[fladrif]

Having read your article, I still don't understand one part. The claim that the honest validators in the face of a malicious superminority can eventually leak them out, but a malicious supermajority cannot do the same to an honest superminority. I figure there would need to be some other mechanism that would tip the balance in favor of the honest validators, otherwise it seems like majority should always win.

[dannyw]

If you run a node, you're also checking that every block follows the rules.

A malicious supermajority cannot break the rules your client enforces, because your client will reject it.

Think of it as everyone running ethereum has a bunch of asserts() each block or communication it receives.

[fladrif]

What are these rules? Say for instance 51% of validators decide to include a malicious transaction inside of a block, what rules would that be breaking?

[capableweb]

Depends on what way the transaction is "malicious". If malicious means transferring funds that don't exists, it'll be noticed. If malicious means transfer funds out of an address it doesn't hold the key for, it'll be noticed, and so on.

[spywaregorilla]

> If malicious means transferring funds that don't exists, it'll be noticed.

who cares?

As far as I can tell, a majority that wants to block a vote can do so freely and the only resolution is a fork where people just assume that the honest fork will win out.

I also think it's not a majority but actually just a little more than a third to block a vote for eth

[fladrif]

And in the case that the malicious supermajority isn't breaking the rules? In the stated instance where they're omitting certain transactions, what rule would they be breaking?