[BasedAnon]

>There's no evidence that consciousness is anything other than a state arising from the physical processes in our bodies

Actually this is backward, "I think therefore I am". There's no reason to believe consciousness is a state arising from a physical process, our experience of consciousness precedes our experience of sensory input and therefore the physical world.

There is more evidence for the reality of consciousness than there is for the physical world, in fact we know for a fact that our understanding of the physical world is aberrational.

edit: evidently alot of empiricists aren't very happy with this comment hahaha

[orwin]

No. Or rather what do you mean?

We are able to track down and physically explain (thanks to MRI) the sentation, the objective part of consciousness (Chalmers's 'easy problems of consciousness'). That really exist and we can prove it (or we have an idea about experiments to run to prove it)

I suppose here you're talking about the subjective sentation, the phenomenal experience, the 'hard problem', and you reference the 'cogito' not because you are a dualists, but because you truly think Descartes was right on this point (and this point only, the rest was extremely weak).

I will argue that you're wrong. There is absolutely no evidence to the cogito, at most billions of anecdata from homo sapiens who all have similar brains and reactions!

Some people believe subjective experience do not really exist [0][1]. A simple explanation would be: if we are somehow able to predict, by pure observation of predictable physical reactions, how an organism will act and react, including the fact that he will believe in a subjective experience, then we do not need to think subjective experience really exist. This is merely a tool for our bodies to create a sense of self unique through time, created from our own continuous perceptions, to allow our brains to strategize and avoid dangers.

[0]https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y

[1]https://github.com/keithfrankish/articles/blob/master/Franki...

[BasedAnon]

>We are able to track down and physically explain (thanks to MRI) the sentation, the objective part of consciousness (Chalmers's 'easy problems of consciousness'). That really exist and we can prove it (or we have an idea about experiments to run to prove it)

What we prove is an evidence that is filtered through our sensory faculties and experienced by our minds. Our minds still remain judge, jury and executioner and in this same sense if we are to take seriously the faculties of our minds in assessing the physical world, then we must also take seriously our experience of conciousness which remains even when we are unable to sense the physical world. In this sense our experience of conciousness is more real than our looking at an MRI.

>then we do not need to think subjective experience really exist.

What would follow is that you do not need to think subjective experiences exist for others, but for you to make this assessment you at least must have a subjective experience.

[gaganyaan]

I don't really buy your argument about what's more real. If I was watching TV and a character punched the screen and I got a bloody nose from it, that's pretty real.

Similarly, if my mind experiences my body reaching out to take a drug and then my conciousness fractures, I think that's a sign that the experience is pretty damn real, regardless of whatever fragile concept of "consciousness" is floating in that reality.

If "you" are unable to sense the real world because you're unconscious, that doesn't mean your body isn't cogitating, it just means that the individual parts haven't come together to construct the illusion that is "you". Parts of your nervous system continue to work, though.

[orwin]

That's the beauty of illusionism, isn't it? You really have to think against yourself. If you can explain a person's reaction without 'knowing' his subjective experience, you do not need 'hard' consciousness to explain your reactions either. So you, right now, digesting this sentence and experiencing subjective thoughts, do not really experience those, you just have the illusion you do. Look at my second link.

[jemmyw]

There are plenty of reasons to believe it's physical. I mean, in some ways I can't believe I'm having to write "there are no ghosts" to a technically minded community.

If consciousness was not physical then where is it? Why would it switch on and off with physical changes to brains? Why would you be able to get altered states of consciousness with chemicals, disease and age? Why would be be able to marry some conscious activity with MRI scans?

There's quite a few bits of evidence to suggest it's physical even if we don't know how it works. There doesn't appear to be any evidence of another... what is a non physical process anyway? Surely there's only two options: the physics we know and the physics we don't know?

[amatecha]

Yeah I’m not sure why someone would argue that consciousness isn’t physical. Take a conscious person and knock them hard in the head. Interesting, their consciousness is altered. Take drugs? Check it out, consciousness altered. People who experience head trauma have their personality permanently altered. In the course of life you will likely directly observe the effects of physical injury on a person’s consciousness, just due to how often that kind of stuff happens.

[jemmyw]

> Yeah I’m not sure why someone would argue that consciousness isn’t physical

Reading the comments, one thing that's been unsaid is whether each person discussing is religious/spiritual or not. My guess is that if you are religious then the idea of there being another layer in the universe goes without saying, and if you are not then it's ridiculous.

It's probably a waste of time debating across that line.

[imtringued]

For me it has very little to do with religiousness but rather calming down some rather frequent panic attacks in the middle of the night. The fact that thinking the wrong thing can erase your consciousness while thinking it, doesn't help from the group that believes thinking the wrong thing erases consciousness.

[imtringued]

The difference is people like you mean consciousness = "consciousness as the average human experiences it", whereas others include every single potential conscious experience, including the delibitated one. From your perspective, a knocked out human isn't conscious the same way a corpse is not conscious, because he does not conform to the average human experience.

Meanwhile others think that the knocked out human and the corpse and the average human are all conscious, but they experience their respective consciousnessess aka the consciousness of an average human, knocked out human or corpse. You could say that this is just a disagreement in what the word conscious means.

[suggestion]

>Why would be be able to marry some conscious activity with MRI scans?

Does the activity cause the changes on the scan or does the changes in the scan cause the activity? How does neuroplasticity result in physical changes to the brain through, for example, cognitive behavioral therapy? Do the thoughts alter the physical structure or does the structure cause the thoughts even before the structural changes?

[jemmyw]

Internal feedback loops. Activity from the existing structure further modifies that structure. That activity is that thoughts are. So sure but it's all physical.

[suggestion]

That doesn't make any sense. If that's the case, the physical change should precede the changes in thought patterns.

Also, physicalism is about as empirical as falling in love. It's far from definitive, proven, fact.

There's no chemical emission that can force someone to have an exact thought, dream, or inner dialogue.

[tsimionescu]

Think about it like in the case of computers. The claim we are making is that our thoughts are essentially the same kind of things as the states that arise in a piece of software. And we already know that there exists today computer software which can be asked to modify itself through its own APIs.

Basically the way we view this is that CBT works kind of similarly to using the JVM APIs to modify some pieces of the running Java program to try to fix a bug. In this analogy, Psychiatric medicine would then be more like directly modifying the bits in RAM that represent a certain piece of executable code. They are both physical modifications ultimately, just working at different levels of abstraction.

[suggestion]

They are not physical alterations. The software doesn't change the physical structure of the FPGA or CPU it's running on. It is not creating new gates or transistors or how they're physically connected, only utilizing the existing physical connections differently

[jemmyw]

There are always physical changes happening. External stimuli, and time based internal changes.

> If that's the case, the physical change should precede the changes in thought patterns.

Not precede, are. These aren't separate things.

> There's no chemical emission that can force someone to have an exact thought, dream, or inner dialogue.

How do you know that to be the case? It seems likely to me that an exact set of sufficiently complicated inputs and stimuli could generate an exact thought. Actually doing so would be too complex to figure out, but many physical systems are like that.

[suggestion]

If it seems likely to you, then you're not as much of an empiricist as you claim

[akomtu]

The idea that consciousness is physical doesn't mean it's mechanical. Physical world is made of fields with no clear boundaries, while mechanical system are made of isolated deterministic and immutable parts.

[BasedAnon]

The difference is that you do not experience ghosts, but you do experience conciousness.

>If consciousness was not physical then where is it?

We can invert this and ask, if physicality is not ideal, then how do we come to know it?

>Surely there's only two options: the physics we know and the physics we don't know?

The third option is that physics is unable to interrogate itself.

[jemmyw]

> We can invert this and ask, if physicality is not ideal, then how do we come to know it?

Why would we ask that? Not ideal for what? It just is.

> The third option is that physics is unable to interrogate itself.

This is likely true. We are the product of physics and we can only delve so deep. It might be that we cannot see to the most fundamental level(s). That's not a third option though, that's just the state of any scientific investigation at any point of time. However, given all we have learnt so far, what we don't need to do is invent new gods for the levels we cannot see or the things we cannot yet understand. I mean, people will, evidently, but that's all just wishful thinking.

Meanwhile there is slow progress to piece together how the brain works. My opinion is that we will figure it out but the answers about consciousness will be unsatisfactory. Just like right now, given the current understanding of physical processes even taking into account quantum systems having probabilistic outcomes, we have no free will. It's an answer, I find it a compelling one, but most folks don't like that answer.

[tsimionescu]

> Why would we ask that? Not ideal for what? It just is.

I'm pretty sure GP was using "ideal" in the sense of "made up of ideas", as in the philosophical concept of idealism, which is essentially the opposite of materialism: idealism is the position that the real world is that of the mind, and physics and the physical world is an emergent property of our minds, not the other way around.

Not that I think this is a real coherent position worth discussing.

[skissane]

> Not that I think this is a real coherent position worth discussing.

Why is it not a "real coherent position worth discussing"?

[tsimionescu]

Because to me it seems that if it were made consistent, it would extend into solipsism. And if it does, I don't think it's worth discussing then.

[jemmyw]

Thanks that was insightful

[aiProgMach]

Thank you. It's really mind boggling how many people miss _this_ especially in scientism echo chambers. My knowledge about myself (consciousness, free will...), is infinitely more reliable than any of "Scientific" input no matter what is the "impact factor" of the publishing medium, so really no amount of "science" can be enough to disprove those very basic principles that everything else is built upon them.

[mikhailfranco]

I think individual self-knowledge is often flawed. There are many strange, damaged, malfunctioning, drunk, medicated, hallucinating, meditating, dreaming and variously other disturbed minds, which have objectively flawed impressions of themselves and their surroundings.

Their doctors, or even a casual observer, will have much more concrete objective knowledge of their state of mind than the subjects themselves.

[aiProgMach]

What you're saying does not contradict what I'm saying. The thing you're describing works on a much higher level than what I was describing, for example in this case the doctor needs to fulfill at least the following requirements (from his own point of view):

1- He's independent agent who's watching and describing another independent agent in a real objective world

2- He acknowledge that there is cause/effect in principal (that's why they can deduce that there are flaws in the patient mind just based on external behaviour)

3- The doctor is trusting that he's not himself hallucinating, and that he's indeed see'ing real things and he's not just a programmed robot doing some random job.

and so on.

--

As you can see I was talking about very basic level, it's the level that allow you to build another more complex level of information, and which any other information is necessarily less reliable than it. Because trusting that I'm independent agent who exists in an objective world along another independent agents is a necessary Premise to accept any external information provided by those other agents, and any information provided by those agents that contradicts this basic experience it also destroys any reliability in the objectivity and correctness of their existence for me and any input provided by them. Hence, any "scientific" paper that contradicts my direct experience about myself (e.g Free will) is necessarily less reliable than said experience no matter what is the impact factor of the journal.

[mikhailfranco]

Most of what you you say is credible. But it comes down to a personal choice about the balance of probabilities for where objective knowledge really resides.

I do not trust myself, as one flawed, idiosyncratic and individual brain.

I am more likely to trust the established objective view of other consciousnesses. The scientific method is (should be) a collective network of communicating, iterating, self-correcting consciousnesses, which operates according to robust rules and procedures established (evolved) by previous generations of collaborating consciousnesses. Of course, it is also flawed, but over long periods of time, it usually gets better answers than the intuition of individuals.

If I think I can drive, but I am drunk, and a good friend tells me I'm drunk and I should not drive, then I should believe them, not me.

If I think I have some medical symptoms, I tell a doctor. However, an individual doctor can be corrupted by mis-education, ignorance, their own psychological issues, or their own financial gains for various treatments. So I ask multiple doctors, but they may have a consistent bias. But if I don't trust any rational explanation of my symptoms, then yet another doctor may diagnose shape-shifting hypochondria or paranoia against doctors. Who to believe? It's not obvious, but it's not obviously me over all others.

[aiProgMach]

Still, even in your case if you slowly strip down the layers of your analysis, you will notice that it necessarily boils down to few things that you know directly and you can't build a proof for them because any other proof will be build on them being correct. Look, there are things that you know are correct and you can't make a proof for them (even the "I think therefore I am" is a circular reasoning, the real info is in "I" itself), and in your case you believe a lot of things about yourself and world you live in before you can really start to depend on the higher order conclusions that allow you to trust your friend or your doctors.

[mikhailfranco]

It takes a 3rd party, someone outside the situation, and possibly some time after the fact, to decide what most approximates objective truth.

I don't trust myself here and now, I could be drunk or deluded, or vain, or biased, or self-obsessed (most people seem to be that way).

I don't trust my doctors, they could be under-educated, or self-interested to overtreat me, or publish more papers on anti-doctor paranoia, and self-obsessed (most people are that way).

I only trust some averaged, collective, rational, longer-term, reflective, investigative, independent, reviewed, challenged, criticized and doubted process to get closer to truth.

[mikhailfranco]

With regard to Free Will, there is a little intellectual dodge called the Compatibilist solution (popularized by Dennett), which says you really feel like you have free will, but you do not. Also see Sam Harris and Robert Sapolsky on the topic (but note Dennett strongly disagrees with Harris, he has no choice, it could not be otherwise :)

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

The feeling of Free Will is bootstrapped from making decisions in a complex world. The subconscious makes most decisions automatically, based on left-brain exploitation of the current situation for survival. The timescales are too short for slow consideration to have an evolutionary advantage. Any imprinting of this instant behavior is made by stress hormones, which enhance memory retention for unusual or extreme situations.

However, the right brain is tasked with fitting actions into a wider context of long-term survival. It can run what-if scenarios, imagine different courses of action, and different outcomes. Its view of an action is always in the belief that something could be different next time, so something could be different last time - I could have done something else. But this is false, the left-brain was in control, and the right brain just provides post hoc rationalizations for those forced actions.

So, approximately, Free Will is the story the right brain tells itself after the left-brain already made the decision.

For more on the split brain aspect of this, see McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary and The Matter With Things.

[mikhailfranco]

Right on cue, here is a podcast interview with Michael Shermer (Skeptic Magazine):

Dan Dennett Looks Back on his Career

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tm6nDmpnmEU

[aiProgMach]

Dennett... I don't think that guy can be called a real philosopher, but at least he's not just random "Journalist" like Sam harris is :)

Again, my direct experience of free will is much stronger than any of the half ass explanations these guys have to offer (and they're obviously much more flawed, you can clearly notice the ideological motives they have in relation to these topics).

My problem with this "explanation" (you feel that you have free will but you don't, it's just a story) is that it just pushes the issue one step further, I mean just think about it, who feels this exactly? They're assuming there is another "agent" within me that have the consciousness and it's being told stories and it accepts them, and this agent can understand that and it feel it can decide another choices, so it can decide? so it means it have some type of free will or the ability to understand different choices? even if in reality it can't execute them? (similar to paralyzed people?).

Anyway, if we want to open the can of worms of telling other people you're just delusional, then maybe the real world doesn't exist? and maybe logic is not real? and scientific method is not scientific? When I was much younger, I used to imagine that I live in a huge magical theater and that everything is being rendered for me, so maybe after all I'm the only real person in existence?

[jemmyw]

I've never heard a credible explanation of free will or what someone means by that. Can you offer a description of what free will means, within known science?

I think it through several layers. At a personality layer most of the time you make decisions that are consistent with your personality. But occasionally you do something out of character.

At a lower level, a mind logic level, your mind / brain makes decisions based on weights. Should I have a coffee now - do I want one, do I enjoy it, am I trying to avoid caffeine because I felt a bit fuzzy yesterday etc. The bigger the decision the more weights go into it, but if you re-ran the same mind with the same weights then it makes the same decision every time, and if it didn't then er why? So where is the freedom there? To make a free choice at this level is to make a choice inconsistent with the experience + inputs of the mind.

Then at the lowest level, the brain is processes in the physical universe. Quantum probabilistic effects, as I understand it, don't have much effect on outcomes. And where they do, it's not like your brain controls that, it just happens. We have a physical state, time goes forward and we have a new state. And that's all there is, no concept of will, free or otherwise.

And you know, I think it's perfectly fine to feel like you have free will and not consider it often. Live your life as if you do. It's only if you focus on it that you can be like "ah, probably not then" but does it matter?

[mikhailfranco]

Dan Dennett is a professional philosopher. He is Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University, and has written several books, including Consciousness Explained.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Dennett

[mikhailfranco]

Sam Harris is not a random scare-quoted "journalist".

He is a writer and podcaster, who has a B.A. in philosophy from Stanford, a Ph.D. in neuroscience from UCLA, and long experience with both meditation and psychedelics, which makes him rather well qualified to comment on the topics of free will and consciousness. Even if you disagree with him.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Harris