[bumby]

If you’re claiming the courts have more non-law domain expertise than agencies, you’ll need some evidence of that for this point to land.

If you look to Chevron for a concrete example, the issue was about the ambiguity of the scope of a “source” of emissions. That is not a law question because the law already deemed that sources can be regulated. It’s really a question of non-law domain expertise in terms of the definition of an emission source.

[Gormo]

> If you’re claiming the courts have more non-law domain expertise than agencies, you’ll need some evidence of that for this point to land.

No, I'm not claiming that. I'm not sure what that has to do with this discussion at all, though, because non-law domain experience has nothing to do with domain experience in interpreting laws.

> If you look to Chevron for a concrete example, the issue was about the ambiguity of the scope of a “source” of emissions. That is not a law question because the law already deemed that sources can be regulated.

Huh? If the law says "sources can be regulated", then the question of what the statute means by "source" is 100% a legal question of statutory interpretation!

> It’s really a question of non-law domain expertise in terms of the definition of an emission source.

No, it absolutely is not! Congress -- not the domain experts in the regulatory agency -- used specific language to establish and circumscribe the scope of the questions that agency's authority would extend to. It is 100% the role of the courts to analyse the statutory text written by Congress and determine whether the agency is or is not operating within the authority that Congress established.

[bumby]

>I'm not sure what that has to do with this discussion at all, though

I would argue that is the central claim. Something can be law and ambiguous. The role of the court previously was to ensure the first part: that the law is Constitutional. Outside of Maybury I don't think anyone is disputing that. The difference is that this now says the arbiter of ambiguity is now the court.

Not everything related to interpretation should be up to the court. The court's primary role is in determining constitutionality; that is a much more narrow scope than what you're presuming. In many (most) court rulings, they are very deliberate in keeping the scope as narrow as possible. This ruling is one of the exceptions, not the rule. But you don't have to take it from me. Justice Kagan states:

"Some interpretive issues arising in the regulatory context involve scientific or technical subject matter. Agencies have expertise in those areas; courts do not. Some demand a detailed understanding of complex and interdependent regulatory programs. Agencies know those programs inside-out; again, courts do not...In one fell swoop, the majority today gives itself exclusive power over every open issue—no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden—involving the meaning of regulatory law. As if it did not have enough on its plate, the majority turns itself into the country’s administrative czar."

>Congress -- not the domain experts in the regulatory agency -- used specific language to establish and circumscribe the scope of the questions that agency's authority would extend to.

I don't think this is correct. The court has acknowledged that Congress cannot make perfectly unambigious laws. The question is about who gets to clear up those ambiguities. Again, the role of the court is best suited to what they have expertise in: determining constitutionality. Defining what an "emission source" (or any other domain expertise question) is outside that scope.

I would argue that becoming an "administrative czar" oversteps the bounds of a judiciary responsible for determining constitutionality to one that blurs the lines with the executive branch. In Kagan's words, it becomes an act of "judicial hubris."

[Gormo]

> The role of the court previously was to ensure the first part: that the law is Constitutional.

No. The role of the court is, and always has been, to determine what the law is -- constitutional law, statute law, common law, all of it. Forget Maybury and think Marbury. Chevron was an unjustifiable deviation from what has been the unambiguous responsibility of the courts for the entirety of their history.

> Not everything related to interpretation should be up to the court. The court's primary role is in determining constitutionality;

No, as above, the courts role is determining the meaning of the law. The constitution happens to be the supreme source of law, but it is and always has been the courts' job to interpret law from all subordinate sources as well.

> I don't think this is correct. The court has acknowledged that Congress cannot make perfectly unambigious laws. The question is about who gets to clear up those ambiguities.

I'm not sure what you are saying you don't think is correct. No one claimed that Congress makes perfectly unambiguous laws -- that is impossible. Rather, Congress passes statutes using specific verbiage, and the responsibility for -- and expertise in -- interpreting that verbiage and clearing up ambiguities is and always has been the domain of the courts, and absolutely not the unaccountable province of people with no expertise in statutory interpretation who have an inherent interest in interpreting their own authority to be as expansive as possible.

[bumby]

I misinterpreted your saying Congress uses specific verbiage to mean that wording is sufficient to avoid ambiguity. You keep repeating the same thing but not really addressing the core point.

I fully acknowledge the difference in opinion here. One side thinks the court has the duty to clear up ambiguity. The other thinks that better resides in the agencies. It’s literally the difference between the ruling and dissenting opinions of the court decision.

My claim is that in a modern society, clearing up that ambiguity requires domain expertise. Just hand waving it away and saying “this is the way it’s always been” (even though that’s not true since that wasn’t the case for the last 40 years) doesn’t actually address that point. So in your opinion, do the complexities of modern society not matter? If not, you’re implying we can bring back a Justice from the 1790s and they can effectively rule on issues related to climate change, the internet, genetics, pharmaceuticals etc. After all, they don’t need any domain knowledge. I disagree; I’ve steelmanned your argument elsewhere in this thread and still find it lacking. The point isn’t “to do things like they were always done before” but the “create a more perfect Union.” I think allowing domain experts to clarify complex issues, within the confines set by the court, is a better system and you haven’t done anything to explain why it isn’t. It comes across as much more about ideology than effective governance.