[woodruffw]

They matter to people who aren't Utilitarians (like me!). I'm much more interested in motive than I am in outcome (although I like Good Things, just like everyone else).

Here's a hopefully intuitive framing: actions are built on outcomes, while institutions are built on motives. It's hard to imagine a consequential derivation of fundamental and inviolable human rights, for example: there will always be cases and circumstances where a consequential view of morality enables you to engage in casuistry to suit the occasion. I'd much rather build (and live under) practical moral systems where things stay right and wrong.

(To be clear: motive itself is not the moral object, in my view. Motive is merely the thing being questioned. The moral object is the moral law.)

[JamesBarney]

So you think it's better to judge charities by what we think of their motives instead of how much they help people?

[woodruffw]

No. What I think is that ordering between charities is a morally insensible act.

[JamesBarney]

So you think all charities are equally good, and applying any ordinality to them is insane?

Why do you think all charities are equally good?

[woodruffw]

Also no. I don’t know where you’re getting that.

There are good charities, and there are bad charities. One of the things that can make a charity bad is having a bad mission. Another thing that can make a charity bad is being corrupt or inefficient. But I don’t presume to order charities based on how bad or good they are, and I don’t think there’s anything particularly good about giving to one good charity versus another good charity.

Also, “insensible” does not mean “insane.” I meant that it does not make sense, in my moral system.

[JamesBarney]

So you're happen to separate charities into "good" and "bad" but wouldn't be ok breaking them down into "bad" "ok" "good" or "bad" "good" better?

You're happy to assign a number of 1 or 0, but would never want to rank them any more than that? That doesn't make sense to me.

[woodruffw]

I'm perfectly happy to establish my own preferences: I tend to donate to journalistic and legal aid nonprofits. That's what I prefer, but I don't operate under the belief that I prefer those things because they're better, morally speaking, than donating to famine relief or animal care nonprofits.

There are lots of ethical theories (a majority, in fact!) that don't require (but may admit) grading actions on a sliding scale from "morally worst" to "morally best." Moral systems all boil down to a Theory of Right, and it's possible to have a Theory of Right rooted in virtue or autonomy rather than Good (i.e., greatest consequence).