[woodruffw]

I think my comment below[1] addresses parts of this: there are really (at least) two things called "EA," and adherents of the more ridiculous one (like SBF) will regularly use the less ridiculous one (Singer's) as moral cover. The post is pretty clearly about the former, not the latter.

I agree with your interpretation of Singer, for what it's worth: I don't recall him ever encouraging maximum personal income in any of his books; only observing that someone could do more good (in the Utils sense) with more resources.

> Setting aside this article, where's all the hate for giving to charity coming from? Guilty consciences? Shouldn't we as a society celebrate and encourage giving? It seems the alternative more often then not is to accumulate.

I don't think anybody really hates charity. What people (rightfully) identify is the "hazard" of motive in charitable giving, particularly public giving: when someone is known publicly to donate, it becomes impossible to distinguish truly benevolent motives from self-interested ones (even if those self-interested motives don't "really" matter from a Utils perspective).

Separately: charitable giving on the scale performed by billionaires demonstrates latent injustice. Even if not intended as such, it effectively represents the conversion of a just action (giving to the poor is right) into a whimsical or motive-driven one (I give to the poor because I want to).

[1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33708972

[tptacek]

Indeed, one of the many raps on, uh, modern? EA is that it's morally isomorphic to the practice of buying indulgences.

[gnramires]

I am committed to give all that I can -- living frugally as much as reasonable until I die. I think we should be more worried about people that simply haven't come to understanding that we need to help the world, and that other lives matter as our own, than about people giving significant part of their incomes to charity. Of course, the idea is you don't have to do that -- if everyone gave 10%, the world would be much, much better![1].

Heck, sometimes (see the war in Russia), people are actively doing the opposite and trying to destroy civilization.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtWINl3C

[physicles]

Btw the phrase "morally isomorphic" is a delightfully creative piece of language -- both intuitive and precise.

[ctoth]

Can you explain what this sentence means?

> when someone is known publicly to donate, it becomes impossible to distinguish truly benevolent motives from self-interested ones (even if those self-interested motives don't "really" matter from a Utils perspective).

Who cares why someone donates, as long as they donate? Is there some thing called "truly benevolent" donations which keep more people alive longer, or have some other measurable impact? I actively am having trouble parsing this. It seems like you realize how ridiculous this sounds, by adding the bit at the end about how it doesn't matter, but then why even bring it up? Like what is special about "truly benevolent" giving?

It's not as though these motives don't "really" matter, they ... just don't matter at all?

[woodruffw]

They matter to people who aren't Utilitarians (like me!). I'm much more interested in motive than I am in outcome (although I like Good Things, just like everyone else).

Here's a hopefully intuitive framing: actions are built on outcomes, while institutions are built on motives. It's hard to imagine a consequential derivation of fundamental and inviolable human rights, for example: there will always be cases and circumstances where a consequential view of morality enables you to engage in casuistry to suit the occasion. I'd much rather build (and live under) practical moral systems where things stay right and wrong.

(To be clear: motive itself is not the moral object, in my view. Motive is merely the thing being questioned. The moral object is the moral law.)

[JamesBarney]

So you think it's better to judge charities by what we think of their motives instead of how much they help people?

[woodruffw]

No. What I think is that ordering between charities is a morally insensible act.

[JamesBarney]

So you think all charities are equally good, and applying any ordinality to them is insane?

Why do you think all charities are equally good?

[woodruffw]

Also no. I don’t know where you’re getting that.

There are good charities, and there are bad charities. One of the things that can make a charity bad is having a bad mission. Another thing that can make a charity bad is being corrupt or inefficient. But I don’t presume to order charities based on how bad or good they are, and I don’t think there’s anything particularly good about giving to one good charity versus another good charity.

Also, “insensible” does not mean “insane.” I meant that it does not make sense, in my moral system.

[emodendroket]

Rich people give to charities to aggrandize themselves. Charities, needing donations, trim their sails to appease self-aggrandizing rich people. Not hard to see how this can lead to the charity in effect doing more to serve its patrons than the people it actually claims to help, and based on some up-close experience, I would say that is not an academic concern.

[JamesBarney]

The whole point of EA is to move toward a system where charities are judged by the good they do and not their marketing campaign.

AMF and other top givewell charities seem far more focused on the good they can do than more classic charities like WWF or Plan Parenthood.

[emodendroket]

I am rather skeptical of the notion that this can be meaningfully quantified.

[JamesBarney]

Surely you think between two charities, one that takes a $1,000 and buys caviar for starving children and one that feeds 1000x as many bread the second one does more good per $ than the first.

[emodendroket]

Sure, it is easy to invent fantastically silly uses of money. Is that what is at issue?

[woodruffw]

And what theory of Good determines how we do that judging? The different "schools" of EA seem to have radically different approaches ("longtermism" versus maximizing QALYs for living beings).

And even this punts on perceptive utility, the kind that Nozick warns us about[1]: it's entirely possible that Johnny in Country X gets more utility out of $100 in charitable giving than 50 others in Country Y. But this seems like a really bad logical consequence, the kind that the Internet Rationalist EA community uses to justify spending money on AGI research instead of donating to AMF.

Overall, it's much easier to live in a world where we can determine that some set of charities are worth giving to, and not try too hard to order between them.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_monster

[JamesBarney]

Do you think it's good to donate to charities?

Do you think that some charities are more effective than other ones?

Do you think we should try to measure that to determine which ones are more effective?

[emodendroket]

When one considers that there are numerous charities with exact opposite goals I’m not sure how you can consider your three questions to have self-evident answers.

[woodruffw]

I think giving to charities is supererogatory, at best. At worst, it’s a reflection of a heteronomous will.

[nonameiguess]

I make no claim at to where our current world is on this spectrum, but there is some point on it where a world full of some tiny number of extremely rich people who shower money on the poor, even to the point of material scarcity largely vanishing, but everyone in this world is a dickhead to each other, is a worse world than a world that still has material scarcity but is full of people who honestly and legitimately care for each other.

This is probably far more obvious at small units like families, where we are all well aware of the existence of absolutely miserable rich kids who might live short, drug-addicted lives that end in suicide, in spite of their parents giving them all the money in the world.