[22c]

Yes, honestly, you should assume that the recipient is also an archaeologist.

If you do not trust the recipient to act with your best interests at heart, do not use this service. I think that should probably be explained better in the documentation.

[theamk]

But if I trust the recipient, why would I need this service? Just send the email and ask not to open until I die.

[22c]

Do you also trust that the recipient will keep their emails secure?

Edit: Moreover, if we assume that there could be a bad actor that wants to know your secret, you have now endangered that 3rd party by giving them your secret.

Again, another scenario: You might trust that 3rd party now, but not in a years time (when, hopefully, you're still alive). Well, the good news is, you never revealed your secret to that 3rd party and you have no obligation to continue making them the recipient of your secret.

[theamk]

> You might trust that 3rd party now, but not in a years time (when, hopefully, you're still alive)

Then you don't want blockchain-based technology. Remember, the data is still on the chain, and can never be deleted - the paper is pretty clear about it.

So in a year's time if the 3rd party contacts the archeologist, they can arrange to truncate the chain and unseal the key. Yes, the archeologist is not going to get paid on-chain by the protocol, but the secret is still out.

Really looks like the bank's safe deposit is a much better solution if your data is valuable.

[22c]

I still think you might be throwing the baby out with the bathwater; though I admit there's a lot more bathwater than baby, especially when compared with first glance.