[Gormo]

What makes it any more reasonable to suggest that it's possible to change the incentives than to suggest we can find uncorruptible politicians?

I don't think that this systemic view aligns with the campaign-finance-reform argument argument at all; the people who want money out of politics regard money itself as the root cause of the problem, but neglects to address the real underlying incentives that money - merely an abstraction of value - actually represents. If you take money out of the picture, those incentives will still exist, and still convey political advantage. Who dominates politics then, if not the wealthiest? The most well-connected? The most ruthless?

The real, underlying systemic problem is the centralized concentration of de jure power in a small set of political institutions. This will always be susceptible to concentrated influence, whether via money or otherwise.

[_delirium]

It's a good question; perhaps we can't. I think it's worth thinking about and considering if we really can't do anything to reduce likelihood or magnitude of corruption, though. The founding fathers spent a decent amount of time thinking about it in their own historical context, rather than leaving it purely to a trust that voters will punish politicians who behave badly. For example, the U.S. Constitution has written into it a prohibition on federal officeholders accepting titles of nobility, no matter how much voters like or dislike the politician in question; they just decided not to leave that question for the voters, but thought it would lead to less corruptible politics if politicians were completely banned from accepting noble titles. That at least doesn't seem to have had any particularly bad effects, though there is debate over whether it had good effects or was just symbolic anti-monarchism. It does seem vaguely analogous to some of the no-gifts clauses that have been proposed and/or implemented more recently, though the analogy isn't perfect.

[Gormo]

I think the founding fathers presumed that a certain level of corruption and abuse will always exist; their solution was to make it very difficult for any single political institution or office-holder to act autonomously, and deliberately constrained the exercise of power, so as to make effective corruption quite expensive and complicated.

Our modern trend toward increasing political centralization and removal of constraints on power is what's making corruption so lucrative and effective: if you build it, they will come.

Many of those who are most vigorously agitating for campaign finance reform want a strong and centralized federal government that isn't influenced by interests that compete with their own. But you can't have your cake and eat it too: if that's what you order, it's coming with a side of corruption (and a mixed metaphor fresh out of the blender).

[jbooth]

Well, here in the real world, there was a Citizen's United decision in 2009, and there was record-setting advertising spending from industry groups in 2010. In a midterm election.

Noone's claiming they have a perfect system, I'd be satisfied if we stopped sliding backwards.

[Gormo]

What do you mean by 'sliding backwards'?

What was wrong with the Citizen's United decision? What's wrong with high advertising spending?

Are you implying that voters are really so easily influenced by the mere volume as advertising that advertising alone is the overriding determinant of electoral success? If that's your point, isn't it actually an indictment of democracy itself?