[bitwzrd]

Why should we possibly believe that any software switches actually fully disable anything? If there isn't a hardware killswitch, there is no reasonable expectation that the cellular radio is actually disabled...

There are trustworthy sources claiming that the NSA still tracks devices that are completely "powered off".

No reason to believe that the CCP doesn't have that ability as well.

[gorkish]

I'm not trying to convince you of anything. I'm just pointing out that there is a tangible benefit to end-user privacy that is enabled by this change inasmuch as the features are advertised to work and inasmuch as I personally have investigated how they operate.

Certainly the CCP has other means to surveil their dissidents, and at a certain level of paranoia, leaving the cell phone behind might be a good idea. However that is a completely separate topic that does not deserve to be convoluted with this discussion.

It seems in the fervor to lambast Apple, very few people seem to be fully considering that the original feature is extremely problematic. People will often enable 'Everyone' when they need to exchange a file with someone, but forget to change it back. If you need any more evidence that this is so, I invite you to go into a public space and scan for Airdrop targets.

[swader999]

It's pretty easy to test this with a meter. I don't get any emf with my Samsung or my MacBook when I'm in those modes.

[refurb]

I do recall reading something about the cellular/radio chip is separate from the rest phones hardware.

It can still communicate with towers even when phone is off. The phone can’t control that behavior.

[gorkish]

> It can still communicate with towers even when phone is off. The phone can’t control that behavior.

It cannot and does not. Please do not perpetuate this ridiculous fantasy.

[kaba0]

Hardware killswitches are security theatre, if you can’t trust the software layer to that degree than you are just lost behind saving.

[miloignis]

Strong disagree - defense in depth is a thing.

I once had my phone, which I had turned off, loudly ring during a moment of silence I was attending. It was extremely embarrassing, and until I replaced that phone whenever I was in a similar situation where it was critical to be quiet, I removed the battery. It wasn't that I didn't trust the phone or it's software, but mistakes and accidents happen, and for some critical situations it's better to be safe than sorry.

Same thing applies to phones with hardware switches.

[xpe]

No. You can inspect the hardware. If you can verify that the switch disables the radio, you don't have to worry about software do you?

... unless there is some other way to exfiltrate data, such as:

1. alternative antennae, chipsets?

2. some kind of filtering + buffer + delayed send

3. something else...?

Whatever the case, such techniques are not free of cost and increase the chance of exfil detection. So, killswitches provide a later of protection. Therefore, the claim that killswitches are of _no_ use is not adequately argued above.

[kaba0]

> hardware. If you can verify that the switch disables the radio, you don't have to worry about software do you?

Until the next time you turn radio on, when it could just send out anything, anywhere if the software stack is untrusted, so we are back at square one.

[xpe]

I'm aware. You apparently did not notice my point #2 above:

> 2. some kind of filtering + buffer + delayed send

Resources (compute, storage) are needed for filtering, buffering, sending. However, these actions are not "free": (1) they increase the chance of detection later; (2) they require electrical power; (3) they require additional design and testing for the device using them. Isn't raising the cost of breaching security the basic idea?

So my point stands: A hardware kill switch serves as a security layer. I'm not saying it's perfect, but it is not (in general) simply security theater (your point above).