| > I'm reading some admittedly biased essays reassuring me this is bad. Do you suggest a longer form essay (besides the opinion) that defends this decision? Perhaps you should skip over all of the biased intermediaries, and just read the ruling itself. > Loper seems like it could have been narrowly interpreted but threw the baby out with the bathwater. What baby? What's desirable about executive-branch officials being given free reign to interpret the statute law that defines their own authority with no oversight? What does anyone -- other than those officials themselves -- gain out of allowing that? > I really would rather the elected executive with subject matter experts interpret then enforce those laws within reason. Subject matter experts at what? These are all normative questions -- yes, factual circumstances frame the real-world context they apply to, and yes, technical expertise may be a relevant and important input, but actually making the decisions means making value judgements, weighing cost against benefits, making risk/reward tradeoffs, reconciling the conflicting interests of involved parties, making sure everyone's rights are protected, etc. How does technical expertise in the factual context give anyone any special expertise in making the normative decisions? Subject-matter experts testify before Congress all the time. Research institutes publish white papers; think tanks draft model statutes and explain them to legislators; expert witnesses testify in every sort of court case imaginable. All of that is important and necessary, and is absolutely not going away. But the idea that having technical expertise in some empirical domain is sufficient qualification to assume absolute control over decision-making, and toss out our whole system of democratic legislation and common-law jurisprudence -- both of which have always relied on experts to provide input on applicable facts -- seems absolutely incomprehensible to me. And that's all even assuming that the people who staff these agencies actually are genuine experts with wholly good-faith intentions. Sure, there are definitely people like that involved. But there are also lots of bare-minimum jobsworths, power-tripping petty officials, corrupt self-aggrandizers, and people who bullshited their way into "expert" credentials, all operating within an institutional system rife with perverse incentives and structural limitations. In other words, they're just like every other organization composed of human beings in our society. So why would we wish to insulate them from the system of accountability and oversight that we expect to hold sway everywhere else? > So? Congress sees the regulations passed under their authority. Why shouldn't they be the ones to call an enforcement action out? Why couldn't the fishermen petition their Representative? This whole conversation is totally downstream of any involvement by Congress -- they have already done their job by passing whatever statutes are currently in effect. The question here is whose job it is to interpret the statutes that Congress has already passed. Congress is absolutely free to monitor the behavior of administrative agencies, and past new legislation to expand, contract, or clarify their authority. They indeed do so semi-regularly. But then those statutes will still need to be interpreted and applied to edge cases by people whose job it is to understand the statutes, i.e. the judiciary. You seem to be trying to factor the need for interpretation of the law entirely out of the question, and I can't even begin to comprehend that. |
Congress writes a law saying "FCC, go guarantee good access to Internet for people" and FCC says "OK, 100mb is the minimum and every ISP should offer that". You think an ISP should be able to sue, and a judge should be able to block, an FCC attempt to implement "good access to Internet" as they see fit? I don't trust the judiciary not to completely supplant or destroy the power that should belong to the executive agency. That level of review defeats the entire purpose of delegating regulatory power to the executive agency.
I get the rationale of "wait what if the exec agency does something really wild" but I think the bar that is required to strike regulations should be really, really high.
I really think I understand your position. I get your stance on normative interpretation. I think the Chevron system was the way to do things best. Maybe if we develop a framework for justices to force a legislature to reconsider the question, not to make the final decision themselves, it would be more reasonable. But judges aren't accountable to anyone.
So maybe an elected subset of the judiciary? Or a "push system" for the house to vote on all the issues that judges find. But not judges making the final call and waiting for the legislature to do something about it.