[hakka-nyu-su]

> The legal fight focused on the definition of “sex” in Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]. The plaintiffs, along with civil rights groups and many large companies, had argued that discriminating against gay and transgender workers was inherently based on their sex and consequently was illegal.

So there's a difference in philosophy between 'textualists' who interpret the meaning of the text, and in particular what the word 'sex' implies, versus 'originalists' who look of the intent of the legislators in 1964.

[hirundo]

The dominant school of originalists are the "public meaning" originalists. They hold that the original public meaning gives notice to the public about how to obey the law, where the original intent does not, since most people can't be expected to know what the intent was. Gorsuch is a leader of the public meaning approach.

[notahacker]

The interesting thing about Gorsuch's opinion considering his reputation is that he specifically focuses on applying the logical implications (if a company would not fire a person for being in a relationship with a man if they were female, clearly firing a man for doing so treats sexes differently) to the Civil Rights Act text rather than likely 1964 understanding of its intent and actually rules out the probable lack of consideration of LGBT issues by the original framers as a relevant factor.

[LudwigNagasena]

Originalists and textualists would interpret “sex” the same way. Unless you think that Civil Rights Act of 1964 implied protections for gay and transgender people in that very time and was misinterpreted by everyone (which is very unlikely).

The people who support the idea that “sex discrimination” can be interpreted as including gay discrimination and trans discrimination adhere to “loose constructionism” and think that constitution and laws can change their meaning without being formally updated.