[strogonoff]

> I suppose. So? Why do you think that matters?

Why do you think it matters? If you didn’t think so, presumably you would not yourself be arguing for a particular explanation (e.g., neurons causing consciousness).

I can pick between a few reasons why it matters to me. One of them is probably similar to why you or I would think that believing or not believing in a deity matters.

> you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior.

I don’t need that evidence if I assume consciousness exists in the first place. You need it if you believe it arises from some configuration of entities in external reality.

> The whole point of my counter-argument is that the original argument is invalid because it ignores the speed at which a human can execute the rules

Why does the speed matter?

> I do not claim that it does not exist, I claim that it is an illusion. Illusions exist, they are just not what they naively appear to be.

Would it be fair to say that time-space is an illusion? It seems that “it is not what it naively appears to be” is a true statement about it, doesn’t it?

> presupposing the objective existence of something for which there is no evidence

The evidence of consciousness is empirically supplied every moment of your existence, though. Empirical evidence of anything else by definition requires consciousness, too.

[lisper]

> I don’t need that evidence if I assume consciousness exists in the first place.

I think you're missing the point here. Let me repeat, with some added emphasis: you have no evidence for the existence of consciousness in entities other than yourself other than their I/O behavior. It's not that you have no evidence. You do. But that evidence takes the form of I/O behavior, which can be completely accounted for by physics. Yes, you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics, but you can also assume invisible pink unicorns. Neither is necessary to explain the data. The only thing that is problematic is your subjective sensation of consciousness, which kinda sorta feels like it should not be possible if physics is all there is. That's the problem that Dennett solved.

> Would it be fair to say that time-space is an illusion?

Yes. See: https://flownet.com/ron/QM.pdf or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc

(Bet you didn't see that coming, did you? :-)

> The evidence of consciousness is empirically supplied every moment of your existence, though.

Yes, I don't deny that. And I don't deny that accounting for it is a Very Hard Problem. The fact that Dennett was able to solve it is one of the many things that made him noteworthy.

[strogonoff]

> you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics

To make that claim is to engage in Cartesian dualism, don’t you see it? I find Cartesian dualism not a particularly elegant theory (even less so than monistic materialism). If you believe you are arguing with a Cartesian dualist, then we are talking past each other.

(This is, I guess, an illustration of why I find complete lack of philosophical rigour so frustrating when arguing with monistic materialists.)

[lisper]

I have no idea who I'm arguing with here. And I have no idea what distinguishes a "monistic materialist" from a non-monistic materialist. AFAIK, there is dualism and there is materialism, and that is an exhaustive partition of the philosophical idea space regarding consciousness.

I also know that you think it's necessary to assume that consciousness exists rather than inferring its existence from (physical) observation, which makes you sound like a dualist to me.

(I also find it rather frustrating that you complain about a lack of philosophical rigor while at the same time being so cagey about your actual position.)

But please set me straight: what is your actual position?

[strogonoff]

As per above discussion starting with https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40316040, I find dualism dubious, and monisms of materialist sort inelegant. It is frustrating if I need to refresh that regularly. Perhaps you are trying to keep up with too many threads :)

Monism in philosophy of mind means assuming the fundamental existence of one sort of thing (e.g., material world) as opposed to two (e.g., body and soul).