[Mauneam]

In an attempt to refute the point about the designer being beyond understanding, you appealed to religion, all the while claiming that you don't have to appeal to religion.

Then you claim that one can't make a kind of an argument that I just demonstrated one can make.

Now you bring the problem of evil into the dialogue, as if that somehow brings the designer within reach of our understanding, when if anything it moves the concept even further beyond our reach.

Not to mention that with the problem of evil, you're dragging morality into this, another framework of thought just like religion, and closely coupled with it, that science does not deal with or recognize. All the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own.

You brought up a bunch of very interesting points in one of your previous posts that I would love to respond to, and I have enjoyed the discussion thus far, but I feel like it would be pointless to engage further unless you can clean up and strengthen your argumentation with regards to understanding the designer, so that it's free of contradictions and self-refutations. Or at least demonstrate willingness to concede a point.

[knightoffaith]

What I said is that the fine-tuning argument does not commit you to any particular religion. In demonstrating how we can understand the designer, I gave theological arguments about God as an example.

Buying some of the theological arguments about God, even if they are employed by theists, still does not commit you to a particular religion. You can agree to the omnipotence and omnipresence of the designer but not its moral interest in the good of humanity, for example. See Spinoza's Ethics for an example of a thinker who subscribes to this and fleshes out an entire system with this in mind. (There might be some controversy on this point, but Spinoza scholar Steven Nadler calls Spinoza an atheist. It's not a stretch to say that you could agree to all the arguments made in Ethics but still not subscribe to any religion.) And of course, as I said in the last comment, you can still go to Aristotle's discussion of the unmoved mover as an example of a thinker who predated Christianity and had no affiliation with any traditional monotheistic religion. The point is that we need not commit to any religion but can still make arguments about certain properties of the designer.

>Now you bring the problem of evil into the dialogue, as if that somehow brings the designer within reach of our understanding, when if anything it moves the concept even further beyond our reach. >Not to mention that with the problem of evil, you're dragging morality into this, another framework of thought just like religion, and closely coupled with it, that science does not deal with or recognize. All the while claiming that fine tuning can stand on its own.

I only introduced the problem of evil so I could give a pithy description of an argument we can make that clearly does not commit us to any mainstream religion but still reveals something to us about the nature of the designer. This is just one clear example of how we could come to understand something about the designer, if you buy the argument.

But maybe this is the crux of the contention you're having with me - implicit in what you've just said is that when you say understanding, you only mean scientific understanding, and likely that when you say explanation, you only mean scientific explanation. As I said before, the fine-tuning argument does indeed move us out of the realm of science and into metaphysics. So the sense in which we can understand or explain things about the designer is no longer scientific, but metaphysical. But that's fine - understanding need not be scientific understanding, and explanations need not be scientific explanations.

Just to elucidate what exactly I've been defending:

The fine-tuning argument does not commit us to a particular religion (we can easily imagine that there is a designer but that no religion is true). It offers an explanation of why the universal constants are what they are (by design as opposed to chance or necessity). It does not shut down further discussion - we can still ask questions about the nature of the designer (see paragraphs 2 and 4 of this comment). The design theory has no predictive power, yes, just like how other explanations of why the universal constants are what they are have no predictive power.

[Mauneam]

First you repeat the claim that fine tuning does not commit you to a religion, and then you keep appealing to religion all the way throughout. That's self-refutation at its finest.

You can stop saying "any particular religion" and just say "religion." I do accept that although fine tuning is almost exclusively pushed by Christian quacks, other religions can push it too. It also seems to be a bit of a straw-man, as I never asserted that it commits you to a specific religion, or to religion for that matter. You inevitably have to come back to it, as there is nowhere else you can take this nonsense, as you have aptly demonstrated, but you don't have to "commit" to it at the onset.

Then you comically bring up Spinoza, seemingly to strengthen your "any particular religion" point, but perhaps without realizing that he undermines your "understanding the designer" point. And you acknowledge literally in the same paragraph that he might have been an atheist. And not only that, but his concept of God, such as it is, is totally incompatible with fine tuning, because he doesn't even ascribe it intelligence. And not just that, but Spinoza ascribes quite meager power to the human mind, even denying us free will. So much for "understanding the designer" with Spinoza. Another self-refutation.

Then you even more comically bring up Aristotle, claiming that he has "no affiliation with any traditional religion," perhaps without realizing that Aristotle has become a staple in Christian theology from St. Aquinas onward. And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension. Another self-refutation.

Then you repeat your point about the problem of evil, without adding anything new, although it's already been refuted. The problem of evil does not help you come to understand something about the designer. All it does is weaken the ontological argument, and other arguments that depend on benevolence, and brings into question free will in both the designer and the human mind, without moving the needle one bit on any of the other issues that you have to content with in a benevolent designer.

Then you concede that fine tuning does indeed move us out of science, when earlier you were trying to demonstrate that it doesn't by citing the Elon Musk simulation joke meme. Nice.

I appreciate you clarifying the language on "understanding." Of course there is no such thing as scientific understanding of the designer, as science doesn't even recognize the concept (thank God, pun intended.) I thought you were the one trying to stay within science because you kept saying that you don't have to commit to religion, and citing things like the simulation hypothesis. When I say that the designer is beyond understanding, I mean primarily in the religious and metaphysical sense. In religion, his ways are mysterious. In metaphysics, he is all-knowing while the human mind is constrained and limited to our senses. That said, I would have accepted it if you were able to somehow demonstrate that there can be a scientific understanding of this concept, but it's now clear that that's not happening.

Also when I say "understanding" I obviously don't mean ascribing it paradoxical and otherwise nonsensical attributes the way I can assert right now that it has three eyes and a four-sided triangle for a mouth. When I say "understanding" I mean understanding why and what this designer is, as you put it earlier. I mean understanding how it came to be this way; to be able to go around fine-tuning things?

In your last paragraph you seem to want to broaden the scope of the dialogue without having refuted or conceded the point on understanding the designer, but we're going to have to stick to that until it's resolved, because it's kinda important. So here is the simple assertion you need to either refute or concede:

"Fine tuning posits a designer that is beyond human capacity to understand."

[knightoffaith]

>First you repeat the claim that fine tuning does not commit you to a religion, and then you keep appealing to religion all the way throughout. That's self-refutation at its finest.

I don't understand? Maybe you can read my previous comment more carefully? I've mentioned Aristotle and Spinoza as more clear examples of thinkers who have thought about the designer and whose arguments, if you accept them, will still not commit you to any religion. I've also given a simple example related to the problem of evil of an argument that reveals something about the designer that does not commit you to any religion. I think it's clear at this point that fine-tuning does not commit you to a religion, and apparently you agree.

>Then you comically bring up Spinoza, seemingly to strengthen your "any particular religion" point, but perhaps without realizing that he undermines your "understanding the designer" point. And you acknowledge literally in the same paragraph that he might have been an atheist.

I don't understand? Atheism is not a religion. That he can be interpreted as an atheist implies that his arguments about the cause of reality (who you might argue is the same as the designer posited in the fine-tuning argument) shows that the positing of a designer and going on to ascribe properties to the designer via arguments can still keep you as an atheist, not a religious person.

>And not only that, but his concept of God, such as it is, is totally incompatible with fine tuning, because he doesn't even ascribe it intelligence.

Spinoza ascribes an intellect to God and describes God as a thinking thing.

>Spinoza ascribes quite meager power to the human mind

He proves many things about God in Ethics, proofs which are a result of the human mind.

>Then you even more comically bring up Aristotle, claiming that he has "no affiliation with any traditional religion," perhaps without realizing that Aristotle has become a staple in Christian theology from St. Aquinas onward. And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension. Another self-refutation.

Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time).

> And not just that, but Aristotle also thought that God was beyond human comprehension.

Aristotle discusses the unmoved mover philosophically and makes arguments about the kind of being it is, for example, that it has no potentiality.

>The problem of evil does not help you come to understand something about the designer. All it does is weaken the ontological argument, and other arguments that depend on benevolence, and brings into question free will in both the designer and the human mind, without moving the needle one bit on any of the other issues that you have to content with in a benevolent designer.

The problem of evil is something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all-good. It gets you to knowledge of the absence of a particular property of the designer. I don't know why this wouldn't be a form of understanding.

>When you concede that fine tuning does indeed move us out of science, when earlier you were trying to demonstrate that it doesn't by citing the Elon Musk simulation joke meme. Nice.

I don't know where I've said that understanding the designer is something we can do scientifically, or where I've implied that the fine-tuning argument does not move us out of science, maybe you can quote me to remind me. I don't take the simulation hypothesis very seriously either, but some people do (see Nick Bostrom), and it is something you might go to if you agree to the conclusion that the universal constants are what they are because of design.

>I thought you were the one trying to stay within science because you kept saying that you don't have to commit to religion

I don't think that religious understanding and scientific understanding exhaust the kinds of understanding we can have. The kind of understanding that's relevant here that is neither of these two things is metaphysical understanding. So not requiring a commitment to religion is not the same thing as being scientific here.

>When I say that the designer is beyond understanding, I mean primarily in the religious and metaphysical sense. In religion, his ways are mysterious. In metaphysics, he is all-knowing while the human mind is constrained and limited to our senses.

I don't understand what the designer being all-knowing in contrast to the human intellect being constrained has to do with the designer being beyond understanding. Again, go back to Aristotle or Spinoza's arguments for examples of ways one can come to ascribe properties to the designer (hence, understand aspects of the designer) without committing to religion.

Maybe I'll guess at what the confusion might be here - I read "not being beyond understanding" not to mean "having a full understanding". For example, the natural world is not beyond understanding (science has allowed us to gain knowledge of various things about the natural world), but it is not something we have a full understanding of---and it perhaps may not be something we ever have a full understanding of. But I, and I suspect almost everyone, would not say the natural world is beyond understanding even if it is something we will never have a full understanding of. One might argue the finitude of human intellect means we cannot come to a full understanding of God, but this says nothing about whether we can understanding some things about God.

>That said, I would have accepted it if you were able to somehow demonstrate that there can be a scientific understanding of this concept, but it's now clear that that's not happening.

I believe I said as much earlier, but I'm sorry if I've miscommunicated that.

>Also when I say "understanding" I obviously don't mean ascribing it paradoxical and otherwise nonsensical attributes the way I can assert right now that it has three eyes and a four-sided triangle for a mouth. When I say "understanding" I mean understanding why and what this designer is, as you put it earlier. I mean understanding how it came to be this way; to be able to go around fine-tuning things?

Yes, I don't mean ascribing it contradictory attributes either, and I don't think I've said anything like this. I mean ascribing it attributes like being all-good or not being all-good. Or being a thinking thing, being an extended thing, etc. See Spinoza's Ethics for a very clear example of arguing for particular attributes (he uses the same language) belonging to God, who you might argue is the designer.

>In your last paragraph you seem to want to broaden the scope of the dialogue without having refuted or conceded the point on understanding the designer, but we're going to have to stick to that until it's resolved, because it's kinda important.

I just want to make it clear what I've been saying, so that we don't get confused and start thinking that I'm saying things that I'm not, e.g. that understanding the designer is within the scope of science.

>So here is the simple assertion you need to either refute or concede:

I think I've already said much more than needed to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding, but I'll summarize it again: There are arguments that, if you buy them, lead you to knowledge of particular properties of the designer.

And just so we don't miss the forest for the trees here, that the designer is not beyond understanding is important because it is still something we can inquire about---it does not shut down further discussion about the topic. Go back to the thinkers I've mentioned so far for examples of inquiry into the kind of existence the designer is.

[Mauneam]

>I don't understand?

Really? You didn't understand me? That's weird, seeing as you claim to be able to understand none other than God. Contradiction

>I've mentioned Aristotle and Spinoza as more clear examples of thinkers who have thought about the designer

Those two have done no such thing. Their concepts of God are incompatible with the designer. One is non-intelligent, and the other is indifferent. False claim

>I think it's clear at this point that fine-tuning does not commit you to a religion, and apparently you agree.

I neither agree nor disagree. I haven't taken a position on it yet as I think it's irrelevant to the argument of understanding the designer. Religion will come up when and if we ever bubble back up from this question of understanding the designer. Non sequitur

>I don't understand?

Oops... Here is this powerful mind that can understand God, not understanding some text on the internet again. How is it possible that a bunch of words is beyond your understanding, but the thing that fine tuned the thing that caused the thing that made the words come together is not beyond your understanding? Could it be that the words are imperfect, but God is perfect and free of contradictions? In which case how do you know this? Or did you mean that God is within human understanding, just not within yours? We just need to find somebody with a big enough brain? Or do you want to redefine "understanding" yet again, to whatever fits your current mid-sentence point? Contradiction

>Atheism is not a religion. That he can be interpreted as an atheist...

Ok... Atheism not a religion... Got it... Gonna interpret Spinoza as an atheist for this argument... Got it... Let's pin this.

>the positing of a designer and going on to ascribe properties to the designer via arguments can still keep you as an atheist

No it can't. Spinoza did not posit a designer, and positing a designer makes you a non-atheist, by definition. Not that this has anything to do with understanding such a designer. False claim

>Spinoza ascribes an intellect to God and describes God as a thinking thing.

Hey, remember that thing we pinned? Here is your atheist, acting like a theist. Contradiction

Also, Spinoza's idea of the intellect that you reference is incompatible with the intelligence required for the fine tuner. Non sequitur

>He proves many things about God in Ethics

Here is that guy you interpreted as an atheist going on and on about God, yet again... Or is he a theist now? You want to interpret him as the opposite of what you just interpreted him as? Tell you what, why don't you just interpret him as whatever you feel like at any given moment? Maybe next time he becomes a Hulk Hogan sidekick? Or you could just interpret him as me agreeing with you? Wouldn't that make it easy? All I ask is that you give him a big mustache. Contradiction

Also, no one has ever proven even the existence of God, let alone "many things" about him. All meta-physicists do is postulate. False claim

Moreover, even if he did prove something about something, even God, that would not show that he did not ascribe meager power to the human mind. Non sequitur

>Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time).

Aristotle is 100% affiliated with Christianity because St. Aquinas affiliated him with it. The fact that he was dead before St. Aquinas was born is irrelevant to the fact that he is now affiliated with St. Aquinas' religion, as his arguments can be found all over Christian theology. False claim

Moreover, you did not seem to mind dragging him into fine tuning, although he was dead before fine tuning came about. So you want to have it both ways? When it's convenient for you, it's Ok to affiliate him with a concept (fine tuning) although he was dead before the concept came about, but when it gets inconvenient for you, it's suddenly not Ok to affiliate him with a concept (Christianity) because he was dead before it came about? Bad faith

>The problem of evil is something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all-good.

The problem of evil is not something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all good, because you would need to establish the designer first, and the problem of evil does not do that. False claim

>It gets you to knowledge of the absence of a particular property of the designer.

It does not get you to knowledge of the absence of a property of the designer because it does not even establish the designer. All it does is show that a particular kind of a designer is logically inconsistent. So you would need to first establish this designer, before you can start getting to knowing some of its properties. But how are you going to establish this designer? Fine tuning? But you are in the middle of arguing that fine tuning is not nonsense. So you want to use a time machine to jump forward in time where you have established fine tuning as a valid argument, and then jump back here to use it to support the thing that supports it? Circular reasoning

>I don't know why this wouldn't be a form of understanding.

This would not be a form of understanding because it is not possible to understand something full of internal contradictions, paradoxes and circular reasoning that the problem of evil brings with it into fine tuning.

>I don't know where I've said that understanding the designer is something we can do scientifically

I inferred it from you bringing up the simulation hypothesis.

>I don't take the simulation hypothesis very seriously either

Why in the world would you bring something you don't even take seriously yourself into the dialogue? Have you already run out of things you do take seriously? Bad faith

>I don't think that religious understanding and scientific understanding exhaust the kinds of understanding we can have. The kind of understanding that's relevant here that is neither of these two things is metaphysical understanding. So not requiring a commitment to religion is not the same thing as being scientific here.

Totally irrelevant to the question of understanding the designer, but let's be honest here: religion and metaphysics are basically two peas in a pod.

>I don't understand what the designer being all-knowing in contrast to the human intellect being constrained has to do with the designer being beyond understanding.

Again something you just don't understand. You're doing a lot of not understanding for somebody who understands God. In this case, one is beyond understanding of the other because one is infinitely larger than the other.

>Maybe I'll guess at what the confusion might be here - I read "not being beyond understanding" not to mean "having a full understanding". For example, the natural world is not beyond understanding (science has allowed us to gain knowledge of various things about the natural world), but it is not something we have a full understanding of---and it perhaps may not be something we ever have a full understanding of. But I, and I suspect almost everyone, would not say the natural world is beyond understanding even if it is something we will never have a full understanding of. One might argue the finitude of human intellect means we cannot come to a full understanding of God, but this says nothing about whether we can understanding some things about God.

I don't think there is confusion here. I suspect you are feigning ignorance. I could not have been more clear on what I meant by "understanding." "Full understanding," or "complete understanding" is a very problematic concept, that may be either paradoxical or impossible depending on the framework used, and I would not have used it. I defined understanding using your own words ("why and what the designer is") and I added "and how it came to be this way, that it can fine tune universes". How could you be confused with your own words?

>Yes, I don't mean ascribing it contradictory attributes either, and I don't think I've said anything like this. I mean ascribing it attributes like being all-good or not being all-good.

Here, in the second sentence you are doing the thing that you said you never did in the first sentence. There is no such thing as an all-good designer, as you demonstrated yourself with the problem of evil. And you cannot ascribe the not-all-good attribute to a thing you have not even established yet. You cannot use Argument A (problem of evil) to support Argument B (fine tuning) while at the same time using Argument B to support Argument A. Circular reasoning

>I think I've already said much more than needed to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding, but I'll summarize it again: There are arguments that, if you buy them, lead you to knowledge of particular properties of the designer.

You have done no such thing. All you've done so far was engage in contradictions, self-refutations, circular reasoning, false claims and other fallacies, so characteristic of goddidit. Not to mention the fact that the definition of understanding you're using in your summary here is yet another reinterpretation, which is not only inconsistent with the definition I gave, but it is also inconsistent with your own wrong interpretation of my definition, where it means "full understanding." Here you are reinterpreting understanding to mean "ascribing paradoxical properties that depend on circular reasoning."

Want to have another go? Just so we don't miss the forest for the trees here, here is the assertion you need to either refute or concede:

"Fine tuning posits a designer that is beyond human capacity to understand."

[knightoffaith]

(1/2)

>Really? You didn't understand me? That's weird, seeing as you claim to be able to understand none other than God. Contradiction

I didn't claim to be able to understand God. What I claimed is that the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyond understanding.

>Those two have done no such thing. Their concepts of God are incompatible with the designer. One is non-intelligent, and the other is indifferent. False claim

Both thinkers ascribe an intellect to God.

However - yes, Spinoza's God is indifferent, and you might reasonably argue that Spinoza's system isn't reconcilable with the fine-tuning argument (Spinoza himself would say that the universe is the way it is out of necessity.)

But the point here is that Spinoza---several of whose arguments are not that alien to the traditional theology before him---is a thinker one could look to to see arguments about the cause of the universe has certain properties. Look at Ethics until Proposition XVII. One can argue for the designer, argue that he is to be identified with substance, and accept all these propositions---coming away with understanding of the designer.

Really, I only mention Spinoza and Aristotle here because I thought one would be less inclined to dismiss them out of hand as saying anything remotely similar to "A triangle does not have three sides. To find out why, and to get saved, come to the service on Sunday! (don't forget the donation)". Of course, Spinoza and Aristotle are not the only ones who discuss God in a way not like this. You can see, for example, Aquinas's discussion of whether God has X property in his Summa, and he makes no assertions like this---but since my earlier mention of theologians elicited the reaction that it did, I tried not to discuss traditional theology further. And no, this is not me saying that further discussion of designer requires religion---one can buy certain arguments about God and his properties but still reject religion; reading the Summa does not force you to buy every single claim that Aquinas makes (even many Christians don't). One can agree with some claims and disagree with others---it's certainly possible to buy the fine-tuning argument and then buy certain Aquinas-style arguments that the designer has certain properties, but disagree with Aquinas's arguments that the designer is to be identified with the God of any religion. Indeed, a common criticism of arguments for God is that even if they succeed and are even successful in establishing certain properties of God, they are not sufficient in establishing the truth of religion.

>Spinoza and atheism

Indeed, it is true that Nadler's thought here is a bit hard to make sense of given Spinoza's discussion of God since belief in God seems to directly contradict atheism, as you've correctly pointed out. What I think Nadler has in mind here is that Spinoza's God is so radically different from the normal theistic conception of God that he is essentially atheist, see a short article by him on his explanation of why Spinoza is atheist [0]. I'm not sure he is using atheist in the normal sense of the word here, yes. I bring this claim of Nadler's up only to make Spinoza's thought (a good portion of which is not too different from, say, Aquinas's thought) and arguments about God and various properties of him more amenable and less liable to dismiss him out of hand for trying to donate to some church, or something like this.

>Also, Spinoza's idea of the intellect that you reference is incompatible with the intelligence required for the fine tuner. Non sequitur

It's not clear that this is the case. The intellect that Spinoza ascribes to God is not unlike the intellect that, just for example, Aquinas, fairly orthodox (little-o) in his theology (and whose fifth way is in a sense a predecessor of design arguments like the fine-tuning argument), ascribes to God. It seems reasonable to say Spinoza's further arguments (e.g. that there is nothing contingent in the world) are ones one cannot square with the fine-tuning argument, but one is not forced to buy those arguments.

>Also, no one has ever proven even the existence of God, let alone "many things" about him. All meta-physicists do is postulate. False claim

Philosophers who engage in metaphysics are primarily in the business of not just postulating arbitrary metaphysical claims, but rather in making arguments for metaphysical claims.

>Moreover, even if he did prove something about something, even God, that would not show that he did not ascribe meager power to the human mind. Non sequitur

The original claim here was that Spinoza ascribed meager power to the human mind, and thus claimed God was beyond understanding. In this sense of "meager power", clearly, Spinoza did not think so, as he believed he had proved various things about God, hence, understood various things about God.

>Aristotle is 100% affiliated with Christianity because St. Aquinas affiliated him with it. The fact that he was dead before St. Aquinas was born is irrelevant to the fact that he is now affiliated with St. Aquinas' religion, as his arguments can be found all over Christian theology. False claim

I don't know what to say here except to repeat again - Aristotle has no affiliation with any traditional religion in the sense that he was not Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, etc., and wouldn't have recognized these religions (not the least because the first two didn't exist during his time). Aristotle does have an affiliation with Christianity in the sense that his thought was influential on important Christian theologians, such as Aquinas, yes, but this is not the only sense in which a person has a religious affiliation. I mean religious affiliation in the sense that one would normally interpret the question "What is your religious affiliation?" to which the answer has nothing to do with whether your thought has influenced some religion in some major way. Clearly, Aristotle was not affiliated with Christianity in this sense, even if he were alive today, not the least because many aspects of his thought needed to be reinterpreted to be squared with Christian theology. This is relevant because there is no contradiction in someone being an Aristotelian today but not subscribing to any religion, just to illustrate the point of how there is thought compatible with understanding the designer that does not tie one into any religion.

>Moreover, you did not seem to mind dragging him into fine tuning, although he was dead before fine tuning came about. So you want to have it both ways? When it's convenient for you, it's Ok to affiliate him with a concept (fine tuning) although he was dead before the concept came about, but when it gets inconvenient for you, it's suddenly not Ok to affiliate him with a concept (Christianity) because he was dead before it came about? Bad faith

I haven't dragged him into fine-tuning or affiliated him with fine-tuning. What I have done is pointed to him as an example of someone whose arguments about the designer of the world (unmoved mover) could be leveraged to establish properties of the designer, hence gain understanding of the designer. The only reason I have pointed to him as opposed to, say, Aquinas, is to avoid a dismissive response involving donations to a church.

>The problem of evil is not something you can use as an argument that the designer is not all good, because you would need to establish the designer first, and the problem of evil does not do that. False claim

But what's at stake here is not whether any argument succeeds in establishing the designer. What's at stake here is whether the fine-tuning argument posits a designer that is beyond understanding. What I'm saying here is that if one buys the fine-tuning argument, one could plausibly establish that the designer could not be all-good via the problem of evil, thus gaining knowledge of the designer, viz. that the designer is not all-good.

>It does not get you to knowledge of the absence of a property of the designer because it does not even establish the designer. All it does is show that a particular kind of a designer is logically inconsistent. So you would need to first establish this designer, before you can start getting to knowing some of its properties. But how are you going to establish this designer? Fine tuning? But you are in the middle of arguing that fine tuning is not nonsense. So you want to use a time machine to jump forward in time where you have established fine tuning as a valid argument, and then jump back here to use it to support the thing that supports it? Circular reasoning

But I'm not in the business of establishing a designer, what I am in the business of is establishing that the fine-tuning argument is not positing a designer beyond understanding. Indeed, I am saying that the fine-tuning argument is not nonsense. Of course, an argument doesn't have to succeed to not be nonsense. (Aside: this is why there is a stark difference in tone between the SEP article for the fine-tuning argument [1] and intelligent design [2], relevant here due to your earlier comments about both being equally silly examples of "Goddidit". )

[knightoffaith]

(2/2)

>This would not be a form of understanding because it is not possible to understand something full of internal contradictions, paradoxes and circular reasoning that the problem of evil brings with it into fine tuning.

Continue off the fine-tuning argument as presented in three statements earlier.(1) and (2) are premises and (3) is the conclusion (and it is a valid argument - accepting the premises logically leads to the conclusion---perhaps it is not a sound argument, but that is neither here nor there). Suppose you accept this argument (because you accept (1) and (2)), and then accept that there was a designer of the universe. Now consider this argument:

Premise (1): There is evil in the universe. Premise (2): If the designer was all-good, there would be no evil in the universe. Conclusion (3): The designer is not all-good.

If you accept (1) and (2) of the fine-tuning argument (and also go on to accept that the universe was designed by a designer), and accept (1) and (2) of this argument, you are logically led to knowledge of the designer, hence understanding of the designer. So it seems that the acceptance of the fine-tuning does not logically lead us into a designer which we can no longer gain forms of understanding of.

>Why in the world would you bring something you don't even take seriously yourself into the dialogue? Have you already run out of things you do take seriously? Bad faith

What I do or don't take seriously isn't relevant to whether the fine-tuning argument posits a designer that is beyond understanding or whether religion is the only place you can take the fine-tuning argument to. I don't buy the fine-tuning argument either (because I am skeptical of premise (2)), but I think credit should be given where credit is due. "Bad faith" doesn't demonstrate that an argument is invalid anyway.

>Totally irrelevant to the question of understanding the designer, but let's be honest here: religion and metaphysics are basically two peas in a pod.

I don't know why a kind of understanding we can have of the designer would be irrelevant to the question of understanding the designer, namely because showing that that kind of understanding of the designer is possible, then that answers the question of understanding the designer.

>religion and metaphysics are basically two peas in a pod

Well, this is a contentious claim among theist and atheist philosophers alike, so it warrants being substantiated.

>Again something you just don't understand. You're doing a lot of not understanding for somebody who understands God. In this case, one is beyond understanding of the other because one is infinitely larger than the other.

I don't see how God's intellect being infinitely larger than human intellect implies that God is beyond understanding.

>How could you be confused with your own words?

I don't think I am, if this isn't the confusion, then I'm sorry.

You can see the thinkers mentioned thus far for arguments of what God is, why God is, or how God came to be this way that it can fine-tune universes.

>Here, in the second sentence you are doing the thing that you said you never did in the first sentence. There is no such thing as an all-good designer, as you demonstrated yourself with the problem of evil. And you cannot ascribe the not-all-good attribute to a thing you have not even established yet. You cannot use Argument A (problem of evil) to support Argument B (fine tuning) while at the same time using Argument B to support Argument A. Circular reasoning

But I'm not using one argument to support another. What I am doing is giving just one example of how one might go about this project of understanding the designer posited by the fine-tuning argument---namely, using the problem of evil to establish that the designer cannot be all-good, thus gaining understanding of the designer.

>All you've done so far was engage in contradictions, self-refutations, circular reasoning, false claims and other fallacies, so characteristic of goddidit.

But it's not clear that I've done this in what I've said to explain why the fine-tuning argument does not posit a designer that is beyong understanding.

>Here you are reinterpreting understanding to mean "ascribing paradoxical properties that depend on circular reasoning."

But this isn't what I've said.

>Want to have another go?

Not particularly.

Now that I've hit the HN limit for a comment's limit (...among other reasons), I now suspect that HN is no longer the appropriate place for this discussion anyway (unless someone tells me that it would be fruitful for me to continue replying here). If you'd like to continue, feel free to drop an email (or XMPP or Matrix account---but please, not Discord or anything like that).

[0]: https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/964/spinoza-the-atheist

[1]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fine-tuning/#FineTuniDesi - "Indeed, many regard the argument from fine-tuning for a designer as the strongest version of the teleological argument that contemporary science affords."

[2]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/creationism - "Scientifically Creationism is worthless, philosophically it is confused, and theologically it is blinkered beyond repair."