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by NotSammyHagar
2126 days ago
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Without knowing about the implementation, I can speculate (always dangerous ;-)) that the web browser exploit potential is loading a web page, the elements, html, js, images, nested loading of other stuff. So the danger is some kind of crash in the code that evaluates these resources and then stack-overflow kind of deal gets your machine to do something, kind of like a regular browser risk, and there's no hardening against it. This sounds like a capability I want for emacs though, I wonder if there's some way to make it safer; I could create a separate account and ssh in from my main session and run emacs. If I set my display variable to display from fakeme to real me what xwindows risks do I incur? I've never understood that level. |
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You make a good point about X. I don't know a great deal about its security either, and most of what I do know comes from jwz's various salty comments about the risks of poorly implemented screen lockers. Based on that, and for whatever it's worth, the strong impression I have of X server security is that, for any client permitted to connect in the first place, there is likewise little to none of it.
It's been a while since I looked in detail at Emacs' xlib integration. But it's evidently comprehensive enough for EXWM to exist, and looking at the EXWM readme, I find it's based on a pure-Lisp X protocol implementation. So I assume that anything an X client can ask an X server to do, you can ask an X server to do from within Emacs, and you don't even need that Emacs to have been specially compiled with support for the protocol - you just need it to evaluate some Lisp, and you're off and running.
I think I'll stick with eww for the foreseeable future.