[strogonoff]

> you can assume that consciousness is a real thing independent of physics

To make that claim is to engage in Cartesian dualism, don’t you see it? I find Cartesian dualism not a particularly elegant theory (even less so than monistic materialism). If you believe you are arguing with a Cartesian dualist, then we are talking past each other.

(This is, I guess, an illustration of why I find complete lack of philosophical rigour so frustrating when arguing with monistic materialists.)

[lisper]

I have no idea who I'm arguing with here. And I have no idea what distinguishes a "monistic materialist" from a non-monistic materialist. AFAIK, there is dualism and there is materialism, and that is an exhaustive partition of the philosophical idea space regarding consciousness.

I also know that you think it's necessary to assume that consciousness exists rather than inferring its existence from (physical) observation, which makes you sound like a dualist to me.

(I also find it rather frustrating that you complain about a lack of philosophical rigor while at the same time being so cagey about your actual position.)

But please set me straight: what is your actual position?

[strogonoff]

As per above discussion starting with https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40316040, I find dualism dubious, and monisms of materialist sort inelegant. It is frustrating if I need to refresh that regularly. Perhaps you are trying to keep up with too many threads :)

Monism in philosophy of mind means assuming the fundamental existence of one sort of thing (e.g., material world) as opposed to two (e.g., body and soul).