[ClayShentrup]

There is absolutely no evidence that bullet voting has been a problem with approval voting.

https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo.html

> I think STAR is slightly worse than Score

I would say they are probably roughly equal, but the best computer modeling we have shows that star tends to perform a little better.

https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic/

> However, STAR's main benefit may be in overcoming political resistance, if its properties are simpler to convince voters. Majority criterion sounds nice even when it is inefficient.

You're definitely correct on this.

[ad8e]

Out of respect for you taking the time to respond, I will elaborate my claims more specifically. My assertion regarding bullet voting is isolated to elections where the voting body cannot be bothered to engage carefully, because they barely care about the race. In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure. The bullet voting comparison I am making is between Score and Approval; I think Score will face less bullet voting than Approval does.

A typical example where bullet voting should occur is a down-ballot election. Examples of low-engagement elections at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Other_organiza... bear out that these elections degrade in behavior to plurality. However, it can't be determined just from this behavior that IRV or Condorcet would do any better.

> https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo.html

1-3 have major engagement from voters and I do not expect approval voting to suffer unduly from bullet voting. 4, an alumni association, should. However, the question then becomes, what about other voting methods? Because if the voter has weak information on the other candidates, he may simply bullet vote under all voting methods. In this context, Score needs testing. Voting values between 0 and 1 would give a much better idea of how voter engagement is affecting their votes, rather than their second choice always collapsing to zero. This is why I claim that it is "unclear to what extent it affects score methods in practice". Granular cardinal scores in even one such election would mean a lot for determining voter behavior.

I do not support FairVote's arguments and consider them dishonest. Notice that in my original post, I carefully describe bullet voting as a consequence of low engagement, which is supported by past real-world low-engagement elections. This is very distinct from FairVote's arguments, which are not sophisticated and demonstrate a willingness to make blind claims. The distortions that FairVote argues for require more justification than they give.

> https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic/

I don't believe much in that simulation. While I agree with your characterization of it as the "best computer modeling" in voting theory, it would still be considered a fatally flawed paper under the standards of most fields, and I faced some heavy obstacles when trying to analyze it. I think this field needs more/better academics. I described some of my objections at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27612876

[ClayShentrup]

> In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure.

A robust cross-system analysis shows that approval voting is more robust to strategy than almost any other method. Most ranked voting methods, for example, fail the favorite betrayal criterion.

https://electionscience.org/library/tactical-voting-basics/

[ad8e]

But nothing I said is about strategy. It is about apathy.