| > 3. You are suggesting that under Chevron, no one would have any remedy for this unconstitutional behavior? Well, this example includes the agency acting in a way that Congress itself would not have the power to authorize in the first place, so this is a bad example. Statutory interpretation doesn't really matter here, because even if the statute did authorize the PTEA to implement this policy, it would still be unconstitutional, so Chevron wouldn't even come into it. Why make up outlandish examples, though, when we have the examples of the actual cases to look at? Loper involved a federal law requiring operators of certain fishing boats to allow for inspections to ensure compliance with fishing regulations. The agency tasked with enforcing that law decided for themselves that the statute conferred them the authority to bill the fishing boat operators for their inspectors' expenses when going out to make the inspections. Under Chevron, the court would not have be able to judge for itself whether or not the statute actually authorizes the agency to charge the fisherman for the travel expenses of inspectors, and would have to defer to the agency's own interpretation that it does. > 3b. You suggest Congress has no power to explicitly prohibit the "PTEA" from imposing individual fines related to speech on the environment? Of course they do, by passing a statute. Which is then up to the courts to interpret and hold the PTEA accountable to -- with the reversal of Chevron, interpreting that statute would thankfully no longer be up to the PTEA itself. |
(You don't have to, I won't blame you or be snide if you don't. Because it really seems like we disagree ideologically).
Loper seems like it could have been narrowly interpreted but threw the baby out with the bathwater. I don't want a judge deciding what levels of lead in the water system are "clean enough" or how deadly a substance must be before the FDA decides it isn't fit for human consumption. I really would rather the elected executive with subject matter experts interpret then enforce those laws within reason.
>Under Chevron, the court would not have be able to judge for itself whether or not the statute actually authorizes the agency to charge the fisherman for the travel expenses of inspectors, and would have to defer to the agency's own interpretation that it does.
So? Congress sees the regulations passed under their authority. Why shouldn't they be the ones to call an enforcement action out? Why couldn't the fishermen petition their Representative?