[createdapril24]

Overall oil refineries are decent targets because they are high cost and statically located and therefore difficult to defend, but Ukraine certainly wishes it had more conventional weapons at longer ranges so that it could strike deeper and dynamic targets.

Ukraine doesn't have many better alternatives. They can strike some energy infrastructure (which they've done) in an effort to affect Russian willpower. It can also try to hit airfields (which they've done) hoping to take out equipment, but Russia has been pretty good at moving equipment out of the way.

The strike campaign itself has been moderately effective but definitely short of a war-winning enterprise. Estimates on the actual damage on production and exports has ranged between the fantastical (28%) to the banal (6%). It looks like domestic petrol supply has been hit the hardest in terms of tangible economic costs, since oil prices have remained reasonable with lessened seasonal demand and lower OPEC supply targets. Russia has additionally made deals with Kazakhstan and Belarus to attempt to mitigate some of the economic effects, has been able to repair oil refinery damage, and has experimented with a range of mitigations.

The strike campaign has been further complicated by the US election year. The Biden Administration has asked Ukraine to stop targeting oil refineries, because global oil instability could cause a crisis that ultimately causes global issues, rising prices, and Biden a second term. Such strikes are expected to uptick after November. And with the possibility of long range missiles from military sponsors, plus winter-time difficulties, this might be a good window to see what Ukraine can really do.

Either way I think the article is not about the long range drones you are alluding to here, but the small commercial sized drones and mid-cost military drones that are based on them.

[ggm]

Moving equipment like fighters and bombers out of range of drones achieves a significant tactical victory for Ukraine by reducing loiter time at target for Russian aircraft. Incremental losses of both aircraft and crew also have compounding effects, since pilots for logistics roles like in air refuelling become scarce.

I agree that lack of weapons for direct assault limits some of the upside benefits as in "you cannot directly win a war on defensive moves" but you can force a better, safer, more advantageous outcome. In effect, Russia is losing a war of attrition on it's economy and materiel side. It does have massive manpower and stocks. It doesn't have infinite supply of economic resilience and home front tolerance for a failing economy undermines Kremlin myths.

Sometimes, not losing is the best you can get pending more help.

Ukraine is not losing.

Russia is not winning.

[createdapril24]

I disagree that failing to hit targets is a significant tactical victory.

But I agree that they should continue the strike campaign. They can't do much else on the battlefield right now. It's the right thing for them to look at areas they can raise cost and complexity for the Russians. I just wouldn't round it up too much...

I disagree that Russia is losing a war of attrition on economy (look at Russia's economy vs Ukraine's!). On a materiel side, maybe, Russia is using a lot of its stockpiles and those will eventually dwindle. But Russia is not somehow out of the fight when those stockpiles get low. On the other side of attrition, Ukraine is low on military aged men, artillery, fortifications, air defense. There's a strong argument to be made that Russia is the one winning the war of attrition, at least for the foreseeable future.

Russia is winning right now. But that doesn't mean it will win. The future isn't determined. I agree with you that a prolonged war won't necessarily go Russia's way, and that it may eventually lose the will to continue.

[shmerl]

Russia can win the war of attrition only if allies stop backing Ukraine, which is exactly what Russia hopes to achieve through bought shills and "useful idiots" like those who delayed aid for Ukraine in US Congress for instance and the likes of Orban and Co.

However if these shills would fail to stall the allies, Russia would surely lose in the long run. I.e. Russia can't sustain long war of attrition, despite smokescreen of having supposedly infinite supplies.

[createdapril24]

I disagree with this other than that Ukraine will definitely lose if its backers stop supporting it.

It's not really clear that Russia would surely lose the war of attrition. A realistic scenario, assuming Ukraine's sponsors sustain its support: Ukraine and Russia continue sustaining losses as they are, Russia ramps up equipment production to offset what its needing to take out of storage, still the war slows down into more static trench warfare, Russia is able to maintain the willpower to stay in the fight, and Ukraine runs of out military aged men before Russia does.

I'm not saying the above will happen. I'm just saying that the above isn't a contrived, unrealistic scenario. No matter how much Ukraine's sponsors supply it with equipment, unless they themselves enter directly into the war there's no way to offset that huge attritional asymmetry.

[shmerl]

Russia can't ramp up production sufficiently - not for the scale of war that Putin is waging now. And this is only going to get worse for them. It's a key factor - shortages will kill its military potential eventually. While allies can sustain production as long as they are willing to. So Russia bets on lack of will on their part.

[createdapril24]

I see your point and I think you have a reasonable point of view, although I don't share it because I think to have that point of view you have to make assumptions I'm not comfortable making.

I think there's a lot of variables in terms of how the timeline could progress: how Russia is able to draw on other sources (trade) for equipment, how global economic winds enable Russia to deal with its labor shortages, how deep those stockpiles really go (already Western observers have significantly underestimated them), how much materiel is needed to sustain a war of attrition (in which Russia isn't advancing), how much Russian air power plays into a future timeline and how and whether Ukraine can mitigate Russian air power starting from its current air defense deficit.

When I look at these, and other variables and unknown quantities, it's hard for me to draw out that Russia is destined/doomed to lose a war of attrition, if supply just continues a little bit longer. We've witnessed Russia adapting significantly during the war - even avoiding (so far) a general mobilization. Furthermore I can think of several more ways in which Russia could win the war with sustained sponsorship of Ukraine (that never test scalability of equipment manufacture). In short, I respect that you've got that view, just uncomfortable of making the assumptions to get there myself.

[eru]

I wouldn't call even a six percent reduction 'banal'. But it depends on the amount of resources invested on both sides.

As a hypothetical:

If the attacker invests approximately zero resources, the defender invests crazy amounts of resources, then even approximately zero actual damage is a great outcome for the attacker. The real damage is in the resources wasted on defense.

Btw, this is pretty close to what our societies did to our own civilian air travel in response to terrorist threats in the 2000s.

(I have no special insight into the numbers for the current war. But I wouldn't sneeze at 6% reduction.)

[createdapril24]

The attacker in this case is investing significant resources and the defender isn't investing crazy amounts of resources.

I see your point but I don't think the hypothetical as stated is a fair depiction of the dynamic.

[kiba]

Oil refinery damage are going to be increasingly hard to repair, given the lack of readily available parts and the loss of western expertise.

[shmerl]

Even those percentages of dropping oil profits can be pretty crippling for Putin. Especially since they can repeatedly hit what Putin wastes resources on repairing. And they should continue doing that even more.

But they surely need more effective ways to take out Russian military airplanes, especially those which are bombing the front line and cities. Not sure why allies can't supply them with needed technology to do it - they should possess some.

[unclebucknasty]

Russia's latest tactic uses fairly massive old-school dumb bombs, retrofitted with satellite guidance kits. These glide bombs are said to be launched by aircraft from high altitude, just outside of Ukraine's radar range. They have thus far proven highly effective and very difficult to intercept.

Not sure F-16s would help here in patrolling closer to launch points and intercepting the aircraft prior to dropping their payloads; or whether they would be too vulnerable. But, it does seem like a job for stealth interceptors, and certainly makes the case for air superiority.

[tim333]

With F16s it rather depends what air to air missiles they are supplied with. There are some that could take out Russian planes from a fair distance. But I'll give you stealth would be better. I'm surprised at how wimpy the west has been with air support - two years in and not an F16 in action. If they'd lent a couple of F35s with volunteer pilots it could have given Russia something to think about.

[unclebucknasty]

Yeah, no doubt the F-16s would be equipped with appropriately-ranged missles. The question is around their own vulnerability while patrolling/acquiring targets.

Seems to imply a job for stealth, or otherwise establishing air superiority. But, even with the latter the outcome might be variable—especially for eastern / northern Ukranian targets—without incursion into hostile (Russian or Belarusian) airspace.

Agree 100% on Western support. Seems we've been fighting to "not escalate" versus fighting to win. But, it's already a war with Ukrainian cities being pounded. In this context, "not escalating" seems to be a euphemism for "losing".

[shmerl]

It's getting better with France and UK pushing to drop that "not escalate" demagoguery in favor of actually facing the problems. And it's helping.

Macron surprisingly was very on point about using the uncertainty tactic as a deterrent method, instead of "we won't do this / we won't do that in order not to escalate". It's good he finally got to that point, though it should have been clear from the start.

Other allies should also remove all restrictions for Ukraine on using weapons to hit targets directly in Russia.

What also works as a deterrent is Russia knowing that for any hit, they'll be hit by Ukraine in return, and not just on the front lines, but anywhere inside their territory.

[unclebucknasty]

Agree 100%. As it is, the risk is all on the Ukrainian side, save for Russian casualties (which Russia has shown to be of little concern, as they shovel everyone from prisoners to conscripts to the front lines).

They need to have more downside risk, which doesn't come from the West constantly reassuring them that we won't "escalate". Hitting targets in Russia would definitely change the calculus. As would enforcing a NATO no-fly zone over Ukraine.

I was glad to hear Macron and others turn the corner there. But, I hope they're willing to back it up, else the bluster would do more harm than good.

I have a feeling it will be tested.

[mcphage]

> Estimates on the actual damage on production and exports has ranged between the fantastical (28%) to the banal (6%). It looks like domestic petrol supply has been hit the hardest in terms of tangible economic costs, since oil prices have remained reasonable with lessened seasonal demand and lower OPEC supply targets.

Isn't that the point, though? Hit refineries, forcing Russia to sell more crude oil to the world, and have less refined oil internally to turn into gas, etc?

[createdapril24]

That's partly the point yeah. Every war is an iterative set of actions and mitigations. The point I'm making is that so far the actual effect created by the strikes hasn't come close to winning the war, and its hard to project the numbers culminating in a war-winning economic catastrophy.

None of that is to say Ukraine shouldn't try, or that it doesn't have some "annoying" affect that increases costs and complexity for Russia. It does. Just want to be accurate about the level of affect and its potential.

And again, I think November after the election is going to be the best show of what Ukraine can do.