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by Gormo
724 days ago
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> If you’re claiming the courts have more non-law domain expertise than agencies, you’ll need some evidence of that for this point to land. No, I'm not claiming that. I'm not sure what that has to do with this discussion at all, though, because non-law domain experience has nothing to do with domain experience in interpreting laws. > If you look to Chevron for a concrete example, the issue was about the ambiguity of the scope of a “source” of emissions. That is not a law question because the law already deemed that sources can be regulated. Huh? If the law says "sources can be regulated", then the question of what the statute means by "source" is 100% a legal question of statutory interpretation! > It’s really a question of non-law domain expertise in terms of the definition of an emission source. No, it absolutely is not! Congress -- not the domain experts in the regulatory agency -- used specific language to establish and circumscribe the scope of the questions that agency's authority would extend to. It is 100% the role of the courts to analyse the statutory text written by Congress and determine whether the agency is or is not operating within the authority that Congress established. |
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I would argue that is the central claim. Something can be law and ambiguous. The role of the court previously was to ensure the first part: that the law is Constitutional. Outside of Maybury I don't think anyone is disputing that. The difference is that this now says the arbiter of ambiguity is now the court.
Not everything related to interpretation should be up to the court. The court's primary role is in determining constitutionality; that is a much more narrow scope than what you're presuming. In many (most) court rulings, they are very deliberate in keeping the scope as narrow as possible. This ruling is one of the exceptions, not the rule. But you don't have to take it from me. Justice Kagan states:
"Some interpretive issues arising in the regulatory context involve scientific or technical subject matter. Agencies have expertise in those areas; courts do not. Some demand a detailed understanding of complex and interdependent regulatory programs. Agencies know those programs inside-out; again, courts do not...In one fell swoop, the majority today gives itself exclusive power over every open issue—no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden—involving the meaning of regulatory law. As if it did not have enough on its plate, the majority turns itself into the country’s administrative czar."
>Congress -- not the domain experts in the regulatory agency -- used specific language to establish and circumscribe the scope of the questions that agency's authority would extend to.
I don't think this is correct. The court has acknowledged that Congress cannot make perfectly unambigious laws. The question is about who gets to clear up those ambiguities. Again, the role of the court is best suited to what they have expertise in: determining constitutionality. Defining what an "emission source" (or any other domain expertise question) is outside that scope.
I would argue that becoming an "administrative czar" oversteps the bounds of a judiciary responsible for determining constitutionality to one that blurs the lines with the executive branch. In Kagan's words, it becomes an act of "judicial hubris."