[imbnwa]

>But reading that article, its main foreign assumption is that the desires of the individual Ukrainians for freedom is irrelevant. Not temporarily ignored out of pragmatism. Not disappointingly accepted due to force majeure. But rather rendered irrelevant by the desire of Russia to rule over them as subjects.

That's not what Mearsheimer said in the article:

>One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts of life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor.

[mindslight]

How does that passage disagree with what I said? By my reading, he acknowledges it only to write it off.

The problem isn't the "realist" analysis itself. It's that such analysis is being held up as a one-sided normative description to affect the actions of the larger might-makes-might of US/NATO. Applying the same standard to both - either we judge the moral merits of Ukrainian self-determination vs Russian conquering or EU/NATO is right to expand simply because they have the might to.