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by qsort
2039 days ago
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No offense but this is only a slightly refurbished version the "videogames make us murderers" type of argument. Those are extraordinary claims, and as such require extraordinary proof, when in fact no correlation (let alone causation) exists. It's like claiming "it's unwise to brush aside any argument that reading HN makes your skin turn green", it's entirely baseless; I don't understand why the burden of proof should rest on me. There's an argument that some themes might be less palatable to some people, but that effectively comes down to personal preferences. For example, I personally hold the view that lotteries and similar games are unethical, but is it really fair of me to cast those who play such games as "objectively immoral"? |
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I agree, which is why I have provided several resources to engage with the philosophical (and by following references, psychological and sociological) literature on the topic of the intersection between violent video games, morality, and (more dubiously and controversially) real world behavior here[0]. The arguments go for and against, but no author to my knowledge has argued that video games and their players do not at least qualify for moral consideration. Furthermore, these arguments are sometimes agnostic regarding major meta-ethical positions. Is this the kind of base for the argument you're looking for?
>For example, I personally hold the view that lotteries and similar games are unethical, but is it really fair of me to cast those who play such games as "objectively immoral"?
There's some concept shuffling here which does not accurately get to the heart of morality and moral resposibility. The word 'morality' is generally used in a normative sense (consider war, vegetarianism, killing, advertising, the environment, etc. as topics we frequently speak of in the normative sense), but your usage of the concept in describing lotteries as unethical targets the descriptive sense - a code accepted by an individual or a community[1].
The normative sense, which I believe the article and GP targets, concerns a code that would be accepted and followed by all rational people given access to moral facts (and processes of deliberation). Those facts may be deducible a priori (but need not be). This is the same sense in which someone might say "you should not do X".
Moral judgements may also imply moral responsibility - not only should you "not do X" as a rational person, but you are in some way responsible if you do do X. Moral responsibility pertaining to both meanings of morality is widely (but not unanimously) accepted by philosophers.
Building on moral responsibility, we finally reach moral blameworthiness, which allows us to "cast those who play games" one way or the other, or reserve judgement.
There are quate a few steps between [deducing that some video games, and indeed playing them, is morally significant] to [casting someone as 'objectively immoral']. Ask, however, that if there is an argument showing that torture is wrong, would we be justified in labelling a torturer with full mental and rational capacity and access to moral facts to be "objectively immoral"? If so, why wouldn't we be able to say the same if the papers I have cited make convincing arguments about video games and players of video games?
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25187823
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/