[_delirium]

If, after several hundred years of trying, we haven't yet found the mythical race of "uncorruptible politician", it might be time for a plan B, like systemic changes to reduce the effects of corruption on the very-human politicians we do have (and are likely to continue having). That's essentially the campaign-finance-reform argument, that the problem isn't going to be solved by hoping that the next crop of politicians, unlike just about every crop throughout human history, will be selfless saints who don't respond to incentives; rather, the solution is to change the incentives.

[CWuestefeld]

it might be time for a plan B, like systemic changes to reduce the effects of corruption ... That's essentially the campaign-finance-reform argument

No, your response doesn't address your goal at all. CFR doesn't do a darned thing to "reduce the effects of corruption". It seeks to decrease the possible vectors of corruption (both in quantity and magnitude), but it does absolutely nothing to address the effects of corruption.

What yummyfajitas and others have been arguing is precisely for a solution to the problem you cite, the effects of corruption. That is to make it so that it matters much less how a bureaucrat gets corrupted, by stripping him of power to the greatest extent possible, so that the potential for damage he can cause is minimized.

[anigbrowl]

That so-called solution also ties the hands of honest reformers. Obstruction of regulatory function is just as subject to corruption as an excess thereof. The notion that the payor is morally pure is absurd; public choice theory shows that large entities like corporations and unions have every incentive to rig the process by exploiting the rational ignorance of the median voter.

[Gormo]

What makes it any more reasonable to suggest that it's possible to change the incentives than to suggest we can find uncorruptible politicians?

I don't think that this systemic view aligns with the campaign-finance-reform argument argument at all; the people who want money out of politics regard money itself as the root cause of the problem, but neglects to address the real underlying incentives that money - merely an abstraction of value - actually represents. If you take money out of the picture, those incentives will still exist, and still convey political advantage. Who dominates politics then, if not the wealthiest? The most well-connected? The most ruthless?

The real, underlying systemic problem is the centralized concentration of de jure power in a small set of political institutions. This will always be susceptible to concentrated influence, whether via money or otherwise.

[_delirium]

It's a good question; perhaps we can't. I think it's worth thinking about and considering if we really can't do anything to reduce likelihood or magnitude of corruption, though. The founding fathers spent a decent amount of time thinking about it in their own historical context, rather than leaving it purely to a trust that voters will punish politicians who behave badly. For example, the U.S. Constitution has written into it a prohibition on federal officeholders accepting titles of nobility, no matter how much voters like or dislike the politician in question; they just decided not to leave that question for the voters, but thought it would lead to less corruptible politics if politicians were completely banned from accepting noble titles. That at least doesn't seem to have had any particularly bad effects, though there is debate over whether it had good effects or was just symbolic anti-monarchism. It does seem vaguely analogous to some of the no-gifts clauses that have been proposed and/or implemented more recently, though the analogy isn't perfect.

[Gormo]

I think the founding fathers presumed that a certain level of corruption and abuse will always exist; their solution was to make it very difficult for any single political institution or office-holder to act autonomously, and deliberately constrained the exercise of power, so as to make effective corruption quite expensive and complicated.

Our modern trend toward increasing political centralization and removal of constraints on power is what's making corruption so lucrative and effective: if you build it, they will come.

Many of those who are most vigorously agitating for campaign finance reform want a strong and centralized federal government that isn't influenced by interests that compete with their own. But you can't have your cake and eat it too: if that's what you order, it's coming with a side of corruption (and a mixed metaphor fresh out of the blender).

[jbooth]

Well, here in the real world, there was a Citizen's United decision in 2009, and there was record-setting advertising spending from industry groups in 2010. In a midterm election.

Noone's claiming they have a perfect system, I'd be satisfied if we stopped sliding backwards.

[Gormo]

What do you mean by 'sliding backwards'?

What was wrong with the Citizen's United decision? What's wrong with high advertising spending?

Are you implying that voters are really so easily influenced by the mere volume as advertising that advertising alone is the overriding determinant of electoral success? If that's your point, isn't it actually an indictment of democracy itself?

[pnathan]

This is the solution; a system level design that assumes a level of corruption and general stupidity, then feeds incentives to help the broad spectrum of society.

[yuhong]

I remember posting this: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3161455

[afterburner]

One solution is term limits on Congress. Unfortunately, Congress votes on the bills and amendments, so it's not happening.

[anigbrowl]

We have term limits in California and there is absolutely no sign that it has led to better legislation.

[afterburner]

The goal is not better legislation; I agree term limits wouldn't do anything for that. The goal is to combat accumulation of power, which results in greater and greater corruption.