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by lolinder
982 days ago
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You're making the exact mistake that OP warned against at the beginning: "selling to game developers is very different than selling games". Even game studios can't just change things willy nilly. If Baldur's Gate 3 had been a microtransaction-funded F2P game, it would have been a flop—their target player base doesn't like that business model and wouldn't have gone for it. It's better to try out a new model with a brand new franchise than to try to pivot an existing franchise. Enterprise software has these same constraints and more, because monkeying with the business model doesn't just mildly irritate prospective customers, it can and does throw off years of planning for thousands of people per company. They can't just shrug and decide to not invest in the next installment in your game franchise, they have to re-do their corporation's 5- and 10-year plans. |
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This, very much so. Unity made two cardinal sins: creating a pricing model that didn't align with customers' business models (tying price to downloads rather than revenue), and then attempting to apply it retroactively to existing contracts (which, at best, would have resulted in high-profile and ugly legal battles against their largest customers and, likely, would have ended in a judge slapping their lawyers around with a copy of Williams v. Walker-Thomas).
In both cases, creating business model risk and uncertainty drove developers towards other software choices, not because developers are opposed to Unity asking for an engine license fee (after all, they already incorporate console fees, app store fees, etc. into their business models), but because Unity created financial uncertainty: they couldn't forecast those fees with decent probability and precision, and because they no longer trusted Unity not to try to retroactively screw them years down the road. Unity fixed the first problem, but now they've got to work to win back trust on the second.