[btmorex]

I encourage everyone to never, ever fly a 737 MAX under any circumstances. Boeing has not been sufficiently punished (as in their future behavior will change). If people refuse to fly the 737 MAX, hopefully they go bankrupt and the existing management can be replaced.

[na85]

They do too much business on the Defence side of things for this to bankrupt them.

[chance_state]

> If people refuse to fly the 737 MAX, hopefully they go bankrupt and the existing management can be replaced.

Lol.

As if Boeing would ever be allowed to go out of business.

[Aloha]

Why would I refuse to fly in a perfectly safe airplane?

I'm not punishing Boeing, I'm punishing Southwest and American Airlines at that point - and probably myself too, as I live immensely close to DFW (I just heard an airplane land).

[caconym_]

This "perfectly safe airplane" has been grounded for almost two years after two crashes killed 346 people. The root cause of these crashes is a mind-bogglingly irresponsible bit of design that can be linked directly to decision makers at Boeing deciding to prioritize corporate profits over human lives.

I don't have a hard time believing that we won't see any more MCAS-related trim runaway accidents after the scrutiny of the past two years, but what evidence do we have that the dysfunctional leadership behind this particular flaw is the exception rather than the rule?

When the Max was flying, it was still extremely unlikely that you'd die on one, but dying is a pretty big deal (to me, at least). For the foreseeable future, I'll be choosing alternatives to Boeing when they're available.

[throwaway201103]

Problems are easy to see in retrospect. You could have made similar arguments after every air crash that was caused by a design flaw.

These problems are found, fixed, lessons learned, new rules enacted, and we move on.

[salawat]

No, no they weren't.

The problems we have is an organization tasked with transporting millions over the timespan of a year at speeds approaching Mach 1 ended up in tge position whereby financial growth outpaced it's primary reason for existence. To manufacture and support the distribution, operation, and uptake of safe passenger airplanes.

Until you get rid of that modus operandi from the upper management, you'll not see a significant culture change.

[Gibbon1]

One thing I noticed about VW, their management culture changed a bit after the German government tossed a couple of managers in prison.

I think the key thing is a fine is always just another line on the spreadsheet.

[caconym_]

> You could have made similar arguments after every air crash that was caused by a design flaw.

I'm not really convinced this is true. For instance, in the classic case of de Havilland Comets brought down by square windows, I think it was an honest mistake that happened because pressurized cabins were new-ish tech. They worked to understand the problem and fixed the design. Nobody was trying to cut corners AFAIK (no pun intended).

I guess we could make another category where an iffy design is made to fail by corner-cutting on the part of the airlines, as in the MD-80 pitch trim jackscrew issues.

The MAX is a case of the actual aircraft manufacturer explicitly compromising the design of a safety feature because they knew it would help them sell more planes (due to avoiding training/recertification requirements). IIRC, the investigation revealed a consistent pattern of negligence and outright malfeasance on Boeing's part to this effect. I wouldn't say this kind of thing has never happened before, but off the top of my head I have to assume it's pretty rare.

[WalterBright]

> The MAX is a case of the actual aircraft manufacturer explicitly compromising the design of a safety feature because they knew it would help them sell more planes

The error was not in the concept of the MAX nor the concept of the MCAS. The problem was twofold:

1. MCAS should have used inputs from both AOA sensors, rather than just one. MCAS had too much authority over the travel, and it should have deactivated itself if the pilots repeatedly countermanded it.

2. The pilots were not trained properly in emergency procedures with the stab trim. Boeing put out an Emergency Airworthiness Directive after the first crash with explicit instructions on how to deal with it, but the EA pilots did not follow those instructions.

https://theaircurrent.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/B737-MA...

[eganist]

> The error was not in the concept of the MAX nor the concept of the MCAS.

The reason MCAS was introduced in the first place was because the platform that Boeing chose to extend (to avoid recertification requirements) was unstable as a result of the introduction of CFM's new LEAP engines.

They insisted on correcting an emergent hardware defect with software in order to reuse an old platform to compete against a surprise threat from Airbus rather than design an inherently safe, novel platform.

All to save time and money getting to production.

I.e. all for profit.

As for the emergency procedures Boeing drafted after Lion Air, they apparently were attempted: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boein... — and more recently https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/04/ethiopian-airl...

[dTal]

>The pilots were not trained properly in emergency procedures with the stab trim. Boeing put out an Emergency Airworthiness Directive after the first crash with explicit instructions on how to deal with it, but the EA pilots did not follow those instructions.

If the planes are still crashing after the "problem" was fixed, then that wasn't the problem.

(Specifically - the "emergency procedures" in question are "what to do if your plane randomly decides to fly you into the ground". The only way to save your skin is to take a specific emergency action within a time window of a few seconds. This is not a reasonable design.)

[adriancr]

Thing is boeing made incredibly bad decisions that should have been avoided given current rules and procedures.

That was only done due to concern for profits and not due to any engineering flaws. (MCAS existing in the first place, it didnt have reliable sensors, pilots were not instructed on it)

How would you react if a loved one died due to boeing or any company greed?

Cynic in me is hoping this is only allowed to fly in the US until it proves safe and boeing execs and employees are forced on every damn flight.

[bronson]

Iterating works well with software but not so well with airplanes.

And, you must admit that Boeing has shown utter disregard for rules through this process.

[eganist]

Southwest and AA would be incentivized to pursue recourse if it turns out their faith was placed in a product as a result of deception or fraud... but this is even more true if consumers punish the airlines for falling victim to such deception in the first place.