| This is a good comment as it explains much more about your perspective than before. --- Alright. We've to first get into the meaning of the word existence. From my perspective: There is a property of reality called existence. And clearly the existence of 2+2=4 is very different from the existence of lions. Thus existence is of two kinds: potential existence and actual (ontological) existence. Concepts of both a universe with gravity and a universe with anti-gravity exist potentially (what I called ghost universes). But only the universe with gravity actually exists, but universe with anti-gravity doesn't. Is is possible for there to be no potential existence? No, there is always potential existence in the form of all logically valid possibilities, because logic (potential existence) necessarily exists. It is illogical for logic to not exist. But is it possible there were no actual existence? Yes, because we see some concepts exist and other don't. To paraphrase your words, there is nothing inherent in the concepts of something that can turn them into actual existence. Actual existence could have been otherwise, including there being nothing actualized. Reality also contains some mechanism by which potentials can become actualized. This mechanism consists of "stating a purely actual axiom/FC" after which the rest of Reality follows. Theists state FC=God who then chooses which of the many potential existence to actualize. Naturalists state FC=base_ruleset out of which the rest of reality emerges. Hopefully this clarifies my position in a different way. --- >> I'd love it if you could show that P1 isn't a valid possibility. > Sure. Logic exists. Haha okay that's on me, I set the bar too low [0]. But as per above, I was talking about actual existence, not potential. Of course logic exists, but logic needs an axiom to start with. The question then becomes, is there necessarily some purely actualized axiom/FC? I think the answer is no. There could have been no actual existence. No "I", no FC, no God, nothing. Only potential existence, but nothing to actualize any of it. --- > Hopefully I have shown that, FC=rules is not logical, while FC=Personal God is. Detailed responses below, but briefly, FC=Personal God still needs to be taken as an axiom, same as FC=rules. You've tried to use existence as the logical basis, but as I show above, on clarifying the definition of the word existence, "it is impossible for God not to exist" fails. More importantly, the fact that God has free will is still not proven. Maybe God can only create the universe we see, but no unicorns, no anti-gravity. The choices God has might be limited to 1. --- > rather, the claim is that all existence of anything and everything, including logic itself, proceeds from God. (Actually, God, in a sense, is logic [...]) This is a main point to discuss, because I don't understand what you mean by "God, in a sense, is logic". I get that God is traditionally defined that way, but I am not able envision what it would mean to say that an entity that has "free will" is logic or the basis of logic. How can God, who is claimed to be purely actual existence, be logic, which is purely potential existence? Logic works on axioms. Logic by itself doesn't have any say on the axioms. It can say: if axioms, then something. But it cannot itself state the axiom. There is no such "will" in logic to posit axioms. But for each "stated" axiom, the logical truths contingent on that axiom automatically manifest. These truths are absolute and indisputable and not even God can change them. So to me, logic precedes everything. Even God would be bound by logic, not the other way around. Can you explain why you think otherwise? --- > God is existence. Existence doesn't need a reason outside existence for existing; in fact, it is illogical for such a reason to exist. I am not sure which existence you're talking about. Clearly concepts like lions or unicorns need an external reason for existing. You may mean potential existence, for which the statement is true, but then God is not potential but purely actual existence. And the statement doesn't generally apply to actual existence. > Given that God is existence, it is impossible for God not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. He needs no reason outside Himself for existing. It is illogical for Him not to exist.
> while FC=Personal God is [logical]. This is a making a logical leap though. First we have to define God appropriately before we can equate God to existence. Because see, the point of contention is that God has a free will or not. So if you say God is existence, then aren't you by definition circularly proving God? To show how, let replace God with Blob. Then, given that Blob is existence, it is impossible for Blob not to exist, so He is the reason for His own existence. It is illogical for Him not to exist. Therefore Blob has free will. Yes silly, but my point is God or Blob are just words at this point. We'll have to do more work to prove the other properties of God, especially free will. Similarly, when you say, "[logic] proceeds from the FC; it is an expression of the FC's being. (The FC is not the FC if something, namely logic, is independent of it.)", then it seems to me you're just defining FC to have this property and calling it God who is of course personal. As I mention above, to me logic is separate and supreme to God, as it has a different kind of existence than God. --- > Do you agree that reference to brute facts is illogical? You already clarified this statement. But I was thinking about axioms. They are the free variables. There is no logical precedence to axioms. They just are posited as priors, and logical reasoning proceeds from the axioms/brute fact. Thus, it is all part of logic and hence not illogical. And this "stating of axioms" is what the discussion is about. Why this axiom and not that axiom? Why a personal God and not a base_ruleset or vice versa. > if you say one thing can happen without a reason (brute facts), you are thereby forced to say anything can happen without a reason, and that therefore you have no reason to think (say) that a chocolate cake can't start doing calculus, or some other bizarre idea. Well no, because brute facts are also bound by logic. A "chocolate cake" as usually defined, does not have the capability to do calculus, otherwise it is not a chocolate cake, but say a cartoon character in the shape of a chocolate cake. The meaning of the words obviously matter. Unstoppable force and immovable object are "defined" to be impossible at the same time. Thus, bizarre ideas are ruled out by definitions/properties and rules of logic. In particular, FC=base_ruleset is a brute fact. But base_ruleset has to be consistent with our observations W. -- > P does not imply N because there is no logical connection between the two > As stated above, if P (empirically-observed) and !P (empirically-falsified) are both compatible with N, then N cannot be said to be empirical. > Not probabilistic or logically implying, but simply irrelevant and disconnected. Perhaps the disagreement is that my approach is from Bayesian reasoning, asking the question: given W, which of A1 or A2 is more likely relative to each other. And seems like you're coming from the perspective of proving M or N with 100% certainty? > Therefore, non-willing, non-free FC is compatible with unicorn events. But if you want to talk about certainties, then yes, non-willing FC is definitely compatible with unicorn events, as I also showed with the Game of Life example. And since N has a non-zero probability, that actually a proof against the 100% certainty of a FC with free will, no? As in okay, let's forget W. Just from logic, everything CAN be explained by "programming" (=N), so how can one logically posit M with 100% guarantee? --- > There is no claim that God actualises base_rules > it is change, not regularity, that the book uses as the starting point Right yes, not explicitly in the book. I'm just extending it from what the books imply. FC has to explain everything we see (W). And I hope you agree that we do observe regularity (as part of W). Everything that we look at follows deep regular rules. In other words, the change we see is regular. It is thus implied in the book, even though it is not explicitly mentioned. And that is also why we don't need to explain the change of everyday objects like lions. We have to explain the base_ruleset that gives rise to the regularity that explains the changes. Hence, A1 or A2. [0] https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/thats-on-me-i-set-the-bar-too... |