[arashf]

you're right in that all these things are theoretically possible in a system where the encryption key is not stored client-side. I don't know of many services that advertise every way in which their systems could be compromised. I think you'd be hard pressed to find a company doing this. in the case of google - is there a document explaining all the places your email could end up?

we believe that what we advertise is in our userbase's best interest. in theory, we could generate a lengthy document attempting to explain every possible way dropbox could be compromised. but in practice, discussing these extremely unlikely theoretical vulnerabilities would generate undue fear. as an ironic sidenote: this thread was spawned by an attempt we made to clarify our handling of court orders (see: http://www.businessinsider.com/dropbox-updates-security-term... )

I say "undue fear" for a couple reasons. first and foremost because we are vigilant about making sure that user data is never compromised. our reputation would be permanently damaged if dropbox is compromised. we have a lot of smart, security conscious people making sure data in dropbox is safe.

we're also listening to feedback we've been hearing from the community on things we can do to improve security. a couple concrete examples: we're working on better protecting the authentication token (config.db) so that gaining access to a dropbox account on a compromised machine is much more difficult. similarly we're working on a performant way to transmit file metadata over SSL on the mobile apps.

secondly, we believe that storing data in dropbox is far more safe than the alternatives. we've designed dropbox to protect user data against threats of all kinds, but we've focused the most on helping users avoid the most common threats to their data: not having any backups at all, not having current backups, accidentally deleting files, losing hours of work, leaving files on the wrong computer, losing a USB drive with sensitive info, protecting from curious snoopers on the dorm network, etc.

for all the talk of security issues in the last few weeks, we're not aware of anybody having been affected by these theoretical vulnerabilities. on the flip side, we have (literally) saved thousands of college kids from losing their theses :-).

[rakkhi]

Arash good security is about mitigating theoretical risks before they become actual.

I am most disappointed in Dropbox because you had made statements like all our data is AES encrypted and our staff do not have access to your data. These are clearly incomplete for the former and are plainly not true for the latter. They are misleading and un-ethical in that they have assisted you in gaining you all these customers. As stated above you should clearly stop using security as selling point and only state you provide security in transit (https) or actually put in place technical measures to make those statements true.

Personally I will no longer be recommending Dropbox and will instead recommend your competitors including changing my answers on Quora: http://www.quora.com/Dropbox?q=dropbox

[JoachimSchipper]

Really, dropbox is probably more secure than most complainers' computers; but when you say things like

    - All transmission of file data occurs over an encrypted channel (SSL).
    - All files stored on Dropbox servers are encrypted (AES-256)

and this turns out to mean "file metadata may not be encrypted" and "all files stored on Dropbox servers are encrypted with the same key (AES-256)"... well, people are going to call "snake oil".

[chernevik]

This is a discussion of the consistency of advertised security claims with disclosures about availability of data to government subpoena.

In that context, statements like "we believe that what we advertise is in our userbase's best interest" make my ears prick up. I'm not a crypto expert, but this sort of thing does not seem like a straightforward response to the OP.

[caf]

The point is that these are the kinds of claims you should be making in the marketing. Users are smart enough to understand "We are vigilant about making sure that user data is never compromised". You shouldn't be trying to bamboozle them with official-sounding acronyms like AES - that when it comes down to it, mean little.

[halostatue]

There are classes of users who will consider it snake oil if well-known encryption algorithm names aren't used, because it implies home-grown encryption.

[techiferous]

"Our reputation would be permanently damaged if dropbox is compromised."

This is why I trust DropBox with my data: because I'm a paying customer. That means our goals are aligned.

[jwr]

But you are not Google, and I expect you to have higher standards. Don't take Google as the reference data point, it's a fairly low one as far as reference data points go.

On a related note, Dropbox is not the only company that advertises security even though what really is offered is kind-of-security. See Backblaze, for example — yes, the data is (supposedly) encrypted using my private key, which (supposedly) only stays on my machine, but I can't be sure because it isn't auditable, and to do a restore I have to supply my private key to the Backblaze website, instead of using a local decryption tool. Not good.

[bxr]

>we're not aware of anybody having been affected by these theoretical vulnerabilities. on the flip side, we have (literally) saved thousands of college kids from losing their theses

I like the idea of what your service does, but this statement just advertizes the success of one feature to back up the failings of another.

If you just want to offer file storage, just set up an http-only svn server and be done with it.

If you want to offer proper encryption, do so, or don't say that you do.