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by tkfu
1054 days ago
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It's not about security by obscurity. A better analogy would be the fight over "tivoization". In safety-critical and highly-regulated systems like automotive and health care, there's a meaningful regulatory interest in ensuring that the devices as sold and authorized to be on the road (or in patients' hospital rooms) don't get modified in dangerous ways. That means that the software and firmware running on each of the dozens of ECUs in a vehicle is part of the (regulated) functional safety spec of the system. There are real, meaningful technical challenges to overcome if you want to meet both the goal of ensuring that dangerous and malicious software can't run in safety-critical domains, and the goal of allowing users to modify their vehicles as they see fit. I'm speaking as one of the authors of the Uptane standard for secure software updates in vehicles, and as a life-long proponent of user freedom and open access to the computers we buy. There are possible solutions here, but they are not easy. |
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What use is preventing dangerous modifications, when unmodified devices contain critical safety bugs, and will continue to contain them. The ongoing effort by automakers is increasing the amount of safety bugs by connecting everything to the internet without proper security practices.
The only reason to require signed firmware/hardware as it stands is to decrease the repairability, harm the second hand market, and increase profits.