[shmerl]

Russia can win the war of attrition only if allies stop backing Ukraine, which is exactly what Russia hopes to achieve through bought shills and "useful idiots" like those who delayed aid for Ukraine in US Congress for instance and the likes of Orban and Co.

However if these shills would fail to stall the allies, Russia would surely lose in the long run. I.e. Russia can't sustain long war of attrition, despite smokescreen of having supposedly infinite supplies.

[createdapril24]

I disagree with this other than that Ukraine will definitely lose if its backers stop supporting it.

It's not really clear that Russia would surely lose the war of attrition. A realistic scenario, assuming Ukraine's sponsors sustain its support: Ukraine and Russia continue sustaining losses as they are, Russia ramps up equipment production to offset what its needing to take out of storage, still the war slows down into more static trench warfare, Russia is able to maintain the willpower to stay in the fight, and Ukraine runs of out military aged men before Russia does.

I'm not saying the above will happen. I'm just saying that the above isn't a contrived, unrealistic scenario. No matter how much Ukraine's sponsors supply it with equipment, unless they themselves enter directly into the war there's no way to offset that huge attritional asymmetry.

[shmerl]

Russia can't ramp up production sufficiently - not for the scale of war that Putin is waging now. And this is only going to get worse for them. It's a key factor - shortages will kill its military potential eventually. While allies can sustain production as long as they are willing to. So Russia bets on lack of will on their part.

[createdapril24]

I see your point and I think you have a reasonable point of view, although I don't share it because I think to have that point of view you have to make assumptions I'm not comfortable making.

I think there's a lot of variables in terms of how the timeline could progress: how Russia is able to draw on other sources (trade) for equipment, how global economic winds enable Russia to deal with its labor shortages, how deep those stockpiles really go (already Western observers have significantly underestimated them), how much materiel is needed to sustain a war of attrition (in which Russia isn't advancing), how much Russian air power plays into a future timeline and how and whether Ukraine can mitigate Russian air power starting from its current air defense deficit.

When I look at these, and other variables and unknown quantities, it's hard for me to draw out that Russia is destined/doomed to lose a war of attrition, if supply just continues a little bit longer. We've witnessed Russia adapting significantly during the war - even avoiding (so far) a general mobilization. Furthermore I can think of several more ways in which Russia could win the war with sustained sponsorship of Ukraine (that never test scalability of equipment manufacture). In short, I respect that you've got that view, just uncomfortable of making the assumptions to get there myself.