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by pierat
1110 days ago
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Now why don't these companies keep the drives in-house instead of destroying? That, I don't know. But aside that, regarding the encryption... If you used the drive without encryption at any time, then its possible to recover the unencrypted data. You'd need to guarantee that your drives were *always* used with encryption from the start to end. And that's a hard guarantee. So yeah, if they were leaving the org, I'd destroy them too. |
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When you do a “secure erase”, the drive will internally regenerate a new key and overwrite it in its NVRAM. Crucially, the algorithm must be securely random and the old key must be reliably overwritten. But if those conditions are met - presto! Everything on the drive that was written with the old key is now unreadable and entirely unrecoverable.
If you actually want to “lock” the drive, the key would be generated by a KDF from the password, the one saved in NVRAM would not be used.
It’s more complicated than that, if you want to support enabling a password without wiping the drive. That would involve encrypting/decrypting a stored key with the password. But either way you can definitely secure erase a modern unlocked drive, if you trust the implementation!