[WalterBright]

It's actually safer for new airplane types to have flying characteristics like the previous types. There have been many accidents where a situation happened and the pilot did the right thing for the previous airplane he flew, but was the wrong thing for the one he was currently flying.

Most of what was written about the MAX crashes in the mass media is utter garbage and misinformation. No surprise there, as journalists have zero expertise in how airplanes work.

Both crashes could have been easily averted if the crews had followed well-known procedures. There was also nothing wrong with the aerodynamics of the MAX, nor the concept of the MCAS system. The flaw was in the way the MCAS system was implemented, and the way the pilots responded to it.

For example, rarely mentioned is the third MAX incident, where the airplane continued normally to their destination. The crew simply turned off the stab trim system.

BTW, I had a nice conversation with a 737 pilot a few months ago. He told me what I had already concluded - the crashed crews did not follow the procedures. I've also had unsolicited emails from pilots who told me what I'd written about it was true.

[WalterBright]

Everything I wrote is true. The LA crew restored normal trim 25 times, but never thought to turn off the stab trim system. The trim cutoff switch is right there on the center console within easy reach for just that purpose.

The EA crew oversped the airplane (you can hear the overspeed warning horn on the CVR) and did nothing to correct it. This made things worse. They were also given an Emergency Airworthiness Directive which said to restore normal trim switches, then turn off the trim system. They did not.

That's it.

I'd say half the fault was Boeing's, the other half the flight crews'.

The MCAS is not a bad concept, note that MCAS is still there in the MAX.

Pilots are a brotherhood, and they don't care to criticize other pilots in public. But they will in private.

[sho]

Everything you said might well be true, and indeed as far as I know it is, but aircraft should not have fail-deadly systems which require lightning reflexes and up-to-the-second training to diagnose and disable fast enough before they crash the freaking plane in the first place. Yes, the pilots of the affected flights might have been able to save the aircraft if their training had been just that little bit better. We'll never know. But the real blame falls squarely on the shoulders of Boeing for shipping such a ticking time bomb in the first place.

Which is why the entire worldwide MAX fleet was grounded for more than a year, and the regulators didn't just mandate a bit of extra training.

Coming up with this narrative about how it's the crew's fault because they failed to disable Boeing's quietly introduced little self-destruct system fast enough to save their own lives was a particularly despicable move from their PR department and I lost a lot of respect for them over that.

[WalterBright]

It did not require lightning reflexes or up-to-the-second training. The first LA crash came after the crew dealt with it for 11 minutes, and restored trim 25 times. The EA crew restored normal trim a couple times, and crashed after 3 minutes if I recall correctly.

As for training, turning off the stab trim system to stop runaway trim is a "memory item", which means the pilots must know it without needing to consult a checklist. Additionally, after the first crash, all MAX crews received an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE with a two-step procedure:

1. restore normal trim with the electric trim switches

2. turn off the trim system

I expect a MAX pilot to read, understand, and remember an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, especially as it contains instructions on how not to crash like the previous crew. Don't you?

> might have been able to save the aircraft

It's a certainty. Remember the first LA MAX incident, the airplane did not crash because after restoring normal trim a couple times, the crew turned off the trim system, and continued the flight normally. They apparently didn't even think it was a big deal, as the aircraft was handed over to the next crew, who crashed.

> a bit of extra training

They are already required to know all "memory items".

> Coming up with this narrative about how it's the crew's fault because they failed to disable Boeing's quietly introduced little self-destruct system fast enough to save their own lives was a particularly despicable move from their PR department

AFAIK Boeing never did say it was the crew's fault. The "have to respond within 5 seconds" is a fantasy invented by the media. It is not factual.

Both Boeing and the crews share responsibility for the crashes.

[sho]

> Both Boeing and the crews share responsibility for the crashes.

And I never said they didn't. I just choose to assign Boeing the lion's share of the blame, as they should never have let that rush-job, cost-cutting death trap of a machine take to the skies in the first place.

Anyway, I see you have your mind made up, so there's not much point in arguing further. If you feel like continuing, why don't you take it up with - let's see - every single global aviation regulator, who also somehow came to the conclusion that there was maybe something a little bit wrong with the type.

[pbhjpbhj]

>Both crashes could have been easily averted if the crews had followed well-known procedures.

I thought that the majority of the problems was that Boeing wanted the same type-rating, so that airlines could avoid paying for training. This resulted in crews not getting proper training and so not knowing the proper procedures ... which was by decision.

Both the airlines and Boeing should take the blame; I don't really see how it would be the pilots fault, if you lie and say "it's the same plane, it flies the same, you don't need conversion training".

I am not in aviation, most of this is from YouTube sources, so y'know ...