[BasedAnon]

The difference is that you do not experience ghosts, but you do experience conciousness.

>If consciousness was not physical then where is it?

We can invert this and ask, if physicality is not ideal, then how do we come to know it?

>Surely there's only two options: the physics we know and the physics we don't know?

The third option is that physics is unable to interrogate itself.

[jemmyw]

> We can invert this and ask, if physicality is not ideal, then how do we come to know it?

Why would we ask that? Not ideal for what? It just is.

> The third option is that physics is unable to interrogate itself.

This is likely true. We are the product of physics and we can only delve so deep. It might be that we cannot see to the most fundamental level(s). That's not a third option though, that's just the state of any scientific investigation at any point of time. However, given all we have learnt so far, what we don't need to do is invent new gods for the levels we cannot see or the things we cannot yet understand. I mean, people will, evidently, but that's all just wishful thinking.

Meanwhile there is slow progress to piece together how the brain works. My opinion is that we will figure it out but the answers about consciousness will be unsatisfactory. Just like right now, given the current understanding of physical processes even taking into account quantum systems having probabilistic outcomes, we have no free will. It's an answer, I find it a compelling one, but most folks don't like that answer.

[tsimionescu]

> Why would we ask that? Not ideal for what? It just is.

I'm pretty sure GP was using "ideal" in the sense of "made up of ideas", as in the philosophical concept of idealism, which is essentially the opposite of materialism: idealism is the position that the real world is that of the mind, and physics and the physical world is an emergent property of our minds, not the other way around.

Not that I think this is a real coherent position worth discussing.

[skissane]

> Not that I think this is a real coherent position worth discussing.

Why is it not a "real coherent position worth discussing"?

[tsimionescu]

Because to me it seems that if it were made consistent, it would extend into solipsism. And if it does, I don't think it's worth discussing then.

[hnfong]

“the universe is the extension of the self” is precisely the idea we are talking about.

IMHO it is the only thing worth discussing.

And yes you can derive new “physics” with this idea alone.

[skissane]

> “the universe is the extension of the self” is precisely the idea we are talking about.

Idealists can take several possible approaches to the issue of how many people/minds exist:

1) Solipsism: only I exist, and everyone else is a figment of my imagination

2) Many minds: only minds ultimately exist, but many distinct minds exist (George Berkeley, John McTaggart)

3) Open individualism: I exist and everyone else exists too, but we are all ultimately the same person, and the idea that we are different people is an illusion (not necessarily an idealist view, but one open to an idealist to adopt; most famous notable proponent is Daniel Kolak; but Kolak in the introduction of his book I Am You extensively quotes the physicists Freeman Dyson and Erwin Schrödinger as expressing the same view)

4) Pan(en)theism: only one mind/person ultimately exists, but we are somehow "sub-minds"/"sub-persons" of that ultimate person. One might call that single ultimate person "God", albeit it is defining the term "God" in a very different way than classical Western theism does. Or, maybe we could call it the "Universe", or borrow Plato's term "the World Soul". (Maybe there is not much difference between (3) and (4), but (4) would view the distinction between different "sub-minds"/"sub-persons" as more "real" than (3) does.)

5) Panpsychism: everything in the universe (even individual atoms) is conscious, and hence has a distinct mind. This in a sense is a variant of (2), but proposes far more minds than Berkeley or McTaggart would ever have admitted. Not all panpsychists are idealists, but you can certainly be an idealist panpsychist

Critics of idealism tend to focus on (1), but in practice (1) has never had any serious proponents. All serious idealists have espoused (2)-(5) (or maybe some other variation I've missed)

See also the philosopher David Chalmers' paper in which he proposes his own taxonomy of idealisms, different from mine: https://philpapers.org/archive/CHAIAT-11.pdf

As an idealist, my starting position is (2), although I have some sympathy for (4).

> And yes you can derive new “physics” with this idea alone.

I don't know exactly what you mean, but I'm not a fan of that kind of talk.

We have to distinguish between physics the natural science, and the philosophical discipline of the philosophy of physics, which is a sub-discipline of the philosophy of science

The idealism debate fundamentally belongs to metaphysics (although contemporary presentations often focus on it through the lens of philosophy of mind instead), but it has obvious consequences for other philosophical disciplines, including epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and indeed philosophy of physics

But while adopting idealism must lead us to a different philosophy of physics, the actual content of physics the natural science is unchanged. Physics the natural science is ultimately just a bunch of mathematical tools for predicting future observations. Those tools, and how you use them, are exactly the same whether you are a materialist, an idealist, a dualist, or none of the above. The only difference is your answer to the philosophical debates about what those tools ultimately are, or what they ultimately mean.

[skissane]

What is inconsistent about non-solipsistic idealism?

[jemmyw]

Thanks that was insightful