[throwrqX]

Russian tactics would be completely different for that scenario. There would be a much more massive bombing campaign using the full might of their air force (which is clearly not what is happening in Ukraine) for one. I wouldn't rule out usage of tactical nuclear weapons either if they faced any difficulties.

[sofixa]

> There would be a much more massive bombing campaign using the full might of their air force (which is clearly not what is happening in Ukraine)

Why? They've shelled indiscriminately civilian city centres, train stations with civilian evacuations, buildings where civilians have taken shelter. It's obvious they couldn't care less about civilian lives, what is stopping them from using their aviation?

Considering what we saw on the rare occasions they did use their aviation (phones with buttons used to coordinate and communicate, using physical landscapes and maps for orientation, pilots in not the best shape) their air force is probably as good as their army. That is, utterly shit, with terrible maintenance, no morale, missing equipment, etc etc etc.

[throwrqX]

Shelling city centers randomly once a day is completely different to a widespread bombing campaign similar to Dresden in WW2. You can see the obvious differences looking at the casualty rates on Wikipedia (~30,000 in 6 months vs ~25,000 in 3 days). They also have to maintain their aviation in case of an escalation with NATO.

How they are currently going now in the war which was clearly not planned well at all doesn't necessary mean their performance would carry over to a war with the rest of Europe which I doubt would be this poorly planned. Plenty of military commentators have noted such a point (Michael Kofman as an example).

[sofixa]

> Shelling city centers randomly once a day is completely different to a widespread bombing campaign similar to Dresden in WW2

Of course they're different, nobody is arguing the opposite.

> How they are currently going now in the war which was clearly not planned well at all doesn't necessary mean their performance would carry over to a war with the rest of Europe which I doubt would be this poorly planned. Plenty of military commentators have noted such a point (Michael Kofman as an example).

I don't follow. Why do you think that:

a) they have some hidden reserves they're keeping for a potential escalation. It'd be mighty stupid to not use them, or at least some parts of them, for the ongoing war which is going very poorly for them. Their advance is stopped and they're even losing ground on some fronts. What could they be possibly waiting for? It seems unlikely that they've taken Tochkas, T-62s and Mosin-Nagant rifles out of the museums to equip the Donetsk and Luhansk "volunteers" and other cannon fodder, or they'd be buying North Korean artillery shells and pieces, if they really had any reserves left. It's a myth that their best units were kept in reserve.

b) that a war they started, on their terms, and for which they've had at least since 2014 to prepare for, is going to be vastly different than any other conflict. If they can't prepare to invade Ukraine, which is literally a part of the same railway system (which is crucial for Russian logistics), with which they have hundreds of kms of borders to invade through, and which is almost entirely surrounded by Russian and allied land... how could they possibly prepare for anything? Russia doesn't stand a chance against Poland and Ukraine, let alone the whole of NATO.

[orwin]

What? It's Thales who produce Russia's R77M1 guidance systems and some of its avionics, and they are worst than MICAs (let's not even talk about Meteors). Russian pilots get on average less than 80 hours/year of real flights, standard in France in 140, including regular wargames against US raptors and superhornets at both Fox3 and Fox2 distance (some old videos are available on the internet of rafale f2 vs F22 raptor, it is fun to watch)(also, i write engagement distance in full letter because french standard for their rafale is confusing).

And not talking about the difference in Fox3 missiles (because Russia cannot compete), even Fox2 it's not that close, with a time to lock for MICA IM at least twice as short as Russia equivalent on the same plane (and MICAs avionics are better, so harder to evade).

But enough talk about missiles and air to air engagement. What about electronic warfare capabilities? Oh yeah, dependant on Thales designs. Also, do you expect a lot from country whose plane passive IFF isn't working? Yeah, that happened on a Su34 (so, not that old of a plane).

The S400 would prevent too much entries in Russian airspace (although we learned last year than EM disruption was enough to counter it, you still have to find it. I think S400 are better than what a lot of people now expect from Russian modern weaponry). I doubt however they would have anything other than Su57 left after two days of war against EU. And since they already lost two (or is it three?) in six months in ukraine, they only have thirteen left (including prototypes).

Also i'm not convinced of Russian nightime optics, i know they didn't hire Thales for those, but i think they should have considering it took two weeks to spot nighttime Mariupol approvisionment raids.

I'm pretty sure aerial warfare is not

[throwrqX]

Why would it matter who produces them? They would be bought where it's cheapest to buy them, that doesn't necessary mean they lack the ability to produce them domestically if needed. Russia's military expenditure adjusted for purchasing power is far more than any individual country in the EU indeed it's more than all the great powers of the EU combined. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/roiw.12536

Russia's air force pilots would be getting more combat experience compared to French pilots whose only would are less active in doing strikes in Africa and the Middle East. This applies to their armed forces in general in comparison to EU armies. I would agree their electronic warfare has been lackluster so far in Ukraine and that sanctions will continue to cause problems but in the long term I am not so sure their effect would be so great if Russia was planning years ahead. Also I would mention there's lots of Russian sympathizers in the EU and the increased amount of espionage that would occur beforehand, it would likely be a lot more brazen than it currently is. I can't find the source right now but recently I read some military commentators talking about how Russia has a much higher industrial capacity than the US currently has too. I would assume this applies to the EU. Even if they lack lots of high tech stuff they can still mass produce more lower tech fighters and so on.

I would be very cautious underestimating Russia's military ability just because of the fuck up in Ukraine. At the start people were calling it the end of the tank in the modern military too but now more wiser heads are prevailing.