[throwanem]

Yeah, I think the attack surface would be in the integration. The Emacs developers are very good in general, but I don't know if they're well placed to address the security concerns of a browser integration, especially in such an otherwise laissez-faire platform as Emacs. Webkit should be pretty secure, I'd expect, but that only helps until you get to where Webkit and Emacs interact in Emacs' own process space.

You make a good point about X. I don't know a great deal about its security either, and most of what I do know comes from jwz's various salty comments about the risks of poorly implemented screen lockers. Based on that, and for whatever it's worth, the strong impression I have of X server security is that, for any client permitted to connect in the first place, there is likewise little to none of it.

It's been a while since I looked in detail at Emacs' xlib integration. But it's evidently comprehensive enough for EXWM to exist, and looking at the EXWM readme, I find it's based on a pure-Lisp X protocol implementation. So I assume that anything an X client can ask an X server to do, you can ask an X server to do from within Emacs, and you don't even need that Emacs to have been specially compiled with support for the protocol - you just need it to evaluate some Lisp, and you're off and running.

I think I'll stick with eww for the foreseeable future.

[NotSammyHagar]

So on regular old linux with xwindows like ubuntu or whatever, suppose I want to use this new deal and also I now don't trust X as well as emacs itself. I create another user that can't SU, and I vnc into a new session, and run dangerous-emacs. You could make the history and text files readable from your main user.

So now VNC is your trust boundary. I should try eww again too.