC. RU also has 100s but a lot of it legacy. Essentially everyone else US would consider adversary like IR or NK has single digits, and would get steam rolled. 2010s PRC borderline in this category, their ISR fleets was low/mid double digits then. Hence carriers are hard to find/kill holds true for that calibre of forces. But "neutralize enemies advantages" is apropos, and against most US adversaries, US primacy is based on US having ability in neutralizing those advantages. Difference vs PRC is PLA spent last 20 years of modernization specifically to neutralize US advantages - that's what their systems confrontation/destruction warfare doctorine is designed around - build enough redundancy to mitigate and defeat US advantages.

[skhunted]

What you are describing is just another aspect of modern warfare. It’s an arms race and an attempt to gain superiority in various areas/capabilities. What you are demonstrating is not the obsolescence of aircraft carriers but just another dimension to fleet defense. Infantryman are not obsolete despite long range artillery, missiles, planes, helicopters, and tanks.

If navies are obsolete then Taiwan’s best course of action is reconciliation with China with the best terms they can find. Likewise for all other countries near China.

[maxglute]

I'm contextualizing that carriers are much more obsolete vs some force structures / hardware stack than others. They are signicantly less less defensible given XYZ adversary capabilities, like having proper ISR, and advanced AShMs. I didn't say navies were obsolete, but their roles may be greatly constrained in IndoPac scenario, hence US wants to preposition land missiles, harden air shelters in region, get TW to porcupine and build asymetric forces. But my feeling is carrier effectiveness specifically, are going to have bad time matching up against near/peer opponents. I've written elsewhere, but USN 11+10 carrier force is literally mandated minimum by law. We know USN + rest of DoD is pivotting hard to reorient force towards confronting PRC, and we know USN specifically are betting on distributed lethality and not building any more carrie than mandated in navy force design 2045. Also despite 10+ years of lamenting the sad state of US shipbuilding over last 10 years, little is being done. Maybe that's reflection US industrial scoliosis, or maybe it's indicator of how planners view navies, more specifically large manned surface combtants.

[skhunted]

Thanks for the perspective. It’s been an interesting conversation.

[borisk]

So if China tries to take Taiwan by military force, how do you think it will end?

[maxglute]

Too open ended to speculate. Near/medium/long term. What's state of PLA modernization. How close is PRC to nuclear parity with US. What's the state of PRC renewables / electrification / autarky. But I think import recognition is PRC ultimate geopolitical goal is to kick US military out of east asia, and if they have to do it via hot war using TW/reunifcation/civil war as springboard, they may not avert it if they have means to not do so, and hence it will likely end in a much broader/bloodier war than just TW unless US chooses to pack up and leave (doubt).

The less bloody route = PRC feels like it's ascending power, and they may think eventually correlation of forces in region will make it obvious US security architecture can't deal with PLA. Ask yourself how much hardware PRC can hypothetically put in Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Carribeans to really deter US. The answer is probably no amount, because US size + disproprotional military potential is in aggregate much larger. PRC 300x ship building advantage is result of casual PRC 2% GDP military build up, they haven't even began the industrial scale arms race i.e. PRC mass gigafactory scale defense procurement. I think in next medium/long term years it will be increasingly clear US posture in region is not going to be survivable or enough to deter PRC. Combine with PRC building out global strike that can conventionally hit CONUS strategic targets may force US to substantially reduce (not abandon) their security posture in East Asia to level that PRC finds tolerable.

I think PRC ability to take TW is almost forgone - can always blockade or raze TW like gaza with purely mainland platforms and grind for capitulation. But after US made PRC containment goal explicit, there's really no seperating a TW scenario with broader PRC/US+co scenario anymore. TLDR is it could end very badly, but I think unspoken is it could end as badly for US as it does for PRC. I think it will end _very_ badly for US partners in region.