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It looks like "reserve requirement" is at most 100% -- so if Archeologist misbehaves, they only lose a small multiple of the contract fees? This seems pretty crazy even you fully buy into rational actors model. Here is a simple hypothetical: Let's say me + my partner have a DeFi startup, and we have $1,000,000 worth of cryptocurrency in cold storage, protected by multisig. In order to prevent money from being lost if something happens, I want my partner to get a key if I die. A regular centralized safety deposit box is $100/year, but I don't trust it, so I set up this "sarcophagus" thing with $10,000 as bounty, to incentivize the archeologist nodes. Assume that my partner is not actually trustworthy, and they want to steal the money. So they contact Archeologists nodes directly, and offer them 10% of "corpse" value if they unwrap early. What would a rational economic actor do? From my reading the paper, it would be in their interest to _defect_ and unwrap earlier. They are going to lose their bond ($10,000 + 10%) and their reserve requirement will raise a bit -- but not too much if they don't do this frequently. And they will gain 10% of corpse value, or $100,000 in this example. So it looks like this scheme is really not useful for any sort of high-value secrets? |
It's even worse becuase if you were in contact with the nodes directly you could simulate unwrapping on a fork - here they would not suffer any economic consequences.
On the other hand there's no guarentee your partner can contact any of the node owners. The protocol doesn't provide a mechanism, nor does ethereum so it only takes 1 to not respond.