| I'm curious about the framing of research like this.. "The poor performance of transformers on arithmetic tasks" (relative to what?) and how that informs the adjacent conversation on progress towards AGI. Some say AGI has already been achieved, others that it's years or decades away. When I dig into the disagreement, it often partially depends on the perspective of how competent humans are on the tasks in question, with the optimists being, I think, more realistic about variance in human intelligence and the pessimists seeming to reserve the term "general intelligence" for possessing a nearly perfect suite of capabilities that many otherwise intelligent people practically don't have. For example with arithmetic, this study cites another [Dziri et al. 2023], that says: "For instance, humans can solve 3-digit by 3-digit multiplication arithmetic after learning basic calculation rules. Yet, off-the-shelf ChatGPT and GPT4 achieve only 55% and 59% accuracies on this task, respectively." But this isn't the case.. 5-6% of the population have https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dyscalculia, but can be otherwise normal. I still see value in normative statements about human capability in AI & AGI research, but I think we'll need to move towards explicit statistical framing. DeepMind's Position paper "Levels of AGI for Operationalizing Progress on the Path to AGI" has a schema like this, where AGI capabilities are defined across 2 axes of Performance level X Generality (narrow vs general), and the Performance levels are measured by comparison with "Percentile of skilled adults" able to perform the task.. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2311.02462#page=3.40 Within that framing, this paper's title or result might be "Achieving AGI Competency in Arithmetic", or "Expertise", or "Virtuosity", i.e. on par respectively with 50th, 90th or 99th percentile of skilled adults. |
LLMs don't share that property, though. Their distribution of proficiency over various dimensions and subfields is highly variable and only slightly correlated. Therefore, it makes no sense to infer the ability or inability to perform some magically global type of reasoning or generalization from just a subset of tasks, the way we do for humans.