Too open ended to speculate. Near/medium/long term. What's state of PLA modernization. How close is PRC to nuclear parity with US. What's the state of PRC renewables / electrification / autarky. But I think import recognition is PRC ultimate geopolitical goal is to kick US military out of east asia, and if they have to do it via hot war using TW/reunifcation/civil war as springboard, they may not avert it if they have means to not do so, and hence it will likely end in a much broader/bloodier war than just TW unless US chooses to pack up and leave (doubt).
The less bloody route = PRC feels like it's ascending power, and they may think eventually correlation of forces in region will make it obvious US security architecture can't deal with PLA. Ask yourself how much hardware PRC can hypothetically put in Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Carribeans to really deter US. The answer is probably no amount, because US size + disproprotional military potential is in aggregate much larger. PRC 300x ship building advantage is result of casual PRC 2% GDP military build up, they haven't even began the industrial scale arms race i.e. PRC mass gigafactory scale defense procurement. I think in next medium/long term years it will be increasingly clear US posture in region is not going to be survivable or enough to deter PRC. Combine with PRC building out global strike that can conventionally hit CONUS strategic targets may force US to substantially reduce (not abandon) their security posture in East Asia to level that PRC finds tolerable.
I think PRC ability to take TW is almost forgone - can always blockade or raze TW like gaza with purely mainland platforms and grind for capitulation. But after US made PRC containment goal explicit, there's really no seperating a TW scenario with broader PRC/US+co scenario anymore. TLDR is it could end very badly, but I think unspoken is it could end as badly for US as it does for PRC. I think it will end _very_ badly for US partners in region.
The less bloody route = PRC feels like it's ascending power, and they may think eventually correlation of forces in region will make it obvious US security architecture can't deal with PLA. Ask yourself how much hardware PRC can hypothetically put in Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Carribeans to really deter US. The answer is probably no amount, because US size + disproprotional military potential is in aggregate much larger. PRC 300x ship building advantage is result of casual PRC 2% GDP military build up, they haven't even began the industrial scale arms race i.e. PRC mass gigafactory scale defense procurement. I think in next medium/long term years it will be increasingly clear US posture in region is not going to be survivable or enough to deter PRC. Combine with PRC building out global strike that can conventionally hit CONUS strategic targets may force US to substantially reduce (not abandon) their security posture in East Asia to level that PRC finds tolerable.
I think PRC ability to take TW is almost forgone - can always blockade or raze TW like gaza with purely mainland platforms and grind for capitulation. But after US made PRC containment goal explicit, there's really no seperating a TW scenario with broader PRC/US+co scenario anymore. TLDR is it could end very badly, but I think unspoken is it could end as badly for US as it does for PRC. I think it will end _very_ badly for US partners in region.