| Way back when I saw a report on hackernews about secret exposure from websites that deployed directly via a git repo as a webroot and didn't block access to .git/ I added a cheeky message to my site's .git/ folder if you attempted to view it. About 2 or 3 months later I started getting "security reports" to the catch all, about an exposed git folder that was leaking my website's secrets. Apparently because my site didn't return 404, their script assumed i was exposed and they oh so helpfully reported it to me. Got like 4 or 5 before i decided to make it 404 so they would stop, mainly because i didn't want to bring false positive fatigue on to "security exploit" subject line emails. I have a feeling CNAs are bringing this kind of low effort zero regard for false positive fatigue bullshit to CVEs. Might as well just rip that bandaid off now and stop trusting anything besides the debian security mailing list. |
I've seen reports that easily fail the airtight hatchway [0] tests in a variety of ways. Long cookie expiration? Report. Any cookie doesn't have `Secure`, including something like `accepted_cookie_permissions`? Report. Public access to an Amazon S3 bucket used to serve downloads for an app? Report. WordPress installed? You'll get about 5 reports for things like having the "pingback" feature enabled, having an API on the Internet, and more.
The issue is that CVEs and prior-art bug bounty payments seem "authoritative" and once they exist, they're used as reference material for submitting reports like this. It teaches new security researchers that the wrong things are vulnerabilities, which is just raising a generation of researchers that look for the entirely wrong things.
[0]: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20060508-22/?p=31...