[haberman]

I don't think Hamas wants to be citizens of Israel, the western-style democracy. Its charter (even the softened 2017 version) unambiguously rejects recognition of Israel: "There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."

Hamas wants an Arab Islamic state to rule Palestine from the river to the sea. It doesn't want equal rights and seats in the Knesset, it wants Arab Muslims to govern the land under Islamic law. This is all spelled out explicitly in their charter.

[racional]

I don't think Hamas wants to be citizens of Israel, the western-style democracy.

Acknowledged.

[The 2017 charter] unambiguously rejects recognition of Israel: "There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity."

By itself this statement certainly sounds unambiguous. But it comes into clear conflict with the language that immediately follows:

However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.

Taken together -- I would not call this an "unambiguous" formulation of their position. There's obviously a very clear surface-level conflict between the two passages.

Holistically -- the most reasonable paraphrase seems to be: "Hamas rejects the moral legitimacy of the Zionist state. However as a practical matter, it will support the 2SS (along June 4 1967 borders) if this is determined the be the national consensus (among Palestinians), and provided the Right of Return is also granted."

The fact that it mentions "borders" is extremely significant, in that this means at least de facto, if not de jure recognition of the State of Israel.

[haberman]

I agree that the 2017 charter hints at acceptance of 1967 borders, and that its formulation is ambiguous in this sense (my "unambiguous" comment was in the context of analyzing whether Hamas would want to be citizens of Israel -- I think their rejection of this idea is unambiguous).

I think your reading is consistent with what the document says. On its face, the document hints at accepting a two-state solution under the 1967 borders. The most charitable interpretation would be that Hamas is willing to consider a two state solution an ultimate settlement of the conflict, with the two states living side-by-side in peace and harmony indefinitely.

However, another possible interpretation is that Hamas is willing to accept 1967 borders in order to secure statehood, but after securing it (including lifting of the blockade, etc) it primarily intends to use its state as a base to attack Israel with more vigor and resources until Israel is destroyed. "As a practical matter" could easily be read as "as a short-term solution."

When I observe Hamas's behavior, the second interpretation seems far more likely to me. Even as the document was announced, they said "We shall not waive an inch of the Palestinian home soil, no matter what the recent pressures are and no matter how long the occupation." The formulation of the document seems designed to legitimize future attacks on Israel once the two states are established. And Hamas shows little interest in developing Gaza as a permanent home for any of its people, as you would expect if they truly see it as a core part of their future state, preferring instead to preserve refugee status for as many people as possible.

[racional]

I think we're on the same basic page about Hamas. They could very well have ulterior motives, and could just be going along with a 2SS process in order to buy time for future offensive strategies.

My only point is that it's important to come to an objective view of what the language of the document says, on its own terms (even if we suspect it's all on the surface and their real intentions may be entirely different). And even if the language is only surface-level -- it at least opens a door to some kind of a pathway towards a solution based on negotiation and international law, without outside observers and verified inspections of their offensive capabilities, verified elections and national referenda at regular intervals, and so forth.

Which is the only viable route out of the current state of the conflict, in my view.

[haberman]

I appreciate your point of view. I'd be happy to see a "internationalist" future that involves a two-state solution along with verified inspections of militarization, UN governance of Jerusalem, etc.

Unfortunately I don't see a Palestinian state accepting international limitations on its offensive militarization. I imagine they would consider that an unacceptable limit on their sovereignty.

I also think the "right of return" is an unfortunate stumbling block that will prevent this kind of settlement. Palestinians want to turn the clock back to a time before their allies launched a war to destroy Israel, and a time before the Mizrahi were expelled from the Arab world. Practically speaking, it's asking Israel to accept an unspecified number of people who are likely to be hostile to its existence. It's hard to imagine how this doesn't lead to a sharp increase in the amount of terror attacks inside Israel.

I want to believe that you are right, and that recognizing/encouraging small steps towards agreement from both sides will ultimately lead to a lasting peace. But my fear is that it is just a ruse to gain advantage, and that accepting it at face value will lead the West to give concessions that will ultimately aid future wars that seek to destroy Israel.

[racional]

Thanks; I appreciate yours as well. I certainly don't pretend to know all the answers here.

[tptacek]

It's a little odd to see discussions of Hamas centering on the 2017 charter. That document was written by Khaled Mishal, who led the Hamas political wing (the "politburo", I guess?) from Doha. It was announced just as Mishal was forced from power by the hardline Gaza-based Al-Qassam wing of Hamas, which rejects that charter.

People go back and forth on how much evidence there is or isn't for Sinwar and Gaza-based Hamas's rejection of the 2017 charter, but read reporting and analysis from the time, untainted by what happened on October 7, about what the objectives were for updating the charter (significantly: easing Egypt's longstanding blocade of Gaza, repairing political relationships, working around Egypt's post-Arab-Spring, post-Sisi coup suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's parent organization). Then look what happened on October 7. Like, there isn't much doubt that the 2017 document was unserious at this point?

This is purely a nerd point and not something I expect would change anybody's mind about what's happening in Gaza or what the outcomes should be.

[racional]

Another way to read the situation:

The Charter was at the time meant seriously, at least by a certain faction within Hamas.

But with intervening events -- such as the appallingly harsh response to the 2018-2019 border protests; the storming of Al-Aqsa; and the election of the 37th Government (which brought on board not just an unsavory cast of characters, but specific plans for the continued expansion of the Settlements) -- the view took hold that Israeli society was plainly not interested in such overtures.

So as a result, the Charter got flagged and downvoted.

[tptacek]

OK, but the reporting at the time of the charter was that Mishal had lost a power struggle with the hardliners --- these are events that occurred before the 2018 "protest". People wrote about the new charter when it happened! There's a bunch of analysis you can go read. You don't need to axiomatically derive this stuff, including the notion that the Al-Qassam wing rejected the 2017 charter.