[godelski]

Fine, go STAR or Score/Range. Honestly I prefer those systems (in that order and I'd argue most people that are pro cardinal systems have that same preference[0]). Nice benefit is that people can bullet vote and we collapse to Approval which is a "good enough" system.

> but would still strongly prefer over one-or-more other candidates?

In fact, this is why I argue for STAR or score. It encodes information for better than a ranked (ordinal) system. In any ranked system you encode your preference with equidistant from one another. Where as when you score you can indicate a much stronger preference.

Here's an example. Let's say I REALLY like candidate A, moderately like candidate B, and strongly dislike candidate C.

Ranked:

A > B > C (with my encoding I'm saying that my preference of A over B is the same as my preference of B over C)

Scoring

A: 10, B: 7, C:0 (with this encoding I can indicate that my preference of A over B is not as large as my preference of B over C. Obviously we are capturing more information here)

Let's just encode information better, I agree. But also let's consider other factors like how easy it is to count the votes (which every cardinal system is going to beat ranked systems).

[0] That same preference where the distance between STAR, Score, and Approval is smaller than the distance between preference of Approval over IRV (e.g. STAR: 10, Score: 8, Approval: 7, IRV: 3, Plurality: 0).

[ad8e]

Small correction: The term "bullet voting" means voting for one candidate only (001000), rather than voting 0 or 1 on each candidate (101011). It is caused by low engagement from the voters, who only take the time to learn about one candidate, their favorite. It has been a problem for approval voting in practice, and it is unclear to what extent it affects score methods in practice.

I think STAR is slightly worse than Score, is comparable to Approval, is much better than IRV, and is likely better than Condorcet methods. STAR has some odd behavior which can be explored in a 3-person race. Score has less-problematic behavior caused by risk-taking with equilibrium voters (not like voters behave in any way similar to Nash equilibria though, and who knows what the real-world behavior will be).

However, STAR's main benefit may be in overcoming political resistance, if its properties are simpler to convince voters. Majority criterion sounds nice even when it is inefficient. Much like Top Trading Cycles losing to Gale-Shapley in school choice algorithms (excluding Boston).

[ClayShentrup]

There is absolutely no evidence that bullet voting has been a problem with approval voting.

https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo.html

> I think STAR is slightly worse than Score

I would say they are probably roughly equal, but the best computer modeling we have shows that star tends to perform a little better.

https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic/

> However, STAR's main benefit may be in overcoming political resistance, if its properties are simpler to convince voters. Majority criterion sounds nice even when it is inefficient.

You're definitely correct on this.

[ad8e]

Out of respect for you taking the time to respond, I will elaborate my claims more specifically. My assertion regarding bullet voting is isolated to elections where the voting body cannot be bothered to engage carefully, because they barely care about the race. In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure. The bullet voting comparison I am making is between Score and Approval; I think Score will face less bullet voting than Approval does.

A typical example where bullet voting should occur is a down-ballot election. Examples of low-engagement elections at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Other_organiza... bear out that these elections degrade in behavior to plurality. However, it can't be determined just from this behavior that IRV or Condorcet would do any better.

> https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo.html

1-3 have major engagement from voters and I do not expect approval voting to suffer unduly from bullet voting. 4, an alumni association, should. However, the question then becomes, what about other voting methods? Because if the voter has weak information on the other candidates, he may simply bullet vote under all voting methods. In this context, Score needs testing. Voting values between 0 and 1 would give a much better idea of how voter engagement is affecting their votes, rather than their second choice always collapsing to zero. This is why I claim that it is "unclear to what extent it affects score methods in practice". Granular cardinal scores in even one such election would mean a lot for determining voter behavior.

I do not support FairVote's arguments and consider them dishonest. Notice that in my original post, I carefully describe bullet voting as a consequence of low engagement, which is supported by past real-world low-engagement elections. This is very distinct from FairVote's arguments, which are not sophisticated and demonstrate a willingness to make blind claims. The distortions that FairVote argues for require more justification than they give.

> https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic/

I don't believe much in that simulation. While I agree with your characterization of it as the "best computer modeling" in voting theory, it would still be considered a fatally flawed paper under the standards of most fields, and I faced some heavy obstacles when trying to analyze it. I think this field needs more/better academics. I described some of my objections at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27612876

[ClayShentrup]

> In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure.

A robust cross-system analysis shows that approval voting is more robust to strategy than almost any other method. Most ranked voting methods, for example, fail the favorite betrayal criterion.

https://electionscience.org/library/tactical-voting-basics/

[ad8e]

But nothing I said is about strategy. It is about apathy.