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by kwantam
787 days ago
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This vulnerability has very little to do with P-521 per se. The issue is with ECDSA: any use of ECDSA with biased nonce generation, regardless of the elliptic curve it's implemented over, immediately causes secret key leakage. (Rant: All these years later, we're all still doing penance for the fact that Schnorr signatures were patented and so everyone used ECDSA instead. It's an absolute garbage fire of a signature scheme and should be abandoned yesterday for many reasons, e.g., no real proof of security, terrible footguns like this.) |
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EdDSA, which is essentially deterministic Schnorr, does solve the problem.
Also, the use of P-521 didn't specifically cause the vulnerability, but the bad interaction between SHA512 and P-521 did play a role. It is unfortunate that nature conspired against us to make 2^511 - 1 a composite number. The fact that you have to go up to 521 bits to get a Mersenne prime whereas the natural target length for a hash output is 512 bits is the fatal interaction here.