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by n3k5
2056 days ago
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I gave an intuition for how it can happen that combining algorithms (in a bad way) results in weaker encryption — without claiming that it must always happen. If we move the goalposts to where the combined algorithm receives a much larger key than any of the individual parts we're comparing to in terms of crackability, then the likely failure mode isn't ‘weaker’ any more, but ‘stronger, though maybe not as much stronger as was intended’. The history of triple DES provides a nice practical example: ‘double DES’ isn't a thing because encrypting already-DES-encrypted data with DES again, with a completely separate key (thus effectively doubling the size of the key), does almost nothing to improve security. |
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A typical example is the crapto-1 Mifare Classic algorithm used to encrypt NFC cards. The way they read from the shift register and combine the bits was dumb and it's complexity weakened the algorithm.
Another I've seen is using two sequential keys XORd against one another to produce and "encryption" key. Turns out reading from low entropic systems very quickly yields a similar enough key that when XORd, partially removes the first one.