[knightoffaith]

Yes, I still have trouble where "beyond understanding" is in (3). One reason I'm having trouble is because theologians, for example, have made arguments about ascribing various properties about the designer, e.g. that the designer is omnipotent, spaceless, timeless, etc. This shouldn't be possible even in principle if the designer is beyond understanding by definition, just like it's impossible to make coherent arguments that a triangle does not have three sides. You've suggested that it seems silly to be able to understand anything beyond the physical universe accessible to us when we don't yet have a full understanding of it, but "it seems silly" seems to be different from "it follows by definition". And in any case, the multiverse hypothesis is an attempt to understand something beyond the physical universe accessible to us, but presumably you wouldn't leverage this same objection against it.

If you really mean "beyond empirical inquiry", I would be inclined to agree, though I don't know how other explanations for the fine-tuning of the universe are better in this respect.

[Mauneam]

Ahh, theologians have made various claims about the designer? The same people that claim that he showed up as a burning bush one day, and as his own son the next?

Theologians have made many garbage assertions throughout centuries. Just because something is self-contradictory, paradoxical or nonsensical does not mean that a human hand can't put it down on paper. Here, watch this:

"A triangle does not have three sides. To find out why, and to get saved, come to the service on Sunday! (don't forget the donation)"

Other than theologians and their quackery, is there anything else that troubles you with regards to the assertion that the designer must be complex beyond understanding?

Furthermore, were you not trying to divorce religion from fine tuning? Are you finding that a little difficult? Do you see irony in the fact that you dragged it back into the dialogue all the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own?

[knightoffaith]

These aren't the kind of assertions I'm referring to though---I'm referring to arguments whose conclusions follow logically from their premises, the kind you can't make about triangles not having three sides because you end up in logical contradictions. If you don't like theologians, go back to Aristotle and his arguments about, for example, the unmoved mover. I mention theologians because they are the ones most often in the business of making arguments about this subject. Of course, you still needn't buy into any religion or theology in going about this project of understanding the designer. Just one example: you might raise the famous problem of evil to claim that the designer cannot be all-good---that's a kind of understanding.

[Mauneam]

In an attempt to refute the point about the designer being beyond understanding, you appealed to religion, all the while claiming that you don't have to appeal to religion.

Then you claim that one can't make a kind of an argument that I just demonstrated one can make.

Now you bring the problem of evil into the dialogue, as if that somehow brings the designer within reach of our understanding, when if anything it moves the concept even further beyond our reach.

Not to mention that with the problem of evil, you're dragging morality into this, another framework of thought just like religion, and closely coupled with it, that science does not deal with or recognize. All the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own.

You brought up a bunch of very interesting points in one of your previous posts that I would love to respond to, and I have enjoyed the discussion thus far, but I feel like it would be pointless to engage further unless you can clean up and strengthen your argumentation with regards to understanding the designer, so that it's free of contradictions and self-refutations. Or at least demonstrate willingness to concede a point.

[knightoffaith]

What I said is that the fine-tuning argument does not commit you to any particular religion. In demonstrating how we can understand the designer, I gave theological arguments about God as an example.

Buying some of the theological arguments about God, even if they are employed by theists, still does not commit you to a particular religion. You can agree to the omnipotence and omnipresence of the designer but not its moral interest in the good of humanity, for example. See Spinoza's Ethics for an example of a thinker who subscribes to this and fleshes out an entire system with this in mind. (There might be some controversy on this point, but Spinoza scholar Steven Nadler calls Spinoza an atheist. It's not a stretch to say that you could agree to all the arguments made in Ethics but still not subscribe to any religion.) And of course, as I said in the last comment, you can still go to Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover as an example of a thinker who predated Christianity and had no affiliation with any traditional monotheistic religion. The point is that we need not commit to any religion but can still make arguments about certain properties of the designer.

>Now you bring the problem of evil into the dialogue, as if that somehow brings the designer within reach of our understanding, when if anything it moves the concept even further beyond our reach. >Not to mention that with the problem of evil, you're dragging morality into this, another framework of thought just like religion, and closely coupled with it, that science does not deal with or recognize. All the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own.

I only introduced the problem of evil so I could give a pithy description of an argument we can make that clearly does not commit us to any mainstream religion but still reveals something to us about the nature of the designer. This is just one clear example of how we could come to understand something about the designer, if you buy the argument.

But maybe this is the crux of the contention you're having with me - implicit in what you've just said is that when you say understanding, you only mean scientific understanding, and likely that when you say explanation, you only mean scientific explanation. As I said before, the fine-tuning argument does indeed move us out of the realm of science and into metaphysics. So the sense in which we can understand or explain things about the designer is no longer scientific, but metaphysical. But that's fine - understanding need not be scientific understanding, and explanations need not be scientific explanations.

Just to elucidate what exactly I've been defending:

The fine-tuning argument does not commit us to a particular religion (we can easily imagine that there is a designer but that no religion is true). It offers an explanation of why the universal constants are what they are (by design as opposed to chance or necessity). It does not shut down further discussion - we can still ask questions about the nature of the designer (see paragraphs 2 and 4 of this comment). The design theory has no predictive power, yes, just like how other explanations of why the universal constants are what they are have no predictive power.

[Mauneam]

First you repeat the claim that fine tuning does not commit you to a religion, and then you keep appealing to religion all the way throughout. That's self-refutation at its finest.

You can stop saying "any particular religion" and just say "religion." I do accept that although fine tuning is almost exclusively pushed by Christian quacks, other religions can push it too. It also seems to be a bit of a straw-man, as I never asserted that it commits you to a specific religion, or to religion for that matter. You inevitably have to come back to it, as there is nowhere else you can take this nonsense, as you have aptly demonstrated, but you don't have to "commit" to it at the onset.

Then you comically bring up Spinoza, seemingly to strengthen your "any particular religion" point, but perhaps without realizing that he undermines your "understanding the designer" point. And you acknowledge literally in the same paragraph that he might have been an atheist. And not only that, but his concept of God, such as it is, is totally incompatible with fine tuning, because he doesn't even ascribe it intelligence. And not just that, but Spinoza ascribes quite meager power to the human mind, even denying us free will. So much for "understanding the designer" with Spinoza. Another self-refutation.

Then you even more comically bring up Aristotle, claiming that he has "no affiliation with any traditional religion," perhaps without realizing that Aristotle has become a staple in Christian theology from St. Aquinas onward. And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension. Another self-refutation.

Then you repeat your point about the problem of evil, without adding anything new, although it's already been refuted. The problem of evil does not help you come to understand something about the designer. All it does is weaken the ontological argument, and other arguments that depend on benevolence, and brings into question free will in both the designer and the human mind, without moving the needle one bit on any of the other issues that you have to content with in a benevolent designer.

Then you concede that fine tuning does indeed move us out of science, when earlier you were trying to demonstrate that it doesn't by citing the Elon Musk simulation joke meme. Nice.

I appreciate you clarifying the language on "understanding." Of course there is no such thing as scientific understanding of the designer, as science doesn't even recognize the concept (thank God, pun intended.) I thought you were the one trying to stay within science because you kept saying that you don't have to commit to religion, and citing things like the simulation hypothesis. When I say that the designer is beyond understanding, I mean primarily in the religious and metaphysical sense. In religion, his ways are mysterious. In metaphysics, he is all-knowing while the human mind is constrained and limited to our senses. That said, I would have accepted it if you were able to somehow demonstrate that there can be a scientific understanding of this concept, but it's now clear that that's not happening.

Also when I say "understanding" I obviously don't mean ascribing it paradoxical and otherwise nonsensical attributes the way I can assert right now that it has three eyes and a four-sided triangle for a mouth. When I say "understanding" I mean understanding why and what this designer is, as you put it earlier. I mean understanding how it came to be this way; to be able to go around fine-tuning things?

In your last paragraph you seem to want to broaden the scope of the dialogue without having refuted or conceded the point on understanding the designer, but we're going to have to stick to that until it's resolved, because it's kinda important. So here is the simple assertion you need to either refute or concede:

"Fine tuning posits a designer that is beyond human capacity to understand."

[knightoffaith]

>First you repeat the claim that fine tuning does not commit you to a religion, and then you keep appealing to religion all the way throughout. That's self-refutation at its finest.

I don't understand? Maybe you can read my previous comment more carefully? I've mentioned Aristotle and Spinoza as more clear examples of thinkers who have thought about the designer and whose arguments, if you accept them, will still not commit you to any religion. I've also given a simple example related to the problem of evil of an argument that reveals something about the designer that does not commit you to any religion. I think it's clear at this point that fine-tuning does not commit you to a religion, and apparently you agree.

>Then you comically bring up Spinoza, seemingly to strengthen your "any particular religion" point, but perhaps without realizing that he undermines your "understanding the designer" point. And you acknowledge literally in the same paragraph that he might have been an atheist.

I don't understand? Atheism is not a religion. That he can be interpreted as an atheist implies that his arguments about the cause of reality (who you might argue is the same as the designer posited in the fine-tuning argument) shows that the positing of a designer and going on to ascribe properties to the designer via arguments can still keep you as an atheist, not a religious person.

>And not only that, but his concept of God, such as it is, is totally incompatible with fine tuning, because he doesn't even ascribe it intelligence.

Spinoza ascribes an intellect to God and describes God as a thinking thing.

>Spinoza ascribes quite meager power to the human mind

He proves many things about God in Ethics, proofs which are a result of the human mind.

>Then you even more comically bring up Aristotle, claiming that he has "no affiliation with any traditional religion," perhaps without realizing that Aristotle has become a staple in Christian theology from St. Aquinas onward. And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension. Another self-refutation.

Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time).

> And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension.

Aristotle discusses the unmoved mover philosophically and makes arguments about the kind of being it is, for example, that it has no potentiality.

>The problem of evil does not help you come to understand something about the designer. All it does is weaken the ontological argument, and other arguments that depend on benevolence, and brings into question free will in both the designer and the human mind, without moving the needle one bit on any of the other issues that you have to content with in a benevolent designer.

The problem of evil is something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all-good. It gets you to knowledge of the absence of a particular property of the designer. I don't know why this wouldn't be a form of understanding.

>When you concede that fine tuning does indeed move us out of science, when earlier you were trying to demonstrate that it doesn't by citing the Elon Musk simulation joke meme. Nice.

I don't know where I've said that understanding the designer is something we can do scientifically, or where I've implied that the fine-tuning argument does not move us out of science, maybe you can quote me to remind me. I don't take the simulation hypothesis very seriously either, but some people do (see Nick Bostrom), and it is something you might go to if you agree to the conclusion that the universal constants are what they are because of design.

>I thought you were the one trying to stay within science because you kept saying that you don't have to commit to religion

I don't think that religious understanding and scientific understanding exhaust the kinds of understanding we can have. The kind of understanding that's relevant here that is neither of these two things is metaphysical understanding. So not requiring a commitment to religion is not the same thing as being scientific here.

>When I say that the designer is beyond understanding, I mean primarily in the religious and metaphysical sense. In religion, his ways are mysterious. In metaphysics, he is all-knowing while the human mind is constrained and limited to our senses.

I don't understand what the designer being all-knowing in contrast to the human intellect being constrained has to do with the designer being beyond understanding. Again, go back to Aristotle or Spinoza's arguments for examples of ways one can come to ascribe properties to the designer (hence, understand aspects of the designer) without committing to religion.

Maybe I'll guess at what the confusion might be here - I read "not being beyond understanding" not to mean "having a full understanding". For example, the natural world is not beyond understanding (science has allowed us to gain knowledge of various things about the natural world), but it is not something we have a full understanding of---and it perhaps may not be something we ever have a full understanding of. But I, and I suspect almost everyone, would not say the natural world is beyond understanding even if it is something we will never have a full understanding of. One might argue the finitude of human intellect means we cannot come to a full understanding of God, but this says nothing about whether we can understanding some things about God.

>That said, I would have accepted it if you were able to somehow demonstrate that there can be a scientific understanding of this concept, but it's now clear that that's not happening.

I believe I said as much earlier, but I'm sorry if I've miscommunicated that.

>Also when I say "understanding" I obviously don't mean ascribing it paradoxical and otherwise nonsensical attributes the way I can assert right now that it has three eyes and a four-sided triangle for a mouth. When I say "understanding" I mean understanding why and what this designer is, as you put it earlier. I mean understanding how it came to be this way; to be able to go around fine-tuning things?

Yes, I don't mean ascribing it contradictory attributes either, and I don't think I've said anything like this. I mean ascribing it attributes like being all-good or not being all-good. Or being a thinking thing, being an extended thing, etc. See Spinoza's Ethics for a very clear example of arguing for particular attributes (he uses the same language) belonging to God, who you might argue is the designer.

>In your last paragraph you seem to want to broaden the scope of the dialogue without having refuted or conceded the point on understanding the designer, but we're going to have to stick to that until it's resolved, because it's kinda important.

I just want to make it clear what I've been saying, so that we don't get confused and start thinking that I'm saying things that I'm not, e.g. that understanding the designer is within the scope of science.

>So here is the simple assertion you need to either refute or concede:

I think I've already said much more than needed to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding, but I'll summarize it again: There are arguments that, if you buy them, lead you to knowledge of particular properties of the designer.

And just so we don't miss the forest for the trees here, that the designer is not beyond understanding is important because it is still something we can inquire about---it does not shut down further discussion about the topic. Go back to the thinkers I've mentioned so far for examples of inquiry into the kind of existence the designer is.