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by evouga
1520 days ago
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One aspect of entropy that I always find counterintuitive is that unlike mass, charge, etc. it is not a physical quantity. In fact, from the point of view of an experimenter with perfect information about a physical system, the entropy of the system is exactly conserved over time (as made precise by Liouville's Theorem). The Second Law survives in this setting only in the most trivial sense that a constant function does not decrease. It's only when you start making crude measurements---lumping positions into pixels, clouds of particles each with their own kinetic energy into a single scalar called "temperature," etc---that you start to see a nontrivial entropy and Second Law. Different ways of lumping microstates into macrostates will give you different (and inconsistent) notions of entropy. |
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The article describes it as a measure of hidden information in a system, which is a good description. But that's not a property of the system itself, it's a property of the observer, from whom the information is hidden.
So different observers with different information about a system will have different opinions about its entropy.
My password, for example, to me has zero entropy. I know its microstate. But it's quite secure from someone trying to guess it, and they will think it's quite high in entropy.
If all you know about a system is that it's a kilogram of air at room temperature, it will seem quite high in entropy to you, as many possible microstates are consistent with that description. But if you have godlike knowledge of the exact configuration of every particle in the container, it will seem very low in entropy to you, and that's more than just an accounting difference. Indeed you can use that information to operate a Maxwell's demon and turn the system into a heat engine, splitting the cold and hot molecules into separate spaces and extracting work as though the system really had low entropy to start with. Because it did. To you.
Most of the confusion about entropy comes from what Jaynes calls the mind projection fallacy: the tendency to treat our uncertainty about a system as a property of the system, rather than a property of ourselves.