[duncanawoods]

Calling trench warfare stupid because of conceptual obsolescence seems suspect. It was a new problem with no obvious solution. Trench warfare in the US Civil War didn't end in such a stalemate so there wasn't much precedence, There were newer automatic weapons and a vast scale of the armies covering an entire front that hadn't been seen before.

A stalemate might have been the best available outcome at the time where other alternatives would allow enemy advances. I believe the only "solution" was the tank which had yet to be invented and it's invention was a direct consequence of the stalemate. It doesn't seem right to call someone stupid for experiencing a problem that led to an invention.

I would only call the pre-tank strategies "stupid" if the decisions discarded available information and solutions.

[hef19898]

Tactics evolved a lot during WW1, e.g. creeping barrages and shock troops. It was also the first true industrial war. It saw submarines and the first combat use of aircraft, in bombing, close air support, recon and air combat. And it let to the invention of the tank.

Haig so, for all his support pf veterans after the war, IMHO never understood what he really did. The Germans wanted a decisive battle, which they didn't get. Haig wanted a break through, which he didn't get neither. What both got, on the western front, was a war of attrition. A war the Entente could afford, and was winning. Haig saw that his break through attempts worked, just out of the wrong reasons. I never got the idea that understood that. Calling that stupid is harsh, but maybe not entirely wrong. By the way, Haig wanted to use tanks to brake through German lines, the hole should then be exploited by horse mounted cavalry.

[daveslash]

Regarding "It was also the first true industrial war", you may like this quote by Scott Westerfeld on the Wikipedia page for Dieselpunk [1]

    "But to me, World War I is the dividing point where modernity goes from 
    being optimistic to being pessimistic. Because when you put the words 
    "machine" and "gun" together, they both change. At that point, war is no 
    longer about a sense of adventure and chivalry and a way of testing your 
    nation's level of manhood; it's become industrial, and horrible."

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dieselpunk

[Zababa]

> At that point, war is no longer about a sense of adventure and chivalry and a way of testing your nation's level of manhood; it's become industrial, and horrible.

That sounds like a dangerous glorification of pre-industrial war.

[hef19898]

maybe, but the difference im scale would still be the same.

[Joker_vD]

> Haig wanted to use tanks to brake through German lines, the hole should then be exploited by horse mounted cavalry.

That makes a lot of sense actually. For example, Red Army has shrunk its cavalry dramatically during the pre- and early WW2 period, down to 13 divisions (about 80 thousand people) in favour of tank divisions... and then when the Germans came, the Soviets suddenly found themselves lacking highly mobile forces, so they reverted that decision: during the 1941, almost 110 new cavalry divisions were created. And the Soviets have been using cavalry (in form of cavalry-mechanized groups: tanks plus cavalry) throughout the rest of the WW2 precisely for the purpose of penetrating deep into the rear of the German lines and interrupting supply and reinforcement movements there. And no, they weren't charging with swords drawn, they were essentially mounted riflemen.

So Haig was pretty much on the spot: make an opening with tanks, rush into it with cavalry. Sure, mechanized corps would perhaps be better but you gotta fight with what you have.

[mcguire]

Yes and no. The problem is that in WWI, the fronts were miles deep. There were several connected trench lines backed by guarded supply, artillery, and HQ positions along with the reserves. Those breakthroughs that did happen (which never actually included cavalry, IIRC) tended to bog down, giving the enemy time to bring up reserves and counterattack.

Cavalry and machine guns don't really mix.

[hef19898]

True. Everything I saw so far doesn't show that Haig came to that conclusion put of an understanding of armored or combined arms warfare but rather from sticking to tactics he knew. And IMHO the reason why you come to a conclusion can be as important as the conclusion itself.

[anyonecancode]

> Trench warfare in the US Civil War didn't end in such a stalemate so there wasn't much precedence

I suppose this hangs on one's definition of stalemate, but I'd consider the nine months of the siege of Petersburg to qualify.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Petersburg

[duncanawoods]

Yes, I think you are right, that counts as precedent.

I was thinking of the famous battles chasing each other around the map that included entrenchment but didn't stall as significantly. I can see an argument that Petersburg is the last stand of an exhausted defeated army digging in at their capital with the attackers choosing to siege rather than purely an unsolvable tactical impasse created by entrenchment technology... but it's probably that too.

[Joker_vD]

But the actual solutions were the shock troops, you know? The tanks and the anti-tank defence kinda reached parity by the middle of the WW2, so tanks became rather ineffective at breaking through the field defences. Solution? Specifically trained infantry groups that would infiltrate and destroy the fortifications, Germans used it since the early WW2. And here's a particularly interesting document from the Soviet side (dated 1944! so it's about time of finishing the liberation of their territory) at https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BC... , here's a google-translated version:

    An instruction to the units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Volnovakhskaya Red Banner Division No. 0590 / op in addition to the previously given instructions on the preparation of assault groups (November 1, 1944).
    To the regiment commanders of the 3rd Guards Rifle Volnovakh Red Banner Division

    In addition to the previously given instructions for the preparation of assault groups, the divisional commander ORDERED:

    1. In each rifle battalion, create an assault group consisting of: a rifle company, a reconnaissance squad, a sapper squad, a chemists squad, a platoon of 45-mm guns, two heavy machine guns.

    2. For the convenience of the actions of the assault groups, divide them during the performance of combat missions into the following subgroups: barriers, blocking, cover and capture.
    Allocate sappers into the barriers subgroup, three - five submachine gunners; provide the subgroup with crampons with ropes, probes, scissors for cutting wire, whistles, small axes, small infantry shovels, extended explosive charges of three kilograms each, pointers to indicate passages.
    In the blocking subgroup, assign 3-4 sappers with universal charges, anti-tank mines or anti-tank grenades to blow up a structure or to throw grenades through an embrasure, before a platoon of shooters to deliver anti-tank mines, explosives and bottles with a combustible mixture, 2-3 chemists.
    In the cover subgroup, allocate the heavy fire weapons attached to the assault group (anti-tank rifles, 45-mm guns, heavy machine guns).
    Provide the cover subgroup with whistles, rocket launchers.
    In the capture subgroup, assign a platoon of riflemen, a reconnaissance squad, 2-3 chemists, 2-3 sappers.
    Arm the capture subgroup with grenades, knives, termite balls, bottles with a combustible mixture, smoke hand grenades.

    3. The unit commanders should conduct training sessions with the assault groups for at least 4 hours every day, during which to work out the issues of the assault group's offensive, attacks by enemy bunkers, bunkers, methods of destroying bunkers, bunkers.

    4. The composition of the assault groups should be submitted to the division headquarters by 10.00 2.11.44.

            Chief of Staff of the Division (signature) No. 0590 / op 1.11.44 

Tanks are not enough, not by a long shot, and Germans knew it by the end of the WW1. Soviets learned it by the middle of WW2.

[duncanawoods]

Given the Ludendorff offensive failed I don't think you can call stormtroopers alone a solution. High casualties, outrunning supply and obtaining territory that is hard to defend which weakens your overall position.

I don't agree that tanks had reached some ineffective impasse. Quoting wikipedia:

> By 1918, tank capabilities and tactics improved, their numbers increased and, combined with French tanks, finally helped break the stalemate. During the last 100 days of the war, Allied forces harried the Germans back using infantry supported by tanks and by close air support. By the war's end, tanks become a significant element of warfare; the proposed British Plan 1919 would have employed tanks as a primary factor in military strategy. However, the impact of tanks in World War I was less than it could have been, due to their late introduction and the inherent issues that plague implementing revolutionary technology.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trench_warfare

Plan 1919 was going to use 30,000 new faster tanks.

[oblio]

You're kind of talking past each other :-)

He's saying that tanks became less effective during WW2, at first offense was overpowering defense thanks to tanks, airplanes and improved logistics. During WW2 defense started getting closer to offense, at least on land (air power improved greatly and it was the thing which facilitated all major offensives).

For example during the Battle of Kursk German tanks couldn't break through the Soviet defense because they didn't have air superiority. The Soviets (and almost everyone else) had learned by that point how to organize an effective anti-tank defense.

[philwelch]

The Soviets also had more tanks, though.

[oblio]

They had a much higher ratio during Barbarossa ;-)

[hef19898]

The Kaiser Schlacht succeeded in braking through. By doing so it also succeeded in out running logistics, moving troops from the highly sophisticated and fortified Hindenburg line and extending the front line by a lot. I would call it tactically successful, strategically stupid. But by then Germany had already lost, so the overall impact on the course of the war was rather limited if you ask me.

[hef19898]

A lesson the Turkish army learned the hard way by losing a couple of Leopard 2s.