| > If you don't like the current solutions, write your own Do you see all the large vendors cooperating on letting third party Passkey implementations seamlessly replace their own? I don't. Do you think it is realistically (and not theoretically) possible to implement a new solution that would provide the security properties as good as sum of all individual fragmented options? I'm not sure. And even if someone spends enormous resources and makes it all real, there's still that issue of a Yubikey in a safe. Sorry, but if N implementations require that inconvenient process I've explicitly outlined, having N+1 option still won't fix it. And it's the standard's fault, not "the implementations aren't there yet". The standard had not addressed this, even though it's pretty much obvious this is going to be an issue on the very first day someone who isn't an ideal customer (100% lifetime loyal to one single vendor) uses Passkeys. When I'm setting up SSH keys on a host I can either give it a list of all my keys, or CA certificate to trust, but I don't have to grab all the individual devices. Here, I must. Attestation is another potential issue, but it's not a problem today. |
Yes, given that I use my open source Solo 2 to log in to any Passkeys-supporting site already. It's not about whether they will support it. It's an open standard, you can use whatever you want.