[edh649]

I would highly highly recommend this podcast. I've listened to every single episode from phase 2 (from episode 114), and a large majority of those from phase 1. I believe listening to this podcast should almost be mandatory for any engineer involved with any form of safety system.

For those interested in the engineering side of the scandal, phase 2 is amazing listening. The amount of detail the enquiry goes into is incredible. The number of failings across the construction industry with this project from architecture to fire consultants to insulation providers is shocking, but despite this you can also see why those failings occured at the time. The enquirers are knowledgeable and ask extremely probing questions, you can almost hear witnesses squirm.

Phase 1 is worth listening to part of, it's all about what happened on the night, the fire service response and failings, call center communication, broken lifts, inadequate equipment and more. However, it is very heavy and depressing listening, and quite repetitive (Phase 1 the podcast was done each day of the enquiry, phase 2 is done weekly).

[jka]

Do you remember whether there's much coverage of the vendor selection and evaluation process that led to the choice of cladding?

One suspicion I have is that these companies may rebrand and continue to operate under different names.

What I wonder as a result is: when future evaluation processes take place, would decision-makers make the connection to formerly-operating-as company names?

I think and hope that the processes are thorough enough to uncover simple avoidance techniques like that, but I also think it's wise not to assume that the process is foolproof.

(I'd also wonder whether many web search engines currently perform this kind of second-order entity name resolution automatically)

[edh649]

There certainly is! Initial architecture selections were based around appearance and price, and in fact specified a zinc fire-resistant cladding. But due to ‘value engineering’ (read: cost cutting) this was switched to aluminium (flammable) cladding. The architects didn’t specify exact materials, they thought this would be done by the design and build contractors, who knew nothing about cladding and outsourced. The facades contractor got a heavily discounted price from the cladding suppliers, but didn’t believe it was their responsibility to check it met fire regulations, especially considering the cladding promotional literature said it was suitable. Then, pet way through the building process there was a shortage of the original insulation, and so another insulation was substituted in. At no point were the engineers/designers informed, and the on site surveyor from building control did not realise. In addition to this the installers were installing things the wrong way round, upside down, improperly cut and attached etc. The failings go on and on...

Re rebranding I think the industry would be aware enough. Despite the tests having been frauded previously, they would need to be redone under new company names at great expense, fraudulently or not. The more likely course I suspect is companies rebranding existing products and claiming new chemical formulas. (As was already done by Celotex: https://www.bdonline.co.uk/insulation-used-on-grenfell-refur...)

[jka]

Thanks, very informative! It sounds like the kind of environment where blame-shifting was easy and no-one felt responsible. I'll try to catch up on some of the podcast episodes.

The rebranding question is still a bit of a question to me, even if industry will remember and if there are dis-incentives around it (i.e. the product line re-testing you mention, which might be still be a worthwhile dodge depending on the expected reputation cost - it probably affects hiring and job retention and various other things as well as industry perception and sales).