[racional]

I think we're on the same basic page about Hamas. They could very well have ulterior motives, and could just be going along with a 2SS process in order to buy time for future offensive strategies.

My only point is that it's important to come to an objective view of what the language of the document says, on its own terms (even if we suspect it's all on the surface and their real intentions may be entirely different). And even if the language is only surface-level -- it at least opens a door to some kind of a pathway towards a solution based on negotiation and international law, without outside observers and verified inspections of their offensive capabilities, verified elections and national referenda at regular intervals, and so forth.

Which is the only viable route out of the current state of the conflict, in my view.

[haberman]

I appreciate your point of view. I'd be happy to see a "internationalist" future that involves a two-state solution along with verified inspections of militarization, UN governance of Jerusalem, etc.

Unfortunately I don't see a Palestinian state accepting international limitations on its offensive militarization. I imagine they would consider that an unacceptable limit on their sovereignty.

I also think the "right of return" is an unfortunate stumbling block that will prevent this kind of settlement. Palestinians want to turn the clock back to a time before their allies launched a war to destroy Israel, and a time before the Mizrahi were expelled from the Arab world. Practically speaking, it's asking Israel to accept an unspecified number of people who are likely to be hostile to its existence. It's hard to imagine how this doesn't lead to a sharp increase in the amount of terror attacks inside Israel.

I want to believe that you are right, and that recognizing/encouraging small steps towards agreement from both sides will ultimately lead to a lasting peace. But my fear is that it is just a ruse to gain advantage, and that accepting it at face value will lead the West to give concessions that will ultimately aid future wars that seek to destroy Israel.

[racional]

Thanks; I appreciate yours as well. I certainly don't pretend to know all the answers here.

[tptacek]

It's a little odd to see discussions of Hamas centering on the 2017 charter. That document was written by Khaled Mishal, who led the Hamas political wing (the "politburo", I guess?) from Doha. It was announced just as Mishal was forced from power by the hardline Gaza-based Al-Qassam wing of Hamas, which rejects that charter.

People go back and forth on how much evidence there is or isn't for Sinwar and Gaza-based Hamas's rejection of the 2017 charter, but read reporting and analysis from the time, untainted by what happened on October 7, about what the objectives were for updating the charter (significantly: easing Egypt's longstanding blocade of Gaza, repairing political relationships, working around Egypt's post-Arab-Spring, post-Sisi coup suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas's parent organization). Then look what happened on October 7. Like, there isn't much doubt that the 2017 document was unserious at this point?

This is purely a nerd point and not something I expect would change anybody's mind about what's happening in Gaza or what the outcomes should be.

[racional]

Another way to read the situation:

The Charter was at the time meant seriously, at least by a certain faction within Hamas.

But with intervening events -- such as the appallingly harsh response to the 2018-2019 border protests; the storming of Al-Aqsa; and the election of the 37th Government (which brought on board not just an unsavory cast of characters, but specific plans for the continued expansion of the Settlements) -- the view took hold that Israeli society was plainly not interested in such overtures.

So as a result, the Charter got flagged and downvoted.

[tptacek]

OK, but the reporting at the time of the charter was that Mishal had lost a power struggle with the hardliners --- these are events that occurred before the 2018 "protest". People wrote about the new charter when it happened! There's a bunch of analysis you can go read. You don't need to axiomatically derive this stuff, including the notion that the Al-Qassam wing rejected the 2017 charter.

[racional]

Acknowledged that there were additional factors and events involved.

Since you prefer not to be centered on the Charter itself: if we are to understand why the decision was made to launch Operation Al-Aqsa Flood; an in particular how they were able to recruit so many people to agree to what was apparently promised as a suicide mission -- then I submit that is necessary to consider the whole background of events up until that time.

The 2018 "protest"

Can we just acknowledge the cruel and unduly harsh nature of the military response to the protests (which by all accounts did at least start peacefully, and from within sectors of society independent of Hamas) without having to allude to the Israeli government's snide, mocking ("fake protest") narrative of it?

As if these people have nothing to protest or be unhappy about.