Hi Sarah from Open Privacy / Cwtch team here - the main major difference is that Cwtch servers are completely untrusted under the risk model - they don't learn anything about the groups they are hosting, who is a member of which group, or who each message is for.
Metadata resistant group comms is still a fairly large open research problem, and we are also working on the research side to reduce some of the bandwidth requirements that are currently required by our group protocol: https://git.openprivacy.ca/openprivacy/niwl
On Android we implement a background service that will wake up periodically and either use the active tor connection or start a new one if the kernel has stopped it for any reason - and also reconnects the UI. This makes Cwtch connections fairly stable on android devices - even for p2p.
However, it also means that Cwtch on Android is fairly battery intensive. We provide a way to easily shutdown Cwtch completely for this reason - and we are researching ways to minimize power consumption (both through tor optimizations and alternative anonymous communication networks)
The design for groups is still in flux, and they are marked experimental but there are a few more details in our Secure Development Handbook https://docs.openprivacy.ca/cwtch-security-handbook/groups.h...
Metadata resistant group comms is still a fairly large open research problem, and we are also working on the research side to reduce some of the bandwidth requirements that are currently required by our group protocol: https://git.openprivacy.ca/openprivacy/niwl