| The way to make sense of entropy is to treat it as a subjective quantity. A subjective quantity is a function where the observer's state of knowledge is one of the input arguments. The article describes it as a measure of hidden information in a system, which is a good description. But that's not a property of the system itself, it's a property of the observer, from whom the information is hidden. So different observers with different information about a system will have different opinions about its entropy. My password, for example, to me has zero entropy. I know its microstate. But it's quite secure from someone trying to guess it, and they will think it's quite high in entropy. If all you know about a system is that it's a kilogram of air at room temperature, it will seem quite high in entropy to you, as many possible microstates are consistent with that description. But if you have godlike knowledge of the exact configuration of every particle in the container, it will seem very low in entropy to you, and that's more than just an accounting difference. Indeed you can use that information to operate a Maxwell's demon and turn the system into a heat engine, splitting the cold and hot molecules into separate spaces and extracting work as though the system really had low entropy to start with. Because it did. To you. Most of the confusion about entropy comes from what Jaynes calls the mind projection fallacy: the tendency to treat our uncertainty about a system as a property of the system, rather than a property of ourselves. |
Was hoping to see someone point this bit out.. I wish references to entropy included this piece of information more frequently. When I was first trying to understand the concept I kept thinking of it as something objective, but as you say it’s a property of the observer