[geye1234]

To briefly summarise what I wrote yesterday:

Let P be "observation shows us that the universe 'unfolds' predictably"

Let Q be "the FC lacks free will"

You are claiming that P implies Q, and !P implies (or at least suggests) !Q.

But I am claiming that there is no connection between P and Q. P may be true, and Q may be true, but there is no necessary connection between the two. P is an empirical observation, but you cannot thereby claim that Q is an empirically-derived statement. And therefore, I think, we have no reason to believe Q.

Hopefully this very short summary clarifies things, and not the opposite :)

[sdht0]

Thanks. Yes nice and helpful summary of your earlier comment. I'll respond more later, but briefly myself:

From my earlier comments: "I'm not saying that the First Cause is definitely impersonal. I'm only claiming that given our current observation as of today, impersonal physical laws can explain all of our observations"

To use your format:

W: Observe that world has causes, parts, etc.

FC: Eternal First Cause as a brute-force fact.

M: FC has will.

N: FC does not have will.

Claim0: W -> FC.

Claim1: W -> M.

Claim2: W -> N.

I think we both agree on Claim0.

The proofs in the book (and you) are asserting Claim1. W is true, hence M is true. In other words, FC has to have free will in creating this world.

Me: !Claim2. So no, I'm NOT claiming FC has to have a lack of free will. I agree with you, that doesn't follow.

Me, instead: W -> (M or N). That's all. If you agree with this, then my job here is done. The book claims: "The real debate is not between atheism and theism." My objective is to show this statement is not true. Atheism is very much still on the table.

Thus, given the observations as of today, we cannot assert Claim1, as the book is doing. Why not? Because we have NOT eliminated N, as it also fits the observations. So no, not everyone should turn into a theist. (But we cannot assert Claim2 either.)

> There is no necessary connection between the two.

There is no necessary connection. But there is a possible connection. P from your comment can explain W (all that FC is is the unfolding of rules) and if so, then Q/N will be implied.

Where does that leave us?

Today: Either M or N is true, but we don't know which. Thus, naturalism is as valid a stance as theism. Neither can claim the other is false. We can only talk in terms of how likely it is that M or N is true. As a naturalist, my claim is that N is likely because we can explain the world using rules. We don't need a Divine explanation. Not definitely, but possibly. And that it helps to adopt something like Bayesian reasoning when thinking about matters such as these.

Tomorrow: God does a (second) revelation. M is then shown to be true and N is false.

Tomorrow: Not likely but possible, science figures out how the universe is self-sustaining. N is then shown to be true, and M false.

[geye1234]

Thanks. I'll wait for your full reply, but very briefly:

My position is that the existence/non-existence of regular laws, and the personality/impersonality of the FC, have nothing to do with one another. As I stated earlier, event E would be compatible with the FC's personality/impersonality, and so is the universe we currently observe.

I don't believe this is your position (and admit my precis of your views earlier may have been inaccurate). I think your position is that observation of the universe's regularity affects the question of God's personality, hence your insistence that this is an empirical question (which I deny). You said:

> ... as a naturalist, I'm saying that given the laws of our universe (whatever they are) and the initial conditions, lions exist and unicorns don't and even God cannot change that. I'll freely agree that the former is from logic and hence necessarily true. But the later is just from empirical observations.

And further up the thread :

> ...it's all empirical. Yes, tomorrow unicorns could start popping into existence and then we'd have to revise what we think of the universe. But until then (this is crucial, my claims are contingent on observations), apriori natural laws seem to be able to explain everything we see. No personal God needed.

And more recently

> So this particular event [unicorn popping into existence], if it happened, would actually be in favor of a personal God!

and

> As a naturalist, my claim is that N is likely because we can explain the world using rules. We don't need a Divine explanation.

All these quotes indicate that you think that the empirical observation P (in my prev comment) at least suggests Q (which = N). Or alternatively, that you think that the truth of P undermines the need for M.

Again, my position is that P and M vs N have nothing to do with one another.

(P and W are different, and we have been using terminology more like P for the past dozen or so comments, hence I discuss P here rather than W.)

[sdht0]

I posted a quite long comment here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39795173

> the empirical observation P (in my prev comment) at least suggests Q (which = N).

> Again, my position is that P and M vs N have nothing to do with one another.

So the question we start with is, why do you think M is correct? You agree that you and the book are asserting Claim1, i.e, W can only be explained by a personal God (= M) with 100% certainty?

One answer you've mentioned is: only M can explain why concepts such as lions exist and unicorns don't.

My counterpoint then is to bring in P and say: P also explains why concepts exists or doesn't exist. Thus, we don't need M to be true and Claim1 is incorrect.

Since P can entirely explain everything we see, the certainty of M is eliminated, thus leading to the possibility of N (= Q). Hence, M or N.

Nitpick: P is part of W. W is everything we see. Causes. Parts. And regularity.

[sdht0]

Actually, can you explain more why you think P is not implying N?

EDIT: I may have been using P incorrectly when I meant FC=rules. See below.

---

P = Our universe is regular to a high degree of accuracy.

P is a provisional truth. It is true and no one can deny it today. If there is a God, no one deny that He chose to create a universe that is regular. But the fact that it is true today doesn't mean it will remain true tomorrow.

Question: what FC is able to cause a universe whose observers see P.

There are probably infinite possibilities, but let's focus on the two interesting ones to us:

A1: FC=base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. N is true.

A2: FC=God. He chose to actualize base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. M is true.

In both cases, FC is a brute-force Truth.

The book claims that only and only A2 is possible. I'm claiming that A1 is also possible.

If P were not true (unicorns popping in), then it will harder to justify A1, though not impossible as you pointed out. But since P is true as of today, positing A1 is more straightforward.

I'm further claiming that as long as P is true, A2 is in fact unnecessary as it is adding one extra thing when it is not needed to explain P, but we don't need to get into that. I'm content just showing that A2 is not the only logical possibility.

--

I'm not saying we observe regularity and thus FC=rules. In a sense, I'm saying the opposite. In any universe where FC=rules, its observers will definitely observe P. Thus our observation of P makes FC=rules a good possibility. And I think then it's clear that FC=rules is mindless N.

--

The book is making a claim of logical truth: W -> M, that is, if "the observations of our world" then "FC has free will", because only M can explain what we see => N is impossible.

But something is shown to be a logical truth only when all other possibilities are eliminated right?

Is N, i.e, a FC without will, able to explain everything we see? My answer is yes, since we would definitely observe P in a universe where FC=rules. And if my claim that this is a valid possibility is correct, then W -> M is not true.

So a concrete goal for natural theology is to be able to find at least one observation of our world that FC=rules cannot explain, even in principle.

Apart from the foundational examples such as resurrection, I think last frontier in this regard is consciousness, but of course here too I think rules is all there is, even though we have a lot way to go in being able to say how.

I'd like to hear your thoughts on this point. You have already raised some good questions: "how can we explain lions but not unicorns" or "why these rules and not others". I think I have good answers to these at least to my satisfaction, if not yours. But would be glad if you can raise more pinpointing issues against FC=rules that will reveal a gap in my understanding.

[geye1234]

> Actually, can you explain more why you think P is not implying N?

P does not imply N because there is no logical connection between the two. As stated, P vs !P and M vs N have no bearing on one-another.

Let's grant that N is true. Your assumption is that the regularity we observe is the same as base_rules/impersonal FC. As a concomitant, you're saying that the regularity we observe cannot change with time. But suppose both these assumptions are false. (After all, neither is logically necessary, and neither can be empirical, because we can't observe the future. Nor can either be probable, because probability assumes that the future will be like the past; it can't be used to show it.) Suppose base_rules, in fact, said that a unicorn will pop into existence on 1/1/2025, and pop out the following day. The FC has no free-will in this scenario, but its 'programming' simply declares that regularity will be suspended for the first two days of 2025. Clearly P is false in this scenario. But why would this be incompatible with N? I think it's entirely compatible.

The possibility that base_rules and observed-regularities are distinct seems implied by your statement here:

> ...it is not necessarily the case that there is FC and then our universe, right? It could be the case that our universe is a simulation in supercomputers of another universe...More realistically, we could be one out of many universes originating from eternal inflation. And FC would then be some base rules causing base realities, inside which the rules for the universe we actually see embedded in an emergent way.

Therefore, non-willing, non-free FC is compatible with unicorn events.

As stated above, if P (empirically-observed) and !P (empirically-falsified) are both compatible with N, then N cannot be said to be empirical.

> A2: FC=God. He chose to actualize base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. M is true.

This is not the claim. There is no claim that God actualises base_rules; rather, the claim is that all existence of anything and everything, including logic itself, proceeds from God. (Actually, God, in a sense, is logic; the word "logic" derives from "Logos", meaning the Word, meaning the Second Person of the Trinity; but that's really a whole separate discussion.) The base_rules don't exist independently of God (because then there would be some principle independent of God, which would mean He isn't God).

Further, it is change, not regularity, that the book uses as the starting point. Change could exist in an entirely irregular universe, or could exist in the brain-in-a-jar universe (because I would go from thinking-about-being-a-brain-in-a-jar to not doing so). None of the book's arguments use regularity or order as a starting point. Some Protestant arguments use regularity to argue for God's existence, which you may have at the back of your mind. I think these arguments for God's personality fail. (The reason I'm discussing regularity is because you brought it up as an argument against the FC's having will.)

So If I'm correct, we've established that regularity and God's having or lacking free-will are entirely orthogonal. Not probabilistic or logically implying, but simply irrelevant and disconnected.

--

Responding to your other comment here:

> I'd love it if you could show that P1 isn't a valid possibility.

Sure. Logic exists. Where does it come from? I say it proceeds from the FC; it is an expression of the FC's being. (The FC is not the FC if something, namely logic, is independent of it.) Insofar as logic shows us what might be (and what can never be), it is a form of existence, if only potential existence. If there were literally nothing, there would be no logic; but if there's no logic, then there's no argument, and therefore no valid or invalid possibility, and no discussion about anything. A bit simplistic, but that's off the top of my head :-)

> Given G1, FC always has to have existed. We can ask "why FC?", but is has no answer. I think you'd agree to this?

Only insofar as it has no answer outside itself. As you say, we believe that "God is His own cause". But "brute fact" implies "no reason", which is not the same as saying "His own reason". We say "God's essence is His existence"; they are one and the same thing. God is existence (which isn't the same as pantheism, but that's another discussion). Existence doesn't need a reason outside existence for existing; in fact, it is illogical for such a reason to exist.

Given that God is existence, it is impossible for God not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. He needs no reason outside Himself for existing. It is illogical for Him not to exist.

This cannot apply to base_ruleset, which logically might have been otherwise (anti-gravity, etc): that is to say, it might not have existed in the way we observe. It therefore needs a reason, outside itself, for being what it is. My reason is in a way very simple: the existing-things we see around us, like gravity and lions, were willed by God, and the logically-coherent-but-not-actually-existing things like unicorns and anti-gravity were not. Or, if you prefer, base_rules were willed by God, and some_other_hypothetical_rules were not: the principle is identical.

My position is logical. The position you propose, on the other hand, is forced to resort to the explicitly-illogical concept of a "brute fact" to explain it. Do you agree that reference to brute facts is illogical? If so, why is it ok to violate logic here, but not elsewhere? "From a contradiction [one contradiction], anything follows." See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion

(To be clear, I am not making a full case for God's existence here; only showing that my position (of a willing FC) is logical, while I respectfully suggest your position is not. Therefore, your tu quoque against my position -- that I am also arguing for a brute fact -- does not succeed.)

> So a concrete goal for natural theology is to be able to find at least one observation of our world that FC=rules cannot explain, even in principle.

Hopefully I have shown that, while I think observed rules are compatible with both positions, FC=rules is not logical, while FC=Personal God is.

[geye1234]

EDIT: I do not think a brute fact actually applies a contradiction. I was getting ahead of myself. Nonetheless, I think that, if you say one thing can happen without a reason (brute facts), you are thereby forced to say anything can happen without a reason, and that therefore you have no reason to think (say) that a chocolate cake can't start doing calculus, or some other bizarre idea.

This obviously isn't the same as a contradiction.

[sdht0]

Thank you. I'll be posting my answer soon (tm).

[sdht0]

This is a good comment as it explains much more about your perspective than before.

---

Alright. We've to first get into the meaning of the word existence.

From my perspective:

There is a property of reality called existence. And clearly the existence of 2+2=4 is very different from the existence of lions. Thus existence is of two kinds: potential existence and actual (ontological) existence. Concepts of both a universe with gravity and a universe with anti-gravity exist potentially (what I called ghost universes). But only the universe with gravity actually exists, but universe with anti-gravity doesn't.

Is is possible for there to be no potential existence? No, there is always potential existence in the form of all logically valid possibilities, because logic (potential existence) necessarily exists. It is illogical for logic to not exist.

But is it possible there were no actual existence? Yes, because we see some concepts exist and other don't. To paraphrase your words, there is nothing inherent in the concepts of something that can turn them into actual existence. Actual existence could have been otherwise, including there being nothing actualized.

Reality also contains some mechanism by which potentials can become actualized. This mechanism consists of "stating a purely actual axiom/FC" after which the rest of Reality follows. Theists state FC=God who then chooses which of the many potential existence to actualize. Naturalists state FC=base_ruleset out of which the rest of reality emerges.

Hopefully this clarifies my position in a different way.

---

>> I'd love it if you could show that P1 isn't a valid possibility.

> Sure. Logic exists.

Haha okay that's on me, I set the bar too low [0]. But as per above, I was talking about actual existence, not potential. Of course logic exists, but logic needs an axiom to start with. The question then becomes, is there necessarily some purely actualized axiom/FC? I think the answer is no. There could have been no actual existence. No "I", no FC, no God, nothing. Only potential existence, but nothing to actualize any of it.

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> Hopefully I have shown that, FC=rules is not logical, while FC=Personal God is.

Detailed responses below, but briefly, FC=Personal God still needs to be taken as an axiom, same as FC=rules. You've tried to use existence as the logical basis, but as I show above, on clarifying the definition of the word existence, "it is impossible for God not to exist" fails.

More importantly, the fact that God has free will is still not proven. Maybe God can only create the universe we see, but no unicorns, no anti-gravity. The choices God has might be limited to 1.

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> rather, the claim is that all existence of anything and everything, including logic itself, proceeds from God. (Actually, God, in a sense, is logic [...])

This is a main point to discuss, because I don't understand what you mean by "God, in a sense, is logic". I get that God is traditionally defined that way, but I am not able envision what it would mean to say that an entity that has "free will" is logic or the basis of logic.

How can God, who is claimed to be purely actual existence, be logic, which is purely potential existence?

Logic works on axioms. Logic by itself doesn't have any say on the axioms. It can say: if axioms, then something. But it cannot itself state the axiom. There is no such "will" in logic to posit axioms. But for each "stated" axiom, the logical truths contingent on that axiom automatically manifest. These truths are absolute and indisputable and not even God can change them.

So to me, logic precedes everything. Even God would be bound by logic, not the other way around. Can you explain why you think otherwise?

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> God is existence. Existence doesn't need a reason outside existence for existing; in fact, it is illogical for such a reason to exist.

I am not sure which existence you're talking about. Clearly concepts like lions or unicorns need an external reason for existing. You may mean potential existence, for which the statement is true, but then God is not potential but purely actual existence. And the statement doesn't generally apply to actual existence.

> Given that God is existence, it is impossible for God not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. He needs no reason outside Himself for existing. It is illogical for Him not to exist. > while FC=Personal God is [logical].

This is a making a logical leap though. First we have to define God appropriately before we can equate God to existence. Because see, the point of contention is that God has a free will or not. So if you say God is existence, then aren't you by definition circularly proving God?

To show how, let replace God with Blob. Then, given that Blob is existence, it is impossible for Blob not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. It is illogical for Him not to exist. Therefore Blob has free will. Yes silly, but my point is God or Blob are just words at this point. We'll have to do more work to prove the other properties of God, especially free will.

Similarly, when you say, "[logic] proceeds from the FC; it is an expression of the FC's being. (The FC is not the FC if something, namely logic, is independent of it.)", then it seems to me you're just defining FC to have this property and calling it God who is of course personal. As I mention above, to me logic is separate and supreme to God, as it has a different kind of existence than God.

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> Do you agree that reference to brute facts is illogical?

You already clarified this statement. But I was thinking about axioms. They are the free variables. There is no logical precedence to axioms. They just are posited as priors, and logical reasoning proceeds from the axioms/brute fact. Thus, it is all part of logic and hence not illogical.

And this "stating of axioms" is what the discussion is about. Why this axiom and not that axiom? Why a personal God and not a base_ruleset or vice versa.

> if you say one thing can happen without a reason (brute facts), you are thereby forced to say anything can happen without a reason, and that therefore you have no reason to think (say) that a chocolate cake can't start doing calculus, or some other bizarre idea.

Well no, because brute facts are also bound by logic. A "chocolate cake" as usually defined, does not have the capability to do calculus, otherwise it is not a chocolate cake, but say a cartoon character in the shape of a chocolate cake. The meaning of the words obviously matter. Unstoppable force and immovable object are "defined" to be impossible at the same time. Thus, bizarre ideas are ruled out by definitions/properties and rules of logic.

In particular, FC=base_ruleset is a brute fact. But base_ruleset has to be consistent with our observations W.

--

> P does not imply N because there is no logical connection between the two

> As stated above, if P (empirically-observed) and !P (empirically-falsified) are both compatible with N, then N cannot be said to be empirical.

> Not probabilistic or logically implying, but simply irrelevant and disconnected.

Perhaps the disagreement is that my approach is from Bayesian reasoning, asking the question: given W, which of A1 or A2 is more likely relative to each other. And seems like you're coming from the perspective of proving M or N with 100% certainty?

> Therefore, non-willing, non-free FC is compatible with unicorn events.

But if you want to talk about certainties, then yes, non-willing FC is definitely compatible with unicorn events, as I also showed with the Game of Life example.

And since N has a non-zero probability, that actually a proof against the 100% certainty of a FC with free will, no? As in okay, let's forget W. Just from logic, everything CAN be explained by "programming" (=N), so how can one logically posit M with 100% guarantee?

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> There is no claim that God actualises base_rules

> it is change, not regularity, that the book uses as the starting point

Right yes, not explicitly in the book. I'm just extending it from what the books imply. FC has to explain everything we see (W). And I hope you agree that we do observe regularity (as part of W). Everything that we look at follows deep regular rules. In other words, the change we see is regular. It is thus implied in the book, even though it is not explicitly mentioned.

And that is also why we don't need to explain the change of everyday objects like lions. We have to explain the base_ruleset that gives rise to the regularity that explains the changes. Hence, A1 or A2.

[0] https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/thats-on-me-i-set-the-bar-too...